than he had anticipated; and old as he was he lived to hear the news that, every vestige of liberty being extinguished in France, the Reign of Terror was inundating the country with blood, and Louis XVI., the constitutional king, was executed on the scaffold as a malefactor."*

I now proceed to a brief consideration of the question, whether there is any truth in the popular notion that great vigour of memory is often associated with limited powers of judgment, defective reasoning, and circumscribed reflective faculties; in other words, conjoined with a low order of intelligence. Do facts establish such an hypothesis or justify the axiom, "beati memoria, expectantes judicium?"

If we based our conclusions upon à priori reasoning, we might, upon a superficial examination of the question, be disposed to answer the interrogatory in the affirmative. The faculty of memory is in its fundamental features an automatic or involuntary power. The mental process involved in the reception of ideas is in itself a simple and elementary one, not necessarily calling into action any complex intellectual operations. The majority of our ideas enter the mind whilst it is in a passive state. Little or no mental effort is required in order to grasp or receive the myriads of impressions that are momentarily forcing an admission into the mind. It is true that many of our ideas are the result of an active state of the intelligence. Among such are those which Locke designates as ideas of reflection, as contradistinguished from those of sensation. Whilst endeavouring to comprehend a subtle and profoundly philosophical process of reasoning, the mind is in the

Campbell's "Lives of the Lord Chief Justices," vol. ii.

p. 558.

highest state of activity, with the view of seizing hold and retaining the ideas embodied in the argument immediately suggested to consciousness. In order to effect this object a great and sustained effort of thought is required, and the more important faculties of the understanding are unavoidably called into active exercise. But to reproduce the ideas so imbibed, a voluntary act of the mind, termed recollection or reminiscence, is only necessary, that is, supposing the ideas do not occur to the mind as a spontaneous act of suggestion.

It requires no obvious exercise of thought or severe course of reasoning to enable us to recal to the mind, when once thoroughly comprehended, the leading principles embodied in Paley's "Evidences," Butler's Analogy," Newton's "Principia," or Kant's "Pure Reason." They are indelibly (presupposing a healthy state of the brain and intellect) impressed upon the mind of every educated man conversant with these branches of literature, and are easily made objects of consciousness by an effort of the will. Considered metaphysically, the memory, although a most important faculty, is not one of a high intellectual character. How different is the memory in this respect from the more exalted faculties of reason and judgment !

If my argument be tenable, we can easily understand the proposition, that great vigour of memory is not necessarily associated with superior powers of judgment or strength of reasoning capacity. Hence an active state of this faculty may co-exist with an intellect generally defective in its organization; in other words, with a mind but partially and imperfectly developed in its higher manifestations.

Many facts have been cited to establish, that extraordinary powers of memory are often allied to an en

feebled condition of the other mental faculties, amounting occasionally to imbecility.* Men possessing but limited intellectual endowments have been favoured with most retentive memories. Idiots have exhibited the faculty of retention to a remarkable extent, and men of very limited and circumscribed powers of reasoning and of most defective judgment have had memories distinguished for their tenacity. I do not question the accuracy of this statement; but what does it demonstrate? Let me consider for a moment the converse of the preceding proposition.

Do we not often witness mental powers of a high order, great manifestations of intellectual vigour, extraordinary reasoning and reflective faculties, combined with great strength of memory? Dr. Johnson, the gigantic character of whose intellect no one can question, was remarkable for the wonderful accuracy of his memory. He never forgot anything that he had seen, heard, or read. He often gave his intimate friends evidence of his wonderful capacity of retaining knowledge. Edmund Burke, of transcendent genius, was also noted for having great powers of retention. Clarendon, celebrated for his "History of the Rebellion," Gibbon, the immortal author of the "Decline and Fall," Locke, the celebrated metaphysician, and Archbishop Tillotson, were all distinguished for having great strength of memory. When alluding to this subject, Sir W. Hamilton observes, "For intellectual power of the highest order none were

"There was," says the Rev. Henry Fearon, "a man in my father's parish who could remember the day when every person had been buried in the parish for thirty-five years, and could repeat with unvarying accuracy the name and age of the deceased, and the mourners at the funeral. But he was a complete fool. Out of the line of burials he had not one idea, could not give an intelligible reply to a single question, nor be trusted even to feed himself."-(On" Mental Vigour," &c.)

distinguished above Grotius and Pascal, and Grotius and Pascal forgot nothing they had ever read or thought. Leibnitz and Euler were not less celebrated for their intelligence than for their memory, and both could repeat the whole of the 'Eneid.' Donnellus knew the Corpus Juris' by heart, and yet he was one of the profoundest and most original speculators in jurisprudence. Muratori, though not a genius of the very highest order, was still a man of great ability and judg ment, and so powerful was his retention, that in making quotations he had only to read his passages, put the books in their places, and then to write out from memory the words. Ben Jonson tells us that he could repeat all he had ever written, and whole books that he had read. Themistocles could call by their names the 20,000 citizens of Athens. Cyrus is reported to have known the name of every soldier in his army. Hortensius, after Cicero, the greatest orator of Rome, after sitting a whole day at a public sale, correctly enunciated from memory all the things sold, their prices, and the names of their purchasers. Niebuhr, the historian or Rome, was not less distinguished for his memory than his acuteness. In his youth he was employed in one of the public offices of Denmark. Part of a book of accounts having been destroyed, he restored it by an effort of memory. Sir James Mackintosh, Dugald Stewart, and Dr. Gregory, are examples of great talent united with great memory."

"I myself," says repeated all that till I was past

Seneca confessed that he had a miraculous memory, not only "to receive but to hold." Ben Jonson," could, in my youth, have ever I had made, and so continued forty; since, it is much decayed in me. peat the whole books that I have read, and poems of

Yet I can re

some selected friends which I have liked to charge my memory with. It was wont to be faithful to me, but shaken with age now, and sloth (which weakens the strongest abilities), it may perform somewhat but cannot promise much."

The facts previously referred to are susceptible at least of two important conclusions:-1. That an active and vigorous condition of the mental faculties is compatible with old age. 2. That a continuous and often laborious exercise of the mind is not only consistent with a state of mental health, but is apparently productive of longevity.

In the succeeding volume this subject will be still further considered, when I address myself to the effects of an undue straining or exercise of the mind upon the mental and bodily health.

In glancing retrospectively over the preceding pages, I am conscious of having omitted a detailed reference to what many may conceive to be an important section of the subject I have had under consideration. I allude to the moral treatment of incipient types of insanity, as well as to the special duties devolving upon those legally entrusted with the medical, mental, and social management of the insane.

I designedly defer for another work any detailed exposition of my views on the first part of this subject. My sentiments on the latter important topic are fully expressed in a Presidential address I had the honour of delivering to a section of the profession officially connected with the management of public and private institutions for the treatment of the insane, and from that discourse I quote the subjoined

passage:

How noble is the study in which the psychological