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Claim for damage to wharf by adjoining occupier.
2. The defendants are the owners and occupiers of a wharf and land which adjoins the said C. Wharf on the east side thereof.
Eq. 409; Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. 467.) It is a nuisance to display fireworks or other exhibition whereby disorderly crowds are collected near the plaintiff's house. (Walker v. Brewster, L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Inchbald v.
Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. 388.) Distinction
here is a distinction to be drawn between nuisances producing injury between
to property and those merely causing personal discomfort. The latter is nuisances
not always actionable, as this would stop many useful trades; but if the
nuisance causes a sensible injury to adjacent property it becomes actionto property able, as where vapours from a furnace injure the plaintiff's shrubs. and those infringing
(St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 35 L. J. Q. B. 66 ; and see Salvin v.
North Brancepath Coal Co., L. R. 9 Ch. 705.) With regard to personal on personal discomfort it has been held that if the alleged nuisance, such as noise or rights.
smoke, interfere with the comfort of human existence in the plaintiff's premises, it is actionable. (Crump v. Lambert, supra.) It has, however, been well settled that merely diminishing the pleasure of the plaintiff in
the enjoyment of his property is not actionable. No defence
If the act of the defendant causes discomfort amounting to a nuisance, that defen
it is no defence that in creating it the defendant only made a reasonable dant only
use of his land and premises. Thus where the defendant erected a brick made
clamp on his land for the temporary purpose of burning bricks for reasonable
building thereon, which clamp was 180 yards away from the plain. use of his
tiff's house, but situated on the most distant part of the defendant's
land, it was held that the erection constituted an actionable nuisance. property.
(Bamford v. Turnley, 31 L. J. Q. B. 286, Ex. Ch, overruling Hole v. Barlow, 27 L. J. C. P. 207. And see Carey v. Lidbetter, 32 L. J. C. P.
104.) Cases of
The question of nuisance frequently runs into that of negligence on the nuisance part of the defendant. Thus where a local board were empowered to erect and negli
in a navigable river a landing stage which was confined by anchors, the gence fre- board was held liable for an injury to a ship by one of the anchors on the quently
ground, that the anchor was not marked by a buoy. (Jolliffe v. Wallascy Local Board, L. R. 9 C. P. 62.) So where a gasfitter sent his servant the plaintiff to fix some gas apparatus in the defendant's sugar refinery at his request, and the plaintiff fell through an unfenced shaft in the refinery, the defendant was held liable for the injury caused by the fall. (Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 2_C. P. 311, Ex. Ch. ; and see Woodley v.
Metropolitan Rail. Co., L. R. 2 Ex. 384.) In the case of Indermaur v. Distinction Dames, the Court of Exchequer Chamber distinguished between cases between
where a person was on premises by mere permission (as to which see cases where
next paragraph) and where a person is on premises for lawful busiperson on
ness in which plaintiff and defendant are interested, in which case premises
the occupier of the premises is bound to use reasonable care to prevent for busi
damage from unusual danger which he knows or ought to know, and ness or by
it is a question for the jury whether he has taken reasonable precaupermission
tion, as by notice, lighting, guarding, &c., and also whether there was at time of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. (See " Negligence.") injury.
This doctrine seems to trench on the decision in Seymour v. Maddox, 20 L. J. Q. B. 327, where it was held that the owner of a theatre was not liable to an actor for injuries sustained by him by falling through an aperture on the stage which was not sufficiently lighted. The doctrine of Indermaur v. Dames, supra, was acted on in white v. France, 46 L. J. C. L. 823.
A person being on or using premises by mere license or permission, is in a different position from one using them, as in the case of Indermaur
3. For several months previous to the commencement of Claim for this action and down to the present time the defendants have damage to
v. Dames, supra, in the course of business with the occupier. The result Liability of the authorities on the subject is that in case of mere licensees the occu- of occupier pier is not liable for damage caused by something defective or dangerous of danon the premises, unless it be in the nature of a trap. (Bolch v. Smith,
gerous pre31 L. J. Ex. 201 ; Gantret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 Č. P. 371 ; Castle v. mises to Parker, 18 L. T. N. S. 364 (1868); Smith v. London and St. Katherine Docks' Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 326 ; Corby v. Hill, L. J. 27 C. P. 318.) It is licensees. on the principle involved in these cases that mere visitors cannot maintain an action through injuries sustained by reason of defects about the house. (See Southcote v. Stanley, 25 L. J. Ex. 339, and Collis v. Selden, L. R. 3 C. P. 495.) This exemption from liability where the injury arises from the negligence of a servant, has been put on the ground that the guest is in the same position as a servant with reference to the acts of the host's servants.
As a general rule the occupier of fixed property is liable for any Rule that nuisance occurring on (Bush v. Steinman, i B. & P. 401); but this
occupier of rule is now subject to so many exceptions, that it would be very dan
land liable gerous to act on it as a general principle. It has recently been held that
for where the defendant has brought another person on land in his occupa. nuisance tion, and allowed him to commit a nuisance thereon, he is liable for such
thereon nuisance. (White v. Jameson, L. R. 18 Eq. 303.) An occupier of land much is not liable for a nuisance committed thereon by a stranger without his
modified. consent, if he has not subsequently approved of it. (See Saxby v. Man. chester & Sheffield Rail. Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 198.) The most important exception to the above rule is where nuisances are
When caused on land in a person's occupation by the malfeasance, misfeasance, nuisance or non-feasance of contractors' servants in the course of work they have created by undertaken. If a contractor employed to do a lawful act causes a
servants of nuisance in the course of his work, he and not the person employing him
contractor. is liable for it. The same rule applies to cases of nuisance as to acts of negligence which may not come precisely within that category. The rule in both is that the wrong-doer himself or “the first person in the ascending line," who is the employer, must be looked to, but there the liability terminates, and the employer of such employer cannot be made liable. (Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C. P. 24. See per Willes, J., p. 27.) Where a contractor employed by navigation commissioners flooded the plaintiff's land by improperly and without authority introducing water into a drain insufficiently made by himself, the contractor and not the commissioners was held liable. (Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. B. 960, 975.) And if a person employs a contractor to build on his land, and the workmen of the latter excavate the ground so negligently as to cause injury to a house on the adjoining land, the contractor and not the person who employs him is liable. (Gayford v. Nicholls, 23 L. J. Ex. 205.) The im• Immediate mediate employer of the person whose act causes the injury, whether he be employer the contractor or sub-contractor, or even sub-sub-contractor, is the person of person liable. (Knight v. Fox, 5 Exch. 721 ; and see Murray v. Currie, supra.) causing The nature of the work raises a presumption that the person sought to be injury made responsible was an independent contractor, and not a servant. liable. (Welfare v. London, Brighton, f South Coast Rail. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 693.) The principle laid down in these cases would not apply in the Exceptions event of the employer of the contractor personally interfering or in any to rule that way making himself a party to the act or omission causing the injury. contractor (Burgess v. Grey, 1 C. B. 578.) Or where the thing ordered to be done liable. or any part of it, as opposed to acts of negligence or nuisance in the doing of it, is itself a nuisance. (Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., 23 L.J. Q. B. 42.) Nor where the employer is charged with a duty by
wrongfully and improperly stacked and kept stacked blocks of for damage granite and other heavy materials against and upon the eastern to wharf by im
wall of the said C. Wharf, and the said buildings of the plaintiffs proper use thereon, whereby the said wall and buildings have been crushed, of party wall by
cracked, and otherwise injured, and have been rendered danadjoining gerous and unfit for use. occupier.
4. By reason of the said trespasses and injuries so committed and caused by the defendants as aforesaid, the plaintiffs the said L. P. Co. have been put to great trouble and inconvenience, and have been prevented from using the said wharf and buildings in the way of their trade, and their goods in the said premises have been damaged and spoilt, and they have been obliged to find other premises for their business.
statute, as he cannot shift his responsibility by employing a contractor. (See Hole v. Sittingbourne, 30 L. J. Ex. 81.) This doctrine, however, seems hardly reconcilable with several cases. (See Knight v. Fox, and
Allen v. Ilayward, supra.) Contractor A contractor lawfully employed to construct a sewer under a road is not not liable, liable for injury caused to a person through a hole having formed in the when. road by the natural subsidence of the ground, assuming that the con.
tractor has properly completed the work. (Hyams v. Webster, L. R. 4 Q. B. 138, Ex. Ch.) In such a case the employer of such contractor would
not semble be liable. Owner of The owner of land is as a general rule not liable for a nuisance erected land not or caused on it after letting it. If, however, he lets with a nuisance on liable for it he continues liable for it (Todd v. Flight, 30 L. J. C. P. 21), but not if nuisance on the nuisance is caused by a particular mode of using that which was on it after let- the land at the time of letting. (Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. P. 783.) The ting.
landlord is liable for a nuisance arising from not doing repairs which as
between himself and his tenant he was bound to do, or if he retains a Unless he
control over the repairs. (Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 349.) Where A. let is bound to
to B. a field for the purpose of its being worked as a lime quarry. The repair or
ordinary way of getting the limestone was by blasting, and A. authorised retain con- the quarrying of the stone and the erection of the lime-kilns in the field. trol over it.
A nuisance was caused to the adjoining occupier by the blasting and by
the smoke from the kilns, and he brought an action against A. and B. Or unless On demurrer by A., it was held that he was liable, although the nuisance nuisance was actually created by the act of his tenant, because the terms of the the result demise were an authority from him to B. to create the nuisance, which of mode was therefore the necessary consequence of the mode of occupation conof occupa- templated in the demise. (Harris v. James, 46 L. J. C. L. 545; distintion con- guishing Rich v. Basterfield, supra.) Where the nuisance arises from templated. non-repair, the landlord not being bound to repair, see Nelson v. The
Liverpool Brewery Co., 46 L. J.C. L. 675. Proprietor The proprietor of collected water is not liable without negligence for of collected its escape caused by vis major; and a fall of rain of a kind which could water not
not have reasonably been anticipated amounts to ris major. (Nichols v. liable for
Marsland, 44 L. J. Ex. 134; 46 L. J. (App.) 134 (C. L.).) It was held escape of
also in that case that the liability of the proprietor of stored water does it by
not apply where a fresh agency intervenes between the water and the unusual
damage. (Fletcher v. Rylands, 37 L. J. Ex. 161, distinguished.) rainfall.
5. The plaintiff J. M. has lost the said company as Claim for tenants of the premises, and will be unable to let the same, and damage to he will be put to great expense in and about repairing the said premises, and his reversionary interest therein has been much injured.
The plaintiffs, the L. P. Co. claim £200 damages.
junction against the continuance or repetition of the
Injury to Dwelling-house by sapping its Foundations. 1. Before and at the time of the committing of the grievances Claim for hereinafter alleged, the plaintiff was possessed of a leasehold injury to interest in the dwelling-house known as No. ,—, in the house by county of M., and had underlet the same to weekly tenants.
conducting 2. The defendants in or about the months of September and building October, 1876, were employed in digging the foundations of an operations. intended building in a certain piece of land next adjoining to the land whereon the said dwelling-house is built, and so negligently, carelessly, unskilfully, and improperly conducted the said building operations by failing sufficiently to shore up the foundations and walls of the said dwelling-house, and dug the said foundations in the land next adjoining the land on which the said dwelling-house is built so carelessly, unskilfully, and improperly that by reason thereof the foundations and walls of the said dwelling-house sank and gave way and became and were greatly weakened, loosened, damaged, and unsafe.
3. In consequence of the premises the said dwelling-house was greatly injured, and the tenants of the plaintiff left the said premises, and the plaintiff for a long period of time was unable to let the house to lodgers as theretofore accustomed, and lost profits in consequence thereof.
4. In consequence of the dangerous, damaged, and unsafe condition of the plaintiff's said dwelling-house, so injured by the defendants as in the last paragraph mentioned, the plaintiff has been served by the M. Board of Works with a statutory notice to repair the said premises, and the plaintiff has incurred liabilities by reason thereof amounting to £200.
The plaintiff claims £300.
Nuisance on a Highway causing Damage to Plaintiff's Cab. Claim for 1. The plaintiff is a cab proprietor. The defendants are nuisance
paviors and contractors. on a highway caus- 2. In October, 1877, the defendants were employed by the ing special vestry of the parish of to do certain repairs to the roads the plain of the said parish, and for the purpose of carrying out such tiff.
repairs the defendants deposited on the roadway of V. Road in the said parish a quantity of sand and ballast so as to cause an obstruction to the thoroughfare.
3. The defendants in breach of their duty in that behalf negligently and carelessly allowed the said sand and ballast to remain on the said roadway during the night of the 27th of October aforesaid without fencing and lighting the same.
4. During the night aforesaid a hansom cab belonging to the plaintiff was being driven along the said roadway, as it lawfully might be, and in consequence of the inability of the driver to see the said obstruction caused by the negligence of the defendants as aforesaid, was accidentally driven against the said sand and ballast, and was overturned and greatly damaged.
5. The plaintiff incurred expense amounting to £10 in repairing the damage done to the cab by being overturned as aforesaid, and was prevented for a long time from letting out the said cab, and she lost the sum of £16 which she would have gained by so letting out the said cab as aforesaid.
The plaintiff claims £26 damages.
Statement of Defence. 1. The defendants deny that they were guilty of any negligence or breach of duty, and say that they properly and sufficiently fenced and lighted the said sand and ballast, and that the same was so fenced at the time of the accident.
2. The defendants say that the driver of the said cab might and could by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have seen the said heap of sand and ballast and the fence and light thereof, and have avoided driving against the same, and that the accident happened solely by reason of the careless and reckless driving of the driver of the said cab.
3. The defendants do not admit the statements of the 5th paragraph of the statement of claim.