dress, and those who are addressed, that application be made to the feelings of humanity, rather than to those which are excited by fear and alarm. That the gentleman, himself, had threatened us with confusion and darkness, and foreboded the hasty setting of the sun of American glory, if we adopted the resolutions; and his coadjutor from Prince George had invaded our country with a French army, and slaughtered our best and dearest friends before our eyes. This mode of argument, however unfair, was by no means novel. When our gallant forefathers conceived the mighty design of declaring the American world independent and free, the same doctrine of terror and alarm, of dangers from abroad, and mischiefs and ruin incalculable within, was pressed and repeated. But, resting firm on principle, they steadily pursued truth, and achieved the glorious deed of American independence. As then, so now, he hoped, this doctrine of terrorism would make no impression; but that the committee would consider the subject upon principle, and determine upon its merits. Mr. Daniel observed, that in the course of the observations which he had made, to obviate exceptions which gentlemen had taken to the resolutions proposed, it was to be discovered, that his principal objections to the "alien-act" were, that it violated the sovereignty of the state govern. ments; that it blended legislative, executive, and judicial powers; that it violated the right of trial by jury, contrary to the Constitution.

With respect to the first objection, he had shown by the foregoing arguments, that the state governments were sovereign as to those powers not granted to Congress, and this subject, not only not being granted, but prohibited Congress by the ninth section, first article of the Constitution, it followed, that as to this subject, the states were severally sovereign; and that any attempt by Congress to legislate on this subject, within the limits of any particular state, was an attack upon the sovereignty thereof.

As to the second objection, that the alien-act blended legislative, judicial, and executive powers, it might be observed, that legislative power is the authority to prescribe a rule of conduct: this rule is the act of the legislative power, declaring what shall be done, and what shall be avoided. The "alien-act," said Mr. Daniel, does not declare what the alien shall do, and what he shall avoid: it does not declare a rule of conduct, which he can know and observe: the President has the power to prescribe this rule of conduct for the alien, by bringing him to the bar of suspicion, if he does not observe a line of conduct, which, not being designated by the "alien-act," is only known and subject to the President's will. But to declare this rule of conduct is a legislative act; the President, by this law, has effectually the right to prescribe this rule: therefore, he contended, that the President was invested with effectual legislative power. He certainly had the power to judge when the alien came within the rule prescribed by his suspicion: and in this, as in all other cases, he was invested with executive power. Thus in one person, contrary to the Constitution, was to be seen the lawgiver, judge, and executioner.

With regard to the third objection, that the "alien-act" infringed the right of trial by jury, he referred the committee to the seventh article of the amendments to the Constitution, where it is found, that "no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law." He contended, that an alien was a person, who had rights of life, liberty, and property, and was therefore within the provision of this part of the Constitution. He had before shown, that by the law of nations, an alien had the right of being tried according to the general laws of the land. It was here evident, that an alien was a person who could not be deprived of his "liberty" without due process of law. It remained then to be inquired what was this "due process of law?" This "due process of law," he said, was to be found in the seventh and eighth articles of the amendments to the Constitution, that "no person shall be held to answer an accusation, unless on a presentment or indictment by a grand jury;" that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." This mode of trial pointed out by the Constitution, this "due process of law," was disregarded, and entirely abolished by the "alien-act." Having taken this short view of the, alien-act, he said he would proceed to consider the "sedition-law," as it was commonly termed. He could have wished that gentlemen had given their opinions freely on this subject. The gentleman from Prince George, he said, had given some apology why he declined the discussion: he had committed himself a day or two past, by declaring that the sedition-law was already sufficiently odious. It was, therefore, Mr. Daniel said, he supposed the gentlemen thought it best not to meddle with it. He would receive the gentleman's apology, and proceed to examine the law, according to his own ideas on the subject, in which he would occasionally take notice of what the gentleman from Frederic had urged.

He stated that the acts enumerated in the first section of the seditionlaw, as offences to be punished with heavy fines and long imprisonment, were "to combine or conspire together with intent to oppose any measure, or to impede the operation of any law of the United States," or to intimidate any officer under the government of the same, from undertaking, performing, or executing his trust or duty; or to counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such counsel or advice had effect or not. The offences enumerated in the second section of said law, he said, were, "to write, print, utter, or publish, or to cause the same to be done, or to aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false writings against the government, the President, or either house of the Congress of the United States, with intent to defame the government, either house of Congress, or the President, or to bring them, or either of them, into disrepute; or to excite against them, or either of them, the hatred of the people; or to excite any unlawful combination, for opposing any law, or act of the President of the United States, or to defeat any such law or act.” These were the provisions of the act. The provisions of the Constitution were, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition

the government for a redress of grievances." Third article of amendments to the Constitution. He requested gentlemen to read the one and the other; to compare them, and to reconcile them if possible. He was one of those who believed, that the first clause of the law would, in its operation, effectually destroy the liberty of speech; and the second clause did most completely annihilate the freedom of the press. "To combine, conspire, counsel, and advise together," was a natural right of self-defence, belong. ing to the people; it could only be exercised by the use of speech; it was a right of self-defence against the tyranny and oppression of government; it ought to be exercised with great caution; and never, but upon occasions of extreme necessity. Of this necessity, the people are the only judges. For if government could control this right; if government were the judge, when the necessity of exercising this right has arrived, the right never will be used; for government never will judge that the people ought to oppose its measures, however unjust, however tyrannical and despotically oppressive. This right, although subject to abuse, like many other invaluable rights, was nevertheless essential to, and inseparable from the liberties of the people. The warmest friend of any government would not contend that it was infallible. The best of governments may possibly change into tyranny and despotism. Measures may be adopted violating the Constitution, and prostrating the rights and principles of the people. He hoped never to see the time; but, if it should so happen, no man would deny but that such measures ought to be opposed. But, he would ask, how they could be effectually opposed, without the people should "com. bine, conspire, counsel, and advise" together? One man could do nothing. This right of adopting the only efficient plan of opposition to unconstitutional, oppressive, and tyrannical measures, whenever they should. occur, he hoped never would be given up. This right had been well exercised on a former occasion against England; and it would probably be well used again, if our liberties were sufficiently endangered, to call forth its exertion. But for the spirited and energetic exercise of this right; but for the "combining, conspiring, counselling, and advising" together of the American people, these United States, now independent and free, would have remained under the tyrannical and despotic domination of the British king. It had been said, that this doctrine leads to anarchy and confusion; but, said Mr. Daaiel, this doctrine gave birth and success to our revolu tion; secured our present liberty, and the privileges consequent thereupon. The contrary doctrine, said Mr. Daniel, leads to passive obedience and non-resistance, to tyranny and oppression, more certain and more dangerOUS. If a measure was unpopular, and should give discontent, it would be discussed if it should thereupon be found to be tolerable, it would be acquiesced in. If, on the contrary, measures should be adopted of such dangerous and destructive tendency, that they ought to be opposed, he would ask, how this could be done but by the means which are forbidden in the first section of the law in question? These were the only means by which liberty, once trampled down by tyrants and despots, could be reinstated and if the general government continued its rapid progress of violating the Constitution, and infringing the liberties of the people, the

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time he feared was hastening on, when the people would find it necessary again, to exercise this natural right of defence.

Mr. Daniel said he would now turn his attention to that part of the law which affects the freedom of the press, in which the Constitution was most palpably, and most dangerously infringed. On this subject, he said, the gentleman from Frederic had contended, that the Constitution was not violated; that the common law was a part of the Constitution; and that the offences enumerated in the act, were always punishable at common law. If this be the fact, said Mr. Daniel, the law in question is nugatory; and the clause of the Constitution on this subject, which had been read, was of no effect. By the gentleman's common law, which he had read, offences against the king and his government, were precisely such as were enumerated as offences in this law, against the President and government of the United States; substituting the word "President," in the latter case, for the word "king," in the former. These offences might be "by speaking, or writing against them; or wishing him (the king in England, and the President in America,) ill, giving out scandalous stories concerning them (the King and his government in England, and the President and his government in America,) or doing anything that may tend to lessen him (the King, or President, as the case may be) in the esteem of his subjects; weaken the government, or raise jealousies among the people." (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, page 123.) When our "sedition law" was so like the law of England, he did not wonder that the gentleman had supposed that the law of England was in force here; one being the copy of the other, with the necessary change of names, and some other trivial circumstances; nor did he wonder that the gentleman should say, in conformity to that authority, that "the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated" by such regulations, "but consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications;" and is otherwise "licentiousness," (4 Blackstone, p. 151 ;) that a printer may publish what he pleases, but must answer the consequence, if a certain set of men shall adjudge his writings to contain "dangerous and licentious sentiments." If this be true, he said, he would be glad to be informed for what purpose was it declared by the Constitution, that "the freedom of the press should not be restrained;" and how we were more free in the United States, than the people of any other nation whatsoever? The most oppressed of Europe; the slaves and subjects of the most despotic power on the earth, he said, had the right to speak, write, and print whatever they pleased, but were liable to be punished afterwards, if they spoke, wrote, or printed anything that was offensive to the government: that there was very little difference as to the liberty of the press, whether the restraints imposed were "previous" or subsequent to publications. If the press was subjected to a political licenser, the discretion of the printer would be taken away, and with it his responsibility; and nothing would be printed but what was agreeable to the political opinions of a certain set of men; whereas subsequent restraints have the same operation, by saying, if you do "write, print, utter, or publish," anything contrary to the political opinions, reputation or principles of certain men, you shall be fined and imprisoned. In vain, he said, were we told that the accused may prove the truth of his

writings or printing, and that we are only forbidden to write or print false facts. The truth was that it was not the facts, but the deductions and conclusions drawn from certain facts, which would constitute the offence. If a man was to write and publish that the Congress of the United States had passed the "alien and sedition acts," that the provisions of the said acts were in these words, reciting the laws as they are; that the Constitution was in these words, reciting the provisions of the Constitution truly; and conclude that the said acts violated the Constitution; that the Congress and the President, in enacting the same, had assumed powers not granted to them, and had encroached upon the liberties of the people, who ought to take measues" to defeat" these laws, and this "act of the President." Here the facts stated, that the laws had been passed, and that the Constitution was in terms stated, could be proved, and would not constitute the offence, but the inference from these facts, that the Congress, in enacting the said laws, had violated the Constitution, assumed powers not delegated to them, and usurped the rights and liberties of the people, in which usurpation the President had joined, would certainly have a tendency "to defame the government, the Congress, and the President, and to bring them into disrepute and hatred among the people," and would therefore constitute the offence. The inference or conclusion from certain facts might be true or not, and was mere matter of opinion. It was opinion then, political opinion, which was the real object of punishment. The deduction made from the facts just stated, he said, was in his opinion true; the consequence of which was, that the Congress and President of the United States had not his confidence; with him they were in "disrepute." But he could not prove that the opinion was true, as a fact; he could offer those reasons which convinced his mind of its truth, but they might not be satisfactory to a jury summoned with a special regard to their political opinions, or to a judge of the United States, most of whom had already pronounced their opinion on the subject, either in pamphlets, or political instead of legal charges to the grand juries of the several circuits of the United States; thus prejudging a constitutional question, which they knew would be made, if ever the law was attempted to be carried into effect.

He said he would state one more case to exemplify his opinion. If at the time of British oppressions, when the parliament of England boldly implied the right to make laws for, and to tax the American people, without representation, any man had by writing maintained that representation and taxation were inseparable, and that it was an usurpation and assumption of power by parliament to impose taxes on the American colonies, who were not represented in parliament, the fact here stated would not offend, because true; but the conclusion, the charge of usurpation, made upon the British government, would certainly have a tendency to bring it into "disrepute and hatred" among the people, as it did most effectually in America, and would have constituted the offence. This opinion, though now clearly admitted to be true, was then new, and could not be proven true to an English judge and jury, for they were so impressed with its falsity, that the nation undertook and carried on a bloody and expensive war, to correct its error. He concluded that the provisions of this act abridged and infringed the liberty of the press, which at the time of the