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This option seeks to remedy this unfavorable situation by ending the power-sharing arrangement between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Secretary of Defense would be given broad authority to alter Service roles and missions. The Congress would forego its right to review these changes.
Abdication by the Congress of its role in specifying Service functions is a drastic step that does not appear justified by the circumstances. What appears to be needed is an expression of congressional willingness to objectively consider changes to roles and missions assignments which the Secretary of Defense believes are necessary. Implementation of the preceding Options 4A and 4B would in themselves be strong indications of a more favorable congressional attitude. G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Military Departments. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions).
Conclusions 1. The basic four-Service
structure of the Department of Defense remains a viable concept.
2. The positions of Service
Secretary can make important contributions to the management of the U.S. defense effort and, therefore, should be retained.
3. There is substantial confu- 3A. Specify in statute the responsi
sion about the authorities, bilities of the Service Secretaries responsibilities, and roles of to the Secretary of Defense. Service Secretaries.
3B. Remove inconsistencies in stat
utory descriptions of roles and authorities of Service Secretaries.
3C. Repeal the Service Secretaries'
authority to submit matters, on their own initiative, directly to the Congress.
3D. Strengthen the role of Service
Secretaries in DoD policymaking and other DoD-wide activities.
Recommendations 3E. Strengthen the role of the Mili
tary Departments in mission integration efforts by formally assigning the Service Under Secre taries responsibilities for crossService cooperation and coordination.
3F. Prevent the Service Chiefs
from circumventing the Service Secretaries.
3G. Remove the Service Chiefs
from the institution that provides unified military advice.
4. There are unnecessary staff 4A. Fully integrate the Secretariats
layers and duplication of and military headquarters staffs effort within the top man- in the Departments of the Army agement headquarters of and Air Force and partially intethe Military Departments. grate the Secretariat and mili
tary headquarters staffs in the Department of the Navy.
5. The Military Departments 5A. Correct the unfavorable per
suffer from inexperienced ception of political appointments political appointees and within the Military Departpoor continuity in senior ci
ments. vilian positions in the Service Secretariats.
5B. Require that Military Department political appointees have strong defense management credentials.
5C. Seek a longer commitment of
service from Military Department political appointees.
5D. Alter Federal tax laws with re
spect to forced sale of assets by appointed Military Department officials to permit the gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.
Recommendations 6. The current assignment of 6A. Require the submission by the
Service roles and missions President to the Congress of a is of limited utility in elimi- one-time report on Service roles nating unnecessary duplica- and missions. tion and in maximizing force effectiveness; in addi- 6B. Require the JCS Chairman to tion, there are no effective submit an annual report to the mechanisms for changing Secretary of Defense on Service roles and missions assign- roles and missions. ments.
PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM A. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental purpose of this study of the organization of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to evaluate (1) the civil-civil, civilmilitary, and military-military relationships among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, and Military Departments; and (2) the ability of these organizational arrangements to provide for sound planning, resource management, administration, and force employment. The reviews of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in this chapter and the acquisition process in Chapter 8 -both of which are internal decision-making processes designed to support the current organization -are intended to be secondary to these larger issues.
Despite this fact, changes to decision-making procedures within DoD can have significant effects on the performance of the
organization as a whole. There are three fundamental sources in DoD for improved organizational performance: (1) people; (2) organizational structure; and (3) managerial techniques. PPBS and the acquisition process represent the most important and visible applications of managerial techniques in DoD. Changes in managerial technology can serve as a substitute for changes in the other two areas. In particular, Allen Schick has written about the use of PPBS during Secretary McNamara's tenure as a substitute for reorganization:
PPB and departmental reorganization can be regarded as partial substitutes for one another. When PPB was flourishing in the Defense Department it was utilized to accomplish many of the objectives that had been sought in earlier reorganization attempts. Even though each of the military services retained its separate organizational identity, it was possible for the Secretary of Defense to make cross-cutting decisions by means of the mission-oriented program budget. (“A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal PPB”, Public Administration
Review, March 1973, pages 151-152) Beyond these considerations, perceived satisfaction or dissatisfaction with PPBS (with its current strengths and weaknesses) could, itself, be an important measure of the effectiveness of existing organizational relationships. Organizational deficiencies may become evident in the PPB system. In addition, it may be possible for PPBS to serve as one of the supplemental integrating devices discussed in Chapter 3. PPBS is, therefore, an appropriate topic for review while addressing the broad issue of DoD organization.
PPBS is DoD's formal process for arriving at resource allocation decisions. Its purpose is the translation of military strategy and