The above return is very complete, and up to date of May last year. It would seem that ironclad ship-construction on various systems is still being carried on briskly in England, France, Russia, Italy, and Austria. Germany is holding her hand for the present; but for her wants as a Baltic Power, she is strong in ironclads.

In Russia and in Italy ironclads have been commenced during the past year, and Russia has quite recently offered rewards to Russian naval officers who may be successful in competing for "the best type of ironclad." Italy, as I have shown, has recently taken the lead in conducting experiments in regard to naval construction, and is building the three largest warvessels in existence. France, it is true, has stopped building two

ironclads recently projected; but there were rumours as to the unsatisfactory nature of their designs before Admiral Aube-who has been called "Amiral Torpille," from his leaning towards torpedoes

gave orders to suspend their construction. It is very important to note that in Italy and Russia more attention has been paid to questions of naval warfare than even in France or Germany. Russia was the first to advocate and attempt to carry out torpedo warfare on a large scale; and the Italians have also shown their full appreciation of the torpedo as a weapon. Yet it is remarkable that both these countries, whose interests lie rather in maritime defence than in offence, with a limited commerce and a geographical position which might allow of

their dispensing with thorough seagoing vessels, are eager to build big ships. France has many ships in course of construction, and will certainly complete them, with the exception of the Charles Martel and Brennas, though this has been stigmatised by the torpedoists à outrance in that country as a waste of public money. Austria has still two ironclads building, and is pressing their construction.

A further comparison of the table is foreign to my purpose in this article; but I am strongly of opinion that our great need at present lies rather in more cruisers, torpedo-vessels, and torpedoboats than in big ships. The latter, on the other hand, take much longer to build, and cannot be neglected; while those who are dissatisfied with the designs on which our new ships of the Admiral class have been constructed, have been naturally anxious that some more formidable vessels should be commenced.

This brings me to the Nile and Trafalgar controversy of last year, in which Admirals Sir Cooper Key and Sir A. Hood took part, and the discussion in the House of Commons on Mr Shaw Lefevre's motion to suspend their construction. The motion depended mainly on tactical questions, and as such it was discussed, though Mr Hibbert, in defending the vote for these large vessels, was content to urge the impolicy of "blowing hot and cold," and to state the necessity for placing this country in a position of equality or superiority" with that of France.

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That the motion was defeated is satisfactory on many grounds, of which I consider the tactical one as the most important; but there was, I admit, abundant justification for it in the utter

ances of naval officers and other responsible persons in this country, of which I propose to give a few specimens:

Admiral Arthur, an officer of high attainments, who was for three years in charge of our admirable torpedo school in the Vernon, in a recent lecture at the United Service Institution, speaks as follows on the question of ironclads. He reminds us that France has generally "given us the lead' in ship-construction, and adds, "they are now ahead of us in the coming arm-viz., the sea-going torpedo-boat. We now hear from France that the days of ironclads of the present type are numbered; and that such is really the case I feel perfectly certain. The destructible ironclad, as I will call it, valued at half a million of money, can be sunk by a locomotive torpedo valued at £400, discharged from a sea-going torpedo - boat, valued, say, £25,000."

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Commander Bethell, M.P., has, both in the House of Commons and at the United Service Institution, pressed very similar views; but at the latter he only went so far as to advocate the substitution of smaller vessels for the large ironclad, while in the House he appeared willing to rely almost exclusively on torpedo-vessels for fleet actions. Captain Bethell, who has had recent sea experience, and who stated that he was putting before the House "the views held by, at all events, a considerable section of his brother officers," stated truly that "big ships were a corollary to big guns, and small ships a corollary to torpedoes, and the question therefore now was between big ships and small ships; and he added his "belief that before long the torpedo would

to a great extent displace the gun in naval warfare." 1

The opinions of these officers deserve all due consideration, and if they are sound, we are clearly wasting money in building expensive ironclads, at least of anything like the present types. I do not think that they are generally accepted; but they are founded on tactical considerations, and if they are to be combated successfully, they must be met by similar arguments founded on views of naval warfare. The argument most often heard in answer is now simply a conservative one-much as follows: "Very likely you are right about the future; but as long as other countries are building big ships we must not be behind hand; so we are laying down or completing such-and-such vessels "--which sounds much like saying, "We have no shipbuilding policy of our own, and it is not a subject which we care to study. We are content to follow other countries, and to continue in our old groove until a revolution in naval warfare is upon us, when we shall of course accept the altered conditions, and act accordingly.' This is little more than blind conservatism and resistance to change; yet it would seem as if some such views had been forced upon Mr Hibbert, who in moving the Navy Estimates this year, after describing the new ironclads Nile and Trafalgar, laid down last year, estimated to cost over £914,000 each-a price which Mr Hibbert is almost afraid to mention"-adds: "I may safely say that these two large ironclads will probably be the last ironclads of this type that will ever be built in this or any other

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country: "2 and he appears to think that the assurance that they will be "equal or superior to any ship of the French navy is sufficient reason for building them. Is it not natural that this determination not to be outdone in worthless (?) vessels by a foreign Power is looked upon in many quarters as such "damning with faint praise" as is intended to condemn them? That this was not meant we may feel sure from Lord Ripon's plain statement in the House of Lords that their construction was to be continued, and Mr Hibbert's resistance to Mr Shaw Lefevre's motion; but when the premisses of the opponents of the big ships are thus practically admitted, it is dif ficult to deny their conclusions. If it can "safely" be foreseen that the Nile and Trafalgar will be the last of the ironclads, it may safely be said that they ought not to be built. Even so high an authority as Admiral Sir Cooper Key, while he strongly supported the building of the Nile and Trafalgar, says, when they are completed we can be content to turn our attention to the construction of fast unarmoured cruisers; " and adds, "these will, in my opinion, form the fleets of the future."

From a subsequent letter of Sir Cooper Key's, it appears that this opinion was rather hypothetical than actual; but it is certain that those who believe that the ironclad is doomed will quote, as they have already quoted, Sir Cooper as a convert to their opinions.

From the above opinions of high authorities, the position of the building of the Nile and Trafalgar has been almost brought to an

impasse from which there is no easy escape dialectically; but still they are building, and are now well advanced, and I may point out that at various periods, as notably both before and after the Inflexible was built, we have held our hands in doubt as to the proper type of a fighting ship this period of doubt and hesitation having been followed by a scare as to our weakness, and perhaps hasty following of foreign types.

It is certain that we cannot afford to stand still and wait for something to turn up. We must have the courage of our opinions; and if, as I believe, big ships will always continue to be necessary, I trust that the knowledge and ability of the able men in charge of the constructive department of the Admiralty will be allowed fair scope to give us the best types which may approve themselves to their minds at the present or at any future time. That the tactical views of naval officers should have full weight in such designs I began this article by saying, and this view has been pressed strongly by Sir Edward Reed and other authorities.

The elaborate manoeuvres of the French squadron in the Mediterranean, carried out by the orders of Admiral Aube in May and June last, intended to test the value of torpedo-boats, although too long to refer to fully, are well worth alluding to. The reports of the admirals in command have not been published, though doubtless our Admiralty have confidential information on the subject. It is certain that the French officers and men are by no means as enthusiastic advocates of torpedo-boats and torpedo tactics as they were a year since.

The French papers say that a flotilla of twelve first-class torpedo

boats, which was intended to intercept Admiral Lafont's ironclad squadron on its passage through the Balearic Isles, failed to do so, many mishaps occurring to the torpedo-boats, and that they could not even keep pace with the ironclads, although they were only steaming 11.5 knots; while in an attack on a squadron at anchor at Ajaccio, only ten days after leaving Toulon with twenty torpedo-boats, Admiral Brown de Colstoun could only muster five fit for service, the attack naturally ending in failure.

It is worthy of remark that these experiments took place in fine weather in the Mediterranean, under circumstances specially favourable for torpedo-boats.

I have quoted fairly and fully the views of those who are distinctly of opinion that the days of ironclads are numbered; but I do not think that they can be supported by a large view of the requirements of a great naval Power. That this is the view held by the majority of those best entitled to judge, I also believe. Foreign opinion I have before referred to; and I believe that there, too, it is decided that the big gun and the big ship must maintain its position. I have broken a lance in favour of the big armed ship or ironclad, while I have not entered into the vexed questions of how much armour should be carried, or how it should be distributed; nor do I mean to contend that all battle-ships should be of enormous size and cost. The majority should, on the contrary, be, I hold, of moderate size,— ships like the Nile and Trafalgar being the 3-deckers of the fleet, the others representing the 74's.

It has not been necessary here to point to the additional means of defence, through quick-firing and machine guns, nets, and other devices, which have strengthened

the power of big ships against torpedo-boats.

The latter are, I hold, simply destructive weapons intended to attack an enemy under favourable circumstances their advocates always assuming that they will make at least as much use of their heels as of their powers of offence; and I hold strongly that no naval Power can rest on similar Parthian tactics. The pecuniary argument I have already referred to as inapplicable; but the argument that, because an ironclad may be destroyed by a torpedo boat, therefore any number of torpedo boats can take the place of the former, is almost ludicrous. Yet this is apparently the view of even so experienced an officer as Admiral Arthur, though it has been left to a French writer to push it to its logical conclusions.

To me it appears equivalent to arguing that a Cæsar or a Nelson could be replaced by the dagger or the bullet which sufficed to put an end to their existence, and to be utterly untenable.

Our American friends are the only people who, as lookers-on at the naval war-game now played by the maritime Powers of Europe, are qualified to act as impartial critics; and I conclude accordingly with an extract from Commander Bainbridge Hoff's lecture, to which I have before referred, and which