Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction
SAGE, 1996年8月13日 - 264 頁
`This is an admirable book which can be recommended to students with confidence, and is likely also to become an indispensable source of reference for those researching fact construction' - Discourse & Society
How is reality manufactured? The idea of social construction has become a commonplace of much social research, yet precisely what is constructed, and how, and even what constructionism means, is often unclear or taken for granted. In this major work, Jonathan Potter offers a fascinating tour of the central themes raised by these questions.
Representing Reality overviews the different traditions in constructionist thought. Points are illustrated throughout with varied and engaging examples taken from newspaper stories, relationship counselling sessions, accounts of the paranormal, social workers' assessments of violent parents, informal talk between programme makers, political arguments and everyday conversations. Ranging across the social and human sciences, this book provides a lucid introduction to several key strands of work that have overturned the way we think about facts and descriptions, including: the sociology of scientific knowledge; conversation analysis and ethnomethodology; and semiotics, post-structuralism and postmodernism.
第 6 到 10 筆結果，共 36 筆
Looked at in this way science becomes a 'hard case' against which to test an
argument about the constructed nature of ... Although much ofit is characterized
as the sociology ofscience, or the sociology of scientific knowledge, in the last
figure in the sociology of science who was most involved in formulating and
attempting to answer these questions was Robert Merton (1970, 1973). I will take
his solutions in turn. Norms and the Scientific Ethos Merton wanted to understand
That is, norms can be seen as one element in the persuasive armoury that
scientists draw on when they are arguing ... Before focusing directly on that,
however, I will turn to the other major feature of Mertonian sociology of science,
which is its ...
Given this selfimposed limit on analysis it is perhaps not surprising that the
crucial developments that paved the way to a full social study of scientific facts
came from philosophy and history of science rather than sociology. Philosophy
Quine suggested that scientific beliefs should be regarded as stretched in a fabric
, rather like the skin ofa drum. ... While sociologists were led away from concerns
with the content of scientific knowledge by Mertonian ideas, philosophers were ...
讀者評論 - 撰寫評論
7 Working Up Representations
8 Criticizing Facts