Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction
SAGE, 1996年8月13日 - 264 頁
`This is an admirable book which can be recommended to students with confidence, and is likely also to become an indispensable source of reference for those researching fact construction' - Discourse & Society
How is reality manufactured? The idea of social construction has become a commonplace of much social research, yet precisely what is constructed, and how, and even what constructionism means, is often unclear or taken for granted. In this major work, Jonathan Potter offers a fascinating tour of the central themes raised by these questions.
Representing Reality overviews the different traditions in constructionist thought. Points are illustrated throughout with varied and engaging examples taken from newspaper stories, relationship counselling sessions, accounts of the paranormal, social workers' assessments of violent parents, informal talk between programme makers, political arguments and everyday conversations. Ranging across the social and human sciences, this book provides a lucid introduction to several key strands of work that have overturned the way we think about facts and descriptions, including: the sociology of scientific knowledge; conversation analysis and ethnomethodology; and semiotics, post-structuralism and postmodernism.
第 6 到 10 筆結果，共 65 筆
This provides a developed research example where one class of descriptions (
accounts) can be understood as performing a particular action, and having
features that facilitate the performance of that action. The loose tradition of
Chapter 4 is a linking chapter which provides brief illustrations of the themes that
are developed in detail in the following three chapters. This could be read as an
introduction to what comes later and stands as a relatively compact summary of ...
In an extension ofthis argument, Merton suggested that modern science is
sustained by a more developed set of puritan values, which he called the norms
ofscience. The argument is that modern science is constrained by four particular
In the 1950s, the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine developed
Duhem's ideas about the interconnection of beliefs and the role of experience
into a famous metaphor, often elaborated as the Quine-Duhem thesis (1961; see
Kuhn's community-based model of science was not the only one developed by
philosophers. For example, Imre Lakatos (J970) argued that the central social
unit for doing science is the 'research programme': a developing series of studies
讀者評論 - 撰寫評論
7 Working Up Representations
8 Criticizing Facts