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231. The next subordinate and auxiliary department, is the "Treasury Department;" the principal officer or head of which is styled "The Secretary of the Treasury;" whose duties relate to the superintendence of the finances, the support of the credit, the collection and management of the revenue, and the regulation of the expenditure and accounts of the United States.

232. "The Secretary of the Treasury" is required by Law, to prepare and lay before Congress at the commencement of every session, a report on the finances, containing estimates of the public revenues and expenditures, and plans for improving the public resources; and to report and give information to either branch of the Legislature, in person or in writing as he may be required, respecting all matters referred to him, or which appertain to his office; and generally to perform all such services relative to the public finances as he shall be directed.

233. The next subordinate branch of the Executive department, is "The Department of War;" the head of which is denominated "The Secretary for the Department of War," and executes such duties as are entrusted to him by the President, relative to military commissions, or to the land forces or warlike stores of the United States, or to such other matters respecting military affairs, and the granting of lands for military services, or relative to "Indian affairs," as are assigned to his department.

234. The last branch of the Executive department, established as auxiliary to the President, is "The Department of the Navy;" the chief officer of which is styled "the Secretary of the Navy;" whose duty it is to execute such orders as he receives from the President, relative to the procurement of naval stores

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and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment of the United States.

235. In case of a vacancy in any of these Executive offices, the President may authorize any person at his discretion, to perform the duties of head of the department, until a successor be appointed, or such vacancy be filled.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE JUDICIAL POWER.

236. The Judicial Power, is that branch of the Government to which the administration of justice, and the interpretation of the Constitution and Laws is entrusted; and no Government can be complete in its form, nor perfect in its principles, without such a distinct and independent department.

237. A Constitution which omitted to establish an adequate Judicial Power, could not be successfully carried into effect; and if, instead of being separated and rendered independent, that Power were blended with one or both of the other departments, or if the officers charged with its administration were dependent on either of the former, the dignity, efficiency, and utility of this department would be destroyed.

238. The Judicial and the Executive departments are mutually auxiliary, and the former partakes, in a measure, of the nature of the latter. It also participates, in some degree, in the Legislative Power, as the Judicial construction of Legislative acts is received as binding and conclusive.

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239. To make Laws, and to execute them, are the respective objects of the Legislative and Executive departments, and are, indeed, the two principal operations of Government; but Laws cannot be correctly and fully executed, without a power in the Constitution to expound and apply them.

240. Under a written Constitution, founded upon the principle of representation, and establishing a just division of the three branches of Government, the Judicial department exercises, moreover, the higher function, of expounding the Constitution, and thereby testing the validity of the acts of the Legislature; and hence the greater necessity of securing, by fundamental provisions, the independence of the Judiciary.

241. The Judicial Power in every Government must be co-extensive with the power of legislation; and if by express terms it should be restricted to a part only of the subjects of legislation, the whole system would, in that proportion, be impaired in efficiency and value. But the authority of the Judiciary cannot be made to exceed the Legislative power, as such excess would be inconsistent with its nature.

242. The Constitution of the United States recognizes a Judicial Power, not as an adjunct to the Executive, but as a necessary and substantive part of the Government; and this was the more requisite, from the extraordinary complications, unavoidably resulting from the nature of the Union, of the authority of the United States, with that of the several States.

243. The Judicial Power of the United States is accordingly vested "in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."

244. A Chief Justice, and other Judges are contemplated by the Constitution; but the complete organization of the Supreme Court, as well as of the tribunals inferior and subordinate to it, is provided for by Law.

245. In reviewing the organization of the Judicial Power under the Constitution and Laws of the United States, it will be proper to consider: First, The mode in which this department is constituted; Secondly, The objects and extent of its jurisdiction; and, Thirdly, The manner in which that jurisdiction is distributed amongst the several Courts.

I. As to the mode in which this department is constituted.

246. The mode of appointment, by the President and Senate, as prescribed by the Constitution, is not only generally advantageous, but peculiarly proper, in regard to Judicial officers.

247. The just and vigorous investigation and punishment of every species of fraud and violence, and the exercise of the power of compelling every man to the punctual performance of his contracts, are duties which, although the faithful discharge of them will command the calm approbation and respect of the candid and judicious portion of the community, are not in their nature of the most popular characters and the fittest men would seldom be selected to fulfil them, by any more open and general mode of appointment.

248. The same considerations recommend the peculiar tenure by which Judicial magistrates hold their offices; which is, in effect, for life, if not sooner removed on impeachment and conviction for official delinquency; and it is esteemed one of the most va

luable of modern improvements in the practice of Government.

249. The Judges, both of the Supreme Court, and of the inferior Courts of the United States, accordingly hold their offices, during good behaviour; which is deemed sufficient as a defence against the encroachments of the Legislative and Executive Powers, and the best expedient that can be devised to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of jus

tice.

250. The Judiciary department, from the nature of its functions, must always be the weakest of the three great departments of power; and although individual oppression may sometimes proceed from Courts of justice, yet the liberties of the People can never be endangered, so long as the Judicial Power remains distinct from both the Legislative, and the Executive departments; and nothing can contribute so much to the firmness and independence of the Judiciary, as permanency in office.

251. In addition to the tenure by which the Judges hold their offices, the permanent provision for their support is calculated to secure their independence. The Constitution accordingly declares, that they "shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”

252. This provision is considered an improvement on all former Constitutions; and tends to secure a succession of learned men as Judges, who, in consequence of a certain undiminished support, are induced to relinquish the lucrative pursuit of their professional practice, for the duties of an important and honourable station in the Government.

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