thing around them, and of drawing conclusions from what they observed, were as essential from a strictly business point of view as are any modern habits which lead to commercial success. Indeed they were even more so, for nowadays if one becomes bankrupt there are many mitigating circumstances; but in prehistoric times there were no poor laws or charities, and failure in business meant extinction. Even the miscarriage of a single enterprise, such as the throwing of a spear at a cave-bear or a bison, often involved a deathpenalty.

We owe our instinctive liking and aptitude for naturalising in the open air to the fact that the practical study of natural history was at one time of saving value to our race. Not only did such accomplishments stave off imminent death as when the recognition of a footprint or a faint sound in the forest told of the presence of some terrible enemy-but they acted surely if slowly in many other ways to the advantage of their possessor. Among the Esquimaux the hunter who could be depended upon to bring home his seal at the end of a day's business on the icefloe could not only have the pick of the girls in marriage, but gained other privileges which tend to make a family prosperous.

Now let us inquire somewhat more in detail as to the faculties which every savage hunter must possess in order to be successful. First of all he must have a general knowledge of natural phenomena, accurate and inconceivably extensive; so that, when he is afield, every item among his innumerable surroundings is so familiar that the least unusual circumstance at

once arrests his attention. Next he must have acquired, in addition to his general knowledge, a complete mastery of the complex arts of tracking and stalking, so that he may approach near enough to his wary game for his rude weapons to take effect. If we go no further than this we find that the untutored savage in his native wilds almost comes up to that formula which defines culture as "knowing something of everything and everything of something.' But other gifts are required beyond mere knowledge and skill. There must be an infinite capacity for taking pains (which has been given as a definition of genius), and also, and above all, there must be a power to reason accurately from the facts observed. I think that many people who have spoken with contempt of the mental capacity of the Bosjesman and the Black Fellow can never have estimated the mental resources quired for ordinary "spooring." Each minute item of evidenceoften so faint that civilised senses can no more apprehend it than the unassisted eye can detect the microbes in a drop of water - has not only to be observed but to be weighed, and given its exact value in a long and intricate argument.

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If I may be allowed to digress from the " spoor " of our present argument for a moment, I should like to point out what seems to have been one exceedingly important factor in the development of the human intellect. On a future occasion1 I shall discuss, in comparing a man's mental processes with a dog's, the probable psychic effect of the comparative size of the olfactory lobe. I mean by the olfactory lobe that part of the brain

-so remarkably developed in the Canide which receives impressions from the nerves of smell. Now, why has man no olfactory lobe to speak of? And what may possibly be the outcome of the deficiency? The answer to the first question is, that man's progenitors were fruit-eating creatures which lived in trees. Now, a frugivorous animal obviously does not need a keen power of scent for detecting and following prey. It usually discovers its food by means of the eye, and one finds that Nature has adapted herself to this state of things by making most fruits of conspicuous colours. Although this may partly explain why man and all the apes have the organ of smell so very slightly developed, it is plain that hereditary vegetarianism will not fully account for their olfactory poverty. For we find that very many graminivorous animals such as antelopes, deer, wild horses, and wild cattle-have an exceedingly acute power of scent, and can detect the approach of an invisible enemy at several hundred yards' distance. But a little thought will show that the life of a creature living high in the trees is never threatened by a foe approaching stealthily from afar off, and hence such a means of protection is unnecessary. And, moreover, in such a situation this sense would be very untrustworthy, for air among the tree-tops moves in eddies and veering gusts, owing to the continual obstructions it meets with, and hence would not tell the direction from which the taint of danger came. Now, when man left his trees and his vegetarianism behind him, and became an amateur carnivore, there was this great distinction between him and the predatory beasts whose habits he

was imitating-viz., that whereas the latter were able both to detect and to follow their quarry by scent, he found his nose practically of no use as an aid to a living. Had he developed, during his early earthwalking career, olfactory powers anything like equal to those of the dog, I make bold to say that 'Maga' would have neither readers nor contributors, and that most of us, if we were now existing, would be getting our livings by sniffing for roots and grubs like a badger, or by yelping along a trail like a pack of jackals! Because, happily, he could not profitably follow his nose, primitive man was obliged to exercise his wits. Where the dog or the wolf gallops blindly and without thought along the tainted line left by the feet of his quarry, the primeval hunter had, from the first, not only to learn to notice each displaced twig, or shifted stone, or shaken dew-drop, but had also from these and a thousand other data to infer what had passed that way, when it had passed, and often, in the case of one wounded animal in a herd, how it had passed, and whether it were sufficiently disabled to make pursuit a profitable speculation. As far as I can see, this faculty, engendered and necessitated by olfactory shortcomings, formed the basis of much of our vaunted reasoning power.

When we analyse not only the hobby of the naturalist but almost any other form of pastime, we find that it is founded upon certain primitive tastes or instincts which we possess in common with the uncivilised races. Civilised man when at play always reverts somewhat towards the condition of the savage.

LOUIS ROBINSON.

A WEEK or two ago Lord Salisbury compared the Government of the British empire to the administration of a trust or public company, of which her Majesty's Ministers stand for the trustees or directors. The simile was duly rebuked by a halfpenny evening paper for its want of exaltation and its cold neglect of the ideal. This was wrong, for the British empire is nothing so uninspiring as a Limited Liability Company paying a cash dividend. The liability is unlimited, extending to the whole fortune and life of every shareholder, and though calls are paid in cash, dividends come usually in the form of national security and national self-esteem. These peculiarities of the concern undoubtedly lay a heavier responsibility on the directors than generally accompanies the office.

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interests are so much vaster, the profits to be made so necessary to tolerable existence, the losses to be insured against so utter and irreparable, that the directors of the British empire are surely called upon to exercise a more than usually unsleeping vigilance over the operations put in their charge. What would the world say of trustees so careless of their trust that in a matter of insurance they took no trouble to satisfy themselves either of the amount of the property to be protected, of the dangers to be forestalled, or of the extent of the insurance necessary to cover these dangers? would the world say of directors so haphazard in their direction that they let an important branch of their business run on without being clear in their own minds what amount of plant it needed for its

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efficient working, and what number of hands were required to do justice to the plant? In the relatively small and unimportant sphere of a Limited Company such men would be branded as culpably incompetent, if nothing worse. Yet in the matter of the security and defensive force of the British empire we have seen within the last few days a strange sight. The First Lord of the Admiralty has proposed to Parliament the Estimates he requires to run his department. These may be adequate or they may not; but the wonderful thing is that the First Lord does not seem to know whether they are adequate or not. If the Estimates for 1897-98 are sufficient it is by a lucky chance, since assuredly Mr Goschen can give no coherent demonstration of their sufficiency. And more wonderful still, it seems nobody's business or interest to ask for such a demonstration. Leaving aside a few isolated protests-far fewer and more isolated than usual.

the country has accepted this rough guess at its most indispensable requirements in a spirit of the happiest-at any rate the happiest-go-lucky-confidence. In whom it reposes the confidence it is difficult to say. It can hardly be Mr Goschen-first, because Mr Goschen has contradicted himself, and secondly, because on the whole neither the House of Commons nor the country has taken the trouble to hear or see whether he contradicts himself or not. To go minutely into the shiftings and windings of this year's official statements concerning the Navy would be a long and useless task. Some of them will have to be considered presently,

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but just now we are only marvelling at the fact that in a question where clear-headedness is of such obvious and primary value, the First Lord should be driven to any shiftings and windings at all. In introducing last year's Estimates he promised that they would bring some point where we may stand." This year he proposes to build fresh ships costing several millions-which may or may not be advisable, but which can hardly be called standing. Last year he casually alluded to the naval pensioners as a possible source of reinforcement to the fleet in war-time. This year the pensioners, who in other respects have not changed their character during the twelve months, find themselves promoted to a force of 10,000 available men, which is practically added to the sea-strength of the Navy. They may be available or not; but if they were not counted in last year, why should they be this? In one of his speeches this year Mr Goschen returned to his "point where we may stand " in another form. There is a balance of naval power in Europe, said he, and if this is disturbed by abnormal effort on the part of any Power, we shall restore that balance. If this means anything, it means that at the moment the desirable equilibrium exists-that our side of the balance is satisfactorily weighted. Yet in the very same speech we find him turning to his critics with words of earnest deprecation. His programme, says he, is not an ideal one; it is simply the best possible at the moment. Now, what is an ideal programme? It can only mean a sufficient one for possible exigencies; since it is nobody's ideal to spend his money in more preparation than he deems necessary. So that on the evidence of the "balance" phrase the

Navy is sufficient; on that of the "ideal" phrase it is not. But both these phrases are in the same speech! We could multiply such contradictions, but what is the use of it? It is plain enough, and only too plain, that the First Lord of the Admiralty is not clear in his own mind whether the Navy is strong enough for its duties or not. As long as he knows not what is wanted, it is vain to be very confident that he will see it provided.

It would indeed be asking too much of any Admiralty to expect it to calculate down to the last penny the sum which would make the difference between readiness for war or unreadiness. The subject is not an exact science, and does not admit of such calculation. Yet there are Governments which seem to be able to make up their minds on the point. That of Germany, for example, which has the needs of possible war ever before its eyes, has found no difficulty in fixing its naval requirements as far ahead as 1902. It is not to the present purpose to ask whether the Kaiser's Government has or has not overstated its requirements, nor whether the Reichstag ought to grant them. As to the first point, it is enough that it has been found possible to make a definite estimate of the shipbuilding desirable during six years. As for the second, the Kaiser may go back upon his demands, but no British Government can shelter itself behind the precedent. The Government knows, and Mr Goschen freely admitted in his speech of March 5th, that this country at least will give all it is asked for. It has only to make up its mind and it will get what it wants. Nor is Germany our only example. It is not the custom of Russia to unveil her designs to the world, yet it can hardly be doubted that

the abnormal activity of the dockyards accords with a definite and far-seeing design. The advance of the Russian fleet has been among the most remarkable movements of the present decade. The Russian navy is formidable by its numbers alone, but doubly and trebly formidable by reason of its rate of increase. Of modern battleships, well - armoured and carrying heavy breechloaders, and huge calibre quick-firers, she had but five last year; two years hence she will have thirteen. Some of these are small, but it would need a large British vessel to go to meet them and defeat them. On top of this striking increase comes this year's new programme. Russia does not publish her programmes to the world, and it is therefore difficult to speak with confidence of her intentions. But so far as can be gathered she is maintaining the activity of her construction: two first-class warships, one second, and one third are spoken of. Adding these to the vessels already in hand, we get twelve new battleships to be completed for the years 1897-1900. Here is a rapid regular progression, and it is not too much to assume that it is intended to be a definite fulfilment of a definite need. For the calculation of such necessities and the orderly satisfaction of them we may search Mr Goschen's speeches in vain.

On the contrary, there seems direct evidence that no such calculation has been made, and no such satisfaction resolved upon. The fleet as provided for on last year's Estimates-that is to say, the fleet as it should stand on March 31st, 1899-was, on Mr Goschen's view, or rather on one of his views, sufficient for the likely demands upon it. We do not share that view, but for the moment we will allow its correct

ness. If the fleet was adequate on last year's Estimates, what did Mr Goschen need this year to maintain that adequacy? Russia, as we have seen, will probably lay down four ships; France certainly one, and probably more: what ought we to lay down? The guiding principle in such matters is believed to rest on the declaration of three admirals consequent on the manœuvres of 1888. We ought to possess a strength "beyond comparison with any two Powers." Yet in face of this most authoritative declaration, Mr Goschen is only proposing to lay down four battleships, as against a probable five of the next two Powers. Is that "beyond comparison"? He may reply, as in effect he has already replied, that this is only probability; as soon as it becomes certainty we can lay down other ships, and, thanks to our more rapid construction, can have ours ready for sea as soon as theirs. But can we? The truth is that our superiority in rapid construction is speedily becoming a delusion. We possess it, no doubt; but of what use is that if we do not use it? Now, Mr Goschen is not proposing to use it. He is going to build three of the 1896 battleships within couple of years or so. But the other two, on the showing of this year's Estimates, are not to be finished until after March 31st, 1899, though they were provided for the financial year beginning April 1st, 1896. That is to say, there will be more than three clear years between the provision for them in the Estimates and their completion for sea, which is constructing rather slowly than otherwise. Three of this year's four battleships tell the same tale. They will be voted by April 1st, 1897, but they will not be laid down

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