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of operations, and should be in an excellent position to judge whether certain newly specified military requirements are consistent with current and future needs.
Third, the OJCS should be the repository of extensive professional military judgment, in that most of the personnel assigned to the OJCS are military officers. Since the question of appropriateness and validity of a military requirement in large part requires such military judgment and experience, it follows that the OJCS should be an effective and competent reviewer of requirements developed by the Services. The OJCS is likely, however, to be unable to forcefully evaluate military requirements unless the institutional deficiencies of the JCS system -as identified in Chapter 4 -are corrected. o Option 1B-enhance the role of OSD in the evaluation of mili
tary requirements The major advantage of increasing the size and breadth of the staff of USDR&E is that such a civilian staff should be well positioned to be an independent evaluator of requirements proposed by the Services. In addition, to the extent that civilian control of various DoD decisions is desirable, this would result in substantial civilian control over one of the key types of decisions the Department of Defense makes —what new weapon systems to develop and produce.
There are potential problems, however, with greater utilization of the OSD staff as the primary evaluator of Service military requirements. The OSD staff has historically had no access to the operational plans developed by the OJCS, has a limited role in the formulation of national military strategy, and has limited professional military expertise. To the extent that the responsibility of any independent evaluator of Service-developed military requirements is to ensure the fit of such requirements with operational and strategic plans, access to or understanding of such plans and related military judgment are essential ingredients to perform the job. In addition, some thoughtful observers already believe that OSD is unwisely micro-managing the Services in many areas, including acquisition programs. This option could increase such micro-management tendencies in OSD. 2. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF FAILURE TO
ACHIEVE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE LEVELS OF MILITARY EQUIP
MENT COMMONALITY • Option 2A -create structures to promote communication
among users, requirements formulators, and procurers of simi
lar types of weapon systems At a minimum, it would seem that there should be mechanisms to promote communication among users, requirements formulators, and procurers of similar types of weapon systems. Formal structures to ensure communication among individuals in different Services involved with similar types of equipment would appear to be essential in order to make certain that Services were aware of what other Services were doing. Thus, the recent effort of the Joint Logistics Commanders to create the joint commanders groups is most welcome. It must be recognized, however, that while the existence of structures of this type would promote communication, they would not ensure commonality.
• Option 2B-enhance the role of OSD
One of the presumed roles of the USDR&E should be to search for opportunities for commonality in military equipment and to take whatever actions might be required to prevent unnecessary duplication of such equipment. USDR&E should be able to require common approaches to weapon system requirements, when it is de termined that such a common approach is feasible and desirable. In addition, USDR&E should be a repository of department-wide knowledge about technical capabilities, and should, therefore, be able to identify opportunities for common utilization of weapon systems or components of weapon systems.
o Option 2C-consolidate the buying commands
If there are strong arguments for consolidation of the buying commands, an issue that is discussed at somewhat greater length later, those arguments do not have to do with the formulation of military requirements. Since the buying commands do not formulate requirements, but become involved only in the execution, consolidation of the buying commands would not necessarily promote common utilization of weapon systems. Such consolidation might, however, promote utilization of a greater number of common components.
Each of the buying commands of the Services is presently an exceedingly large organization, and there is a real and serious question about whether a consolidated command would be manageable. In addition, a consolidated command would almost certainly take away the supervisory responsibilities of the Service Secretary and Chief. It remains to be seen whether such extreme centralization would have more advantages than disadvantages.
o Option 2D -develop a larger number of joint programs
The issue of joint programs is discussed at greater length in the discussion of problem area #3. It should be adequate to state at this point that a joint program is the most direct means of obtaining common utilization, if it is determined at the outset that two or more Services can use the same type of equipment, either in identical form or with only slight modification. 3. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF WEAK MANAGE
MENT OF, AND GENERAL RESISTANCE TO, JOINT PROGRAMS o Option 3A –let OSD manage all joint programs and assign a
program manager The main advantage to giving OSD a controlling role in joint programs is that, though a number of military officers serve in OSD, it institutionally has no Service bias or affiliation. As already indicated, one of the problems in the management of joint programs is that it is difficult to maintain equal Service commitments to various programs. Controlling these programs through a program manager reporting directly to an OSD official might relieve that problem. In addition, OSD should have the technical expertise to manage programs, and it should have the detachment from any
Service interest to resolve disputes about technical requirements that are raised.
This would be a significant role change for OSD. Some of the other impacts of this change are summarized by GAO:
It would alter the character and structure of USDRE, requiring enlargement of control and the scope and depth of the staff. It might have to infringe on the military service -doctrine, capability selection, and service expenditure choices. It would be at odds with DoD administration's favoring decentralizing the decision-making to the Military Departments. ("Joint Major System Acquisition by the Military Services: An Elusive
Strategy,” page 32) The primary shortcoming of this option is that OSD presently exercises no line management over the various programs. Therefore, it would almost certainly not be well equipped to suddenly exercise such line management. The buying commands, on the other hand, already have very large program management organizations and the staff support that these require. o Option 3B-reserve a block of OSD funds to finance the devel
opment phases of joint programs The primary advantage of reserving department-wide funds, rather than Service funds, to finance the development phases of joint programs is that the Services might be willing to cooperate in joint program development if their own resources were not being used. However, there is some question as to whether this would truly be the perception, since set-aside funds are still defense money and would probably be viewed as such in the eyes of the Services. o Option 3C—ensure that OSD protects the funding levels for
joint programs As has already been noted, OSD could achieve control of joint funding with existing authority, if it chose to exercise it. This option should theoretically pose no difficulties to anyone, since OSD should, with respect to all departmental programs (whether joint or single Service), be exercising sufficient control over the budget to ensure that resources commensurate with the importance of the program are committed. OSD could certainly use this same authority and discretion to maintain sufficient support of all Services for joint programs which it regards as programs of critical importance. 4. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF EFFECTIVE
DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION OF ACQUISITION • Option 4A-consolidate the buying commands
The theoretical benefits of a consolidated acquisition agency are relatively apparent. There would presumably be common policies, common contract administration, greater coordination of departmental research efforts, greater flexibility in staffing, and other similar related benefits which should arise from having one procurement agency.
On the other hand, each of the existing buying commands of the Services is already an exceedingly large organization, and a consolidated agency might be unmanageable.
The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985 directs the U.S. General Accounting Office to conduct a study of the feasibility of creating a consolidated acquisition agency and asks GAO to identify advantages and disadvantages of such a plan. It would seem essential to have a very detailed feasibility analysis and exceedingly careful study before any action as far-reaching as this option was undertaken.
In addition, it might generally be desirable to look toward more incremental means of achieving greater coordination and integration of the buying command activities. Incrementalism offers the benefit of being able to make careful adjustments at different stages of the process. There is always the concern with any change as massive as consolidation of the buying commands that substantial unforeseen problems might result. o Option 4B—have the commanders of the buying commands
report directly to a senior official in DoD Option 4B is similar to the present system in the United Kingdom. Though the Ministry of Defense
in Britain has procurement agencies in each Service, the senior official in the Service responsible for procurement reports to the Minister for Defense Procurement.
Under this option, there would be no change in the buying commands of the Services, but there would be a line reporting relationship directly into OSD rather than through the Service military and civilian chains of command. The advantage of this option is that it would give the senior OSD acquisition official control over the individuals actually performing procurement. Presently, for example, the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition and Logistics is limited in his ability to affect results. He may issue guidance, directions, or policy, but the implementing officials work for the Services. If those individuals worked for the responsible OSD official, then there should be far greater OSD control over day-to-day procurement activities.
A primary drawback of this option is that it is inconsistent with the general management policy of decentralization of the present Administration. Both the Service Chief of Staff as well as the Service Secretary would probably regard it as totally unacceptable to have all the acquisition functions of the Service removed from their jurisdiction. They might well feel that some of the most important areas of management were no longer under their control.
In addition, the process of weapons development and acquisition is one that must be carefully related to operational realities. Creating a reporting relationship directly into OSD would reduce the interaction between users, requirements formulators and the acquisition community. • Option 4C-strengthen OSD coordination using existing struc
tures This option is another of the type where OSD technically has the authority to provide coordination, but may not be exercising that authority. The question, then, is whether or not OSD coordination efforts have sufficient top-management support to require Service conformance with established policies. It would seem that this should be unobjectionable, since presumably if OSD issues a policy, it would be implemented by the Services.
o Option 4D-consolidate contract administration
The primary advantages of consolidating contract administration services are that plants would not shift from one Service to another for contract oversight purposes if the balance of business at a plant shifted from one Service to another; no Service would have its contracts overseen by officials of another Service; and there would be uniform contract administration policies, practices, and procedures.
The view has been expressed that the Services, through their plant representative offices, do an effective job of contract administration. It is not clear, however, whether the Services do the job of contract administration more professionally than the Defense Contract Administration Service. Service control of contract administration would seem to be preferred to consolidated administration only in those instances where tangible benefits from Service control can be shown.
G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the acquisition process. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).
Recommendations 1. There is insufficient as- 1A. Enhance the role of the Orga
sured connection between nization of the Joint Chiefs of national military strategy Staff in the formulation of miliand the formulation of mili- tary requirements by requiring tary requirements.
the OJCS to prepare an assessment of newly specified military requirements.