Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction
SAGE, 1996年8月13日 - 264 頁
`This is an admirable book which can be recommended to students with confidence, and is likely also to become an indispensable source of reference for those researching fact construction' - Discourse & Society
How is reality manufactured? The idea of social construction has become a commonplace of much social research, yet precisely what is constructed, and how, and even what constructionism means, is often unclear or taken for granted. In this major work, Jonathan Potter offers a fascinating tour of the central themes raised by these questions.
Representing Reality overviews the different traditions in constructionist thought. Points are illustrated throughout with varied and engaging examples taken from newspaper stories, relationship counselling sessions, accounts of the paranormal, social workers' assessments of violent parents, informal talk between programme makers, political arguments and everyday conversations. Ranging across the social and human sciences, this book provides a lucid introduction to several key strands of work that have overturned the way we think about facts and descriptions, including: the sociology of scientific knowledge; conversation analysis and ethnomethodology; and semiotics, post-structuralism and postmodernism.
第 6 到 10 筆結果，共 30 筆
(Mulkay and Gilbert, 1981; Potter, 1984). That is, norms can be seen as one
element in the persuasive armoury that scientists draw on when they are arguing
with other scientists or attempting to legitimate the practice of science as a whole.
... observation to work as a foundation for knowledge building; whatever else
might be going on, we can see some particular properties of the world, and also
others can check our observations by substituting themselves for us (Mulkay,
... whole set of theoretical assumptions; and if we try to unpack these
assumptions, and ground them in terms of other observations, these too are
theory dependent (see Chalmers, 1992; Mulkay, 1979, for useful summaries of
... content of the consensual view may be varied; that is, scientists may espouse
the 'same' theory, but what they mean by that theory may be radically different (
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Latour, 1987). Moreover, if we take a longer historical ...
... elsewhere they may emphasize its novelty or sophistication when compared
with the original (see also Ashmore, 1988; Mulkay, 1985). Collins' study raised a
second and more fundamental problem with the orthodox account of replication.
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7 Working Up Representations
8 Criticizing Facts