ward and join Reno. Heintzelman's corps, which had reached Warrenton Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being my purpose to push forward that corps, as soon as practicable, to Greenwich, about half way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I sent orders to Colonel Haupt, to direct one of the strongest divisions being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, and requested General Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be transported by rail, with the limited means of railroad transportation in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the Colonel commanding at Manassas Junction for the first division that reached there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that place, and directed him to push forward all of his cavalry in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, to watch any movements the enemy might make from that direction. I had instructed General Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, on the 22d of August, to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's station, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed General Kearney, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23d, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. After these precautions and assurances, I had thought, and confidently expected, that by the afternoon of the 26th, Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville; one division would have been occupying the works at Manassas Junction, and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could have been at once pushed north in the direction of Warrenton turnpike. The orders for the disposition of the forces then under my command were sent, and the movements made, so far as practicable, during the

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day of the 26th. About eight o'clock at night on the 26th, the advance of Jackson's force having passed through Thoroughfare Gap, cut the railroad in the neighborhood of Kettle Run, about six miles east of Warrenton Junction. The cavalry force which I had sent forward to Thoroughfare Gap, on the morning of the 26th, made no report to me. The moment our communications were interrupted at Kettle Run, I was satisfied that the troops which had been promised me from the direction of Washington, had made no considerable progress. Had Franklin been even at Centreville, on the 26th, or had Cox and Sturgis been as far west as Bull Run on that day, the movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap, upon the railroad at Manassas, would have been utterly impracticable. So confidently did I expect, from the assurances which I had time and again received, that these troops would be in position, or, at all events, far advanced toward me, that Jackson's movement toward White Plains, and in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, had caused but little uneasiness; but, on the night of the 26th, it was very apparent to me that all these expected reinforcements had utterly failed me; and that upon the small force under my own immediate command, I must depend alone for any present operations against the enemy. It was easy for me to retire, in the direction of the lower fords of the Rappahannock, to Fredericksburg, so as to bring me in immediate contact with the forces there, or arriving there; but, by so doing, I should have left open the whole, front of Washington; and, after my own disappointment of the reinforcements which I had expected, I was not sure that there was any sufficient force, in the absence of the army under my command, to cover the capital. I determined, therefore, at once to abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and throw my whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction, to crush the enemy, who had passed

many of his wounded, and much of his baggage on the field of battle.

"The railroad had been torn up, and the bridges burned, in several places between Bristow station and Warrenton Junction. I accordingly directed MajorGeneral Banks to cover the railroad trains at Warrenton Junction until General Porter's corps had marched from that place, and then to run back the trains as far as practicable, and covering them with his troops, to repair the bridges as fast as possible. I also directed Captain Merrill, of the engineers, with a considerable force, to repair the railroad track and bridges as far as possible in the direction of Bristow station. The road was, accordingly, put in order from Warrenton Junction to Kettle Run, during the 27th, and the trains ran back to that point early next day. At dark on the 27th, General Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he had but five ronnds to a man left. I had by that time become convinced that the whole force under Jackson, consisting of his own, A. P. Hill's, and Ewell's divisions, was south of the turnpike, and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his position during the night of the 27th, as did also Kearney and Reno, and it was clear on that night that he had interposed completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was still west of the Bull Run range, and in the neighborhood of White Plains. Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristow station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, was in little condition to make long resistance, I sent back orders to General Porter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at one o'clock in the night, and report to me at Bristow by daylight in the morning, leaving instructions in some detail for Banks, who was expected at Warrenton Junction during that night or early

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in the morning. General Porter failed utterly to obey the orders that were sent him; giving as an excuse that his men were tired, that they would straggle in the night, and that a wagon-train proceeding eastward, in the rear of Hooker's division, would offer obstructions to his march. He, however, made no attempt whatever to comply, with this order, although it was stated to him in the order itself that his presence was necessary, on all accounts, at daylight, and that the officer delivering the dispatch was instructed to conduct him to the field. There were but two courses left open to Jackson in consequence of this sudden and unexpected movement of the army. He could not retrace his steps through Gainesville, as it was occupied by McDowell, having at command a force equal, if not superior, to his own. He was obliged, therefore, either to retreat through Centreville, which would carry him still further from the main body of Lee's army, or to mass his force, assault us at Bristow station, and turn our right. He pursued the former course, and retired through Centreville. This mistake of Jackson's alone saved us from the serious consequences which would have followed this disobedience of orders on the part of General Porter.

"At nine o'clock on the night of the 27th, satisfied of Jackson's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push forward, at the very earliest dawn of day, toward Manassas Junction, from Gainesville, resting his right on the Manassas Gap railroad, and throwing his left well to the east. I directed General Reno to march at the same hour from Greenwich, direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearney to march at the same hour upon Bristow. This latter order was sent to Kearney to render my right at Bristow perfectly secure against the probable movement of Jackson in that direction. Kearney arrived at Bristow about eight o'clock in the morning, Reno being on the left, and marching

also to Gen. King, several times during the night of the 28th, and once by his own staff officer, to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west, and that at daylight in the morning our whole force from Centreville and Manassas Junction would be up with the enemy, who must be crushed between us. I also sent orders to General Kearney to push forward at one o'clock that night, cautiously, from Centreville along the Warrenton turnpike, to drive in the pickets of the enemy, and to keep closely in contact with him during the night; to rest his left on the Warrenton turnpike, and to throw his right well to the north, if possible, across Little River turnpike; at daylight in the morning to assault vigorously with his right advance; and that Hooker and Reno would be up with him very shortly after day-dawn. I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to be at Manassas Junction, where he should have been, in compliance with my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn, and stated to him the position of the forces, and that a severe battle would undoubtedly be fought during the morning of the 29th. The only apprehension I had at that time was that Jackson might attempt to retreat to the north, in the direction of Leesburg, and for the purpose of preventing this, I directed Kearney to keep closely in contact with him during the whole of the night of the 28th. My force was so disposed that McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, whose joint forces amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, were immediately west of Jackson, and between him and Thoroughfare Gap, while Kearney, Hooker, Reno and Porter, about twenty-five thousand strong, were to fall on the enemy from the east, at daylight in the morning, or very shortly after. With this disposition of troops we were so far in advance of Longstreet, that by using our whole force vigorously, we should be able to crush

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Jackson before Longstreet could by any possibility reach the scene of action. To my great disappointment, however, I learned, toward daylight, on the morning of the 29th, that King's division had fallen back in the direction of Manassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to Thoroughfare Gap, and making new movements and dispositions of troops immediately necessary.

"The disposition of the troops on the west of Jackson having failed, through Ricketts' movement toward Thoroughfare Gap, and the consequent withdrawal of King, an imminent change in the disposition and proposed movements of the troops for the succeeding day became necessary; and about daylight on the morning of the 29th, shortly after I received information of the withdrawal of King's division, I sent orders to General Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, supported by Reynolds' division, to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand, if it were possible to do so. I instructed General Heintzelman to push forward from Centreville toward Gainesville at the earliest dawn, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, and directed General Reno to follow closely in his rear; to use all speed, and as soon as they came up with the enemy to establish communication with Sigel, and attack with the utmost promptness and vigor. I also sent orders to MajorGeneral Fitz-John Porter, at Manassas Junction, to move forward with the utmost rapidity, with his own corps, and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was supposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from Manassas Junction to that place. I urged him to make all speed, that he might come up with the enemy and be able to turn his flank near where the Warrenton turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. Shortly after sending this order, I received a note from General McDowell, whom I