value it on the ground of high moral principle. To judge of France in that respect, we need only look at her literature.

Does any writer in France dare to take up the ground of condemning the French aggressive warfare in past times? Look at the national mind, as exhibited in public meetings-Has there ever been a meeting called for the purpose of recording a dissent from the principles of lawless conquest? In this country, had our Government attempted any thing so wanton and unprovoked as the appropriation of Algeria, the public feeling of the land would have put down the attempt summarily. In France there has been not a murmur heard except on the score of economy. As to India, the case is far different. Those who pretend that we have proceeded, in that instance, on principles of aggression, do so generally in pure ignorance of the facts. We have always been the assaulted parties. For that is virtually the character we hold, when preparations and treaties have been going on for eventually assaulting us. To anticipate, in such a case, through superior energy, address, or knowledge-that is not aggression. Besides, though that is not what we rely upon, the Company would be unfairly confounded with the British nation; and the mere distance obscures the facts. So determinately hostile is the public mind amongst us to all unprovoked aggressionto war waged for the primary purpose of profit-that, even in the case of China, where our provocations were gross and manifold, and tended to utter ruin of our interests, a movement was beginning to stir amongst the public for remonstrating against any appeal to arms. And it would have spread rapidly, had it not been for two counteracting forces. 1st, the Duke of Wellington's authority. He, as one who had been familiar with Eastern affairs, was listened to when he assured the public that their officers, the Queen's representatives, had been scandalously treated; that he had never read of any thing so bad; and that the public faith of the Indian Government required a military movement. In this way, and by his own commanding name, he gave a turn to the gathering storm. 2dly, The national good sense, which suggested at

once that the information yet was too local and too narrow to furnish a ground for any public expression of opinion. In its present stage they felt that the conduct of the affair was left with more propriety to the Government. But had the case of Algeria in 1830, or of Egypt in the year 1799, been ours, the Government would have been compelled to desist by the national voice. From a nation so wantonly aggressive as the French, governed by feelings so essentially ju venile of martial vanity, we have every thing to fear. Temper and position alike make France formidable to us. But in Russia, neither the territorial situation, which nowhere places her in contact with ourselves, nor the national temper, which is not aggressive, nor the national interest, which in no point clashes with our own, gives us any cause for jealousy. Beforehand, we see no presumption arising that Russia should look with favour upon any feud with England; and, looking back to such feuds as have been created on her behalf by the French press, we see quite as little of any plausible grounds for the belief.

Let us begin with Khiva. If any thing could point the attention of the British press to the injurious use made of the Russian name in the foreign journals, it would be Khiva. Simply to reprint their own notifications upon this subject, would be the severest exposure. Seven times running, at seven independent periods of time, the London journals have solemnly announced to the world-that a Russian army had reached Khiva. Seven times running have these journals been obliged to confess, within a week of this general assurance, that all was smoke and mere abuse of the public credulity. To some readers this will seem to argue mere carelessness and levity of faith; but what is that more than every body allows for in newspapers? Surely no man of the world believes any thing until it has received official sanction, and then only according to the circumstantial details avowed. True; but these statements as to Khiva were never given as reports; they were announced, in each separate instance, as something that had been long expected, was at length accomplished, on which the public might finally rely, and with a consciousnes, that more was conveyed than the mere

military fact; there was an understanding between the editor and his shadow. Here at length is the political fact; here is that overt act of Russian aggression which we have so long promised. And again there were circumstances of distinction. Usually, when an editor has found himself indiscreetly misled into making his journal an instrument or ally of de. ception, he draws attention, with honourable frankness, to his own errors. He is even anxious to confess an error of credulity or inattention, lest the public should suspect an error of design. But in this long series of falsehood as to Khiva, as each successive falsehood was announced, no reference was made to previous exposures, no caution given as in a case liable to delusion; and in each subsequent withdrawal of the statement, no confession was made of error. But there is more to be remembered than simply this singular obstinacy of error, and this determination to avow no error. Generally and inevitably, where no tricks are going on underground, the natural course for an intelligent editor is that, after repeated duperies, he becomes at least aware of the fact; his attention is called to the uniformity of the deception; he not only feels sorry that his journal has lent itself to the propagation of falsehoods, but he begins to suspect a purpose in this systematic falsehood. It is no longer simple distrust of the information that he feels-it is jealousy of the intentions. This is the natural course; but this was no the course followed in this case of the anti-Russian journals. Duly as this lie was withdrawn, duly as the contradiction was extorted and racked out of the newspapers by the mere progress of certainties, upon the very denial as to the fact was engrafted a re-assertion of the lie as to the calumnious meaning. Coupled with the very words of confession, that all the previous circumstantialities had been mere fictions, came a more bitter fabrication than ever of new circumstantialities arguing the deepest hos tility in Russia.

But, after all, the malignant reports of intriguers, whatever be their exaggeration, and whatever their motive, are good for our instruction and for our faith, in so far as they coincide with the statements of the honest. Now, is it not certain that our own

incorruptible agents in Persia, and more recently in Cabul or other parts of Affghanistan, have corroborated these French reports in part? We answer, with this distinction--they have corroborated them in that part which Russia has no interest in denying. All that is hostile in our European fictions, disappears from the facts of our own British agents. But we must remember one caution in reading even British letters on this subject; the honourable character of the writer will secure him from reporting unfaithfully what comes under his own knowledge, but cannot secure him against most unjust opinions, nor even (as respects downright facts) against precipitation and the large credulity of prejudice. Not an officer in the Indo-British army, not au attaché in any legation or royal commission, but has gone to those regions with pre-occupied minds. On this subject, there is no truth or impartiality to be found in the British press. It scarcely matters what journal a reader relies on; all are anti-Russian, with a unanimity that we do not remember on any broad aspect of politics in our times. And so rapid is the intercourse at present, especially with Bombay and the whole of Western India, that the private letters from Affghanistan at this time, reflect the most recent prejudices of the London journals. What is said on Midsummer day, by a morning paper, comes back to us from Cabulistan by Michaelmas; and the Michaelmas impression of London rebounds from the Upper Indus by Christmas.

Our British testimony, therefore, is good only for its facts: and amongst its facts only for that part which depends on official report. For all beyond this, we insist, that British testimony, as it is ultimately, even in Cabul or Candahar, only a reflection from the London press, and therefore of the Continental press, in so far as opinions are concerned, comes to us through a French atmosphere, distorting its proportions and colouring its complexion. So that all of us, in the moment when we think ourselves most on our guard against false biasses, are too often unconsciously imbibing views originally French, French feeling as to persons, and French pre-occupations against truth. This caution given, let us now con

by possibility there might have been some hidden sense in surmounting so many difficulties, supposing the object to have been a permanent hold on that country; but on the other hypothesis of a mere fugitive purpose, it would be saying in effect that, for a purpose in transitu, and confessedly for no ultimate object, the Russian Government had selected that route, of all others in Central Asia, which experience has shown to be so difficult as that now notoriously it may be pronounced under absolute interdict and physical sequestration. We must suppose it to be designed for something more than a post in transitu, if we would vindicate the Russians from mere mania; and then, once having supposed that, once assuming that it is a fixed station as a centre or basis for ulterior operations to the south and south-east, we find it liable to all the capital dis advantages already recited under three heads.

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And, 4thly, It is liable to this be side, which, for any purposes of offensive war, seems conclusive. The passage of artillery from Khiva into Bokhara is pretty nearly a physical impossibility. Thus stands the case. The marauding people of Khiva go annually into Bokhara; as light cavalry, why should they not? The mountainous range between Khiva and Bokhara may be surmounted on horseback; but what means of transport will be applicable to the heavy artillery? Camels, no doubt, it will be said and accordingly it is known that, in all attempts to reach Khiva, the Russians have relied hitherto upon this animal-so admirably adapted to the steppes, or the sandy deserts of Asia. But why? Why is the camel adapted to that quality of ground? Notoriously, because both the steppes of Central Asia, and the sands of Western Asia, present, generally speaking, a dead level. To such ground, or nearly such, the use of the camel is confined. Let the road ascend at any thing of a sharp angle, and the camel is neutralized. This fact was first practically made known on a large scale to the British in Upper India. It is well known that of late years, instead of resorting to the Cape of Good Hope for the restoration of shattered health, English valetudinarians from every quarter of India have sought

health and relaxation of spirits in that delightful climate which is offered by the mountainous region to the northin fact, the advanced guard of the mighty Himmalaya. In one instance, when a governor-general was making a progress in this direction, it happened that, from mere thoughtlessness in the official persons consulted, the whole camp had trusted to camels for the conveyance of their baggage. But, as soon as the ascent began in good earnest, it became apparent that the camel is as unsuitable for steep hills as the "horse marines" for the decks of a ship. The motion of ascent is painful to the camel: he cannot ease the difficulty by traversing: he cannot guide his own bulk at the edge of precipices. Thousands of camel skeletons remain to this day in the bottom of ravines, attesting the wholesale ruin which attends the use of this animal in Alpine regions. How is it, then, that we ourselves convey heavy artillery in India? Generally speaking, we have benefited hitherto by flat countries as the seat of war. Secondly, we have the command of water carriage, vast regions of Hindostan being (as Major Rennell remarked in his work upon Indian geography) more elaborately reticulated with water than any known country unaided by art. Thirdly, when these advantages are wanting, (though it is to be observed that, from the recent application of steam to the Indus-we are moving upon the ascending scale,) we, from our local connexions, have the means of raising new local centres for the casting of great guns, without needing to transport them at all: an advantage which could rarely offer itself to a new or hasty invader.

These four points considered, it may be said very fairly, that as a station for a military power, as a basis for military operations towards the Indus, Khiva is as ludicrous an object for Russian ambition as Sir Gregory Gazette's equivalents would have been for papal diplomacy. On the other hand, if we are not determined to find mares' nests in every act of Russia, if we can content ourselves with plain reasonable purposes for a plain reasonable expedition, every man of good sense will find at once, in the real terms of that expedition, all that is sufficient to account for its very moderate objects. Once lend

your ear to lying numbers, you must then, by the mere logic of proportion, suppose-a lying object. Armies of forty or fifty thousand men do not move across Asia for a merely commercial purpose. But an army of ten to fourteen thousand might. And the purpose, though commercial, is really important enough for an expedition on that scale. The whole communication of Russia with China, on account of her two great capitals, is carried on overland. A certain route, leading the caravans not from the south, but from the east, upon regions liable to Khiva marauders, cannot be abandoned without vast difficulty and loss. This system of Khiva piracy has increased. The perils are personal as well as to the property. To sabre a few columns of these pirates does no lasting service. If the trade is not to be abandoned-if a great potentate is not to lie down helplessly before the robbers of Central Asia-the nest of these vipers must be occupied. The capturing of individual Algerine corsairs, did nothing to exterminate the system. Now, when Algiers itself is captured, piracy is at an end. Surely those who were so quiet upon all the ulterior purposes of France in that Algerine expedition, might upon mere parity of cases have supposed-that the Emperor of Russia, with a far greater interest at stake, (but an interest of the same kind,) might pursue the same policy for abating a nuisance under the same circumstances of provocation. The journals affect to laugh at the Russian zeal for the deliverance of two thousand obscure captives. But if that purpose happens to coincide with another, then, although the one might be unavailing, both might not. Even as regards the captives, the case is not truly stated. It is not to take vengeance, because captives have been made, and reduced to slavery. It is, that henceforwards cap tives may not be made; and, apart from considerations of person, the most luxurious portion of the Russian imports-all the tea, (of a far finer quality than any which we see,) all the spices, all the gems, all the ivory, &c., come by this route, lying open for three hundred miles to Khivan outrage. In short, the whole intercourse of Russia with south-eastern Asia, is concerned in the Khiva question. And in the commercial per

manence of the interest, arises the motive for attempting to reach Khiva by so difficult a route. Were the object merely to gain a station for military head-quarters in relation to some future base of military operations; then, in the event of so absurd a choice being made, the advance upon Khiva would have been, made without any sacrifices at all, through Persian provinces with Persian sanction. But the real object of Russia was to trace, 1st, The shortest route; 2dly, A permanent route; and to make that route safe, by a chain of military posts, for the commercial caravan. Now, it is clear that a route gained by Persian permission would have been a precarious route, and held on a tenure of accident. But the whole policy of the case was directly applied to the putting down of accident. The object was, that a great nation's commerce should no longer lie under the reproach of being the most perilous lottery in the world. There we see a good reason for floundering amidst Zaarrahs of snow, and fighting with storms. But had the motive for aiming at an occupation of Khiva, been what our journals and their suborners the French journals pretend, it is perfectly inexplicable why Russia should not have marched through southern latitudes, under permission from the Persian govern

ment.

Thus far as to Khiva, considered in the light of a means to Indian aggression; and in that light the whole scheme labours with so much absurdity, that, perhaps, we might find the reader willing to dispense with any separate consideration of the imaginary end. If it were evident to him that the whole plot against India is but a derivative fable from the fable about Khiva, then it must follow that with the one fable vanishes the other. If the means indicated were perfectly irrational with relation to the supposed end, it would follow of itself that no such end can have been contemplated by Russia. Yet, because the public mind is so much pre-occupied by this notion of Russia hankering after India, and French intrigues are so much interested in keeping up that delusion, very clear it is that no sooner will this Khiva romance be driven out of the market, than some other will take its place. There are, besides,