"The order was given, and the order of attack was formed. On the next morning, just before the column was to have started, General Sumner came up to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack. I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.' Advice of that kind from General Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advancing whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same opinion prevailed among them.

"I then sent for General Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated; and besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack-that he would give me all the support he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed-I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried.

"In the afternoon of that day I again saw the officers, and told them that I had decided to withdraw to this side of the river all our forces, except enough to hold the town and the bridge heads, but should keep the bridges there for future operations in case we wanted to cross again."

It was determined, however, by the advice of General Hooker, not to attempt to hold the town even, and on Monday night the Federal army commenced recrossing the river. By Tuesday morning the forces had disappeared from the south bank of the Rappahannock, and General Burnside's was another name added to the list of Federal generals who had suffered defeat at the hands of Lee and Jackson.

CHAPTER XXIX.

GENERAL BURNSIDE ATTEMPTS A LAST ADVANCE.

WE have not described the excesses which the Federal officers permitted the troops to commit in Fredericksburg-the burning of houses, the rifling of wardrobes, and the general spoliation of private property. These scenes, of the tragic and grotesque mingled-for men were found dead after Meagher's charge, with women's shawls and bonnets on-would take up too much space, and excite only disgust. They will doubtless be recorded by local historians in the future, and will remain a dark portion of the great picture of the recent struggle.

We pass to General Burnside's final effort to gain a foothold south of the Rappahannock. In the latter part of January, the Federal commander massed his army opposite Banks' ford, several miles above Fredericksburg, and the troops were already in motion to attempt the crossing of the river, when the weather suddenly changed, and torrents of rain descended upon the army.

The fate of any movement at this most unpropitious of seasons, was soon shown. General Burnside was literally stuck in the mud, and could not carry out his projected advance. The movement is described so vividly in army letters written to Northern journals at the period, that we shall make one or two extracts, and then dismiss the subject. One correspondent writes:

"Within a space of two miles the scene of confusion was greatest. In a deep gully, and on a hill-side, where the road ascended, where stuck fast more than a dozen guns, caissons, brigade wagons, and great headquarter wagons. The guns and pontoons were three days in reaching the ford, and had to be dragged by united labor of men and horses, when it was discovered that approaches to the river were impracticable. The mud in the freshly-cut roads was too deep. The men got in sight, they said, of rebel camp-fires.

"At every turn or rise on the road a wagon or caisson could be seen sticking fast in the mud; horses and mules were down in the mire, unable to rise. In every gully batteries, caissons, supply-wagons, ambulances, and pontoons were mired; horses and mules up to their bellies in mud; soldiers on the march sinking to their knees at almost every step. It was impossible to draw an empty wagon through the dreadful mud. The whole army was stuck fast."

Another correspondent gives a minute picture of the attempted advance, and of the feeling of the troops. He says:

"The march of the army to this place has been gloomy enough. The severest storm of the season has continued since early Tuesday evening until to-day. This afternoon there are signs of sunshine again. Of course the inclement weather rendered army operations upon any very extensive scale wholly impracticable. The execution of the orders for an advance would have been poorly enough in the finest weather, for, as I told you before, the army has lost its prestige; the soldier no longer thinks it an honor to belong to the Army of the Potomac. As an illustration of the feeling prevalent among the officers, I will say that when General Burnside's order, which you have no doubt already published, was read, the inquiry was made by an officer, 'What do you think of it?'

"General, it don't seem to have the ring,' was the response. "No, sir, the bell is broken,' said the General.

"Not that he meant any want of confidence in General Burnside; but the bell of the Army of the Potomac is sadly fractured, and its tones have no longer the clear, inspiring ring of victory. But I do not need to refer to the condition of the army at greater length. Every phase you can get will reveal the same truth, which is well understood here and at Washington.

"All day on Wednesday the men dragged their feet from one mud footstep to fathom another still more uncertain, and picked their way along the skirts of woods and fields and the edge of the road to keep as sound footing as possible. The cold rain poured in torrents.

"The mules and horses, already worn to hide and bone with cold and starvation, floundered and trembled in the uncertain ruts and deceptive mud pools. Teamsters and riders cursed and lashed their beasts, but to no avail. At two o'clock pontoons and guns and caissons, ammunition wagons and ambulances were promiscuously mixed and interspersed in one long line, where the mire was momentarily growing deeper and the darkness of night approaching. Each general and commanding officer whose business it was, were exerting themselves to their utmost to get the teams along. Some generals covered with mire personally directed the drivers and the squads of men who manned long drag-ropes and assisted the horses in moving the heavy loads.

"At the front the same state of affairs was observed. If the pontoons had been up on Tuesday; yes, if the army had moved when the order was first given, when the roads were dry and hard, instead of waiting a week, until the enemy had learned of the move and of its destination, and the utmost reasonable expectations of continued fair weather had passed, the march would have been fine and the crossing would have been easy. The place selected had all the advantages that could be asked, and to the rebels disadvantages which would have given us easy success. I forbear giving you the particulars of the location and preparations for crossing, as well as the strength of the army, guns, and such arrangements, as they may be secrets which would give the enemy an advantage should General Burnside return to the attack at this point when the roads are dry and troops rested.

"It had been contemplated to cross at several points, but the difficulty of moving pontoon trains and guns compelled the abandonment of all but one place, and the concentration of men and trains at that on Wednesday night. In fact, I suspect the purpose of crossing had been abandoned by General Burnside at that time, and the troops and munitions were concentrated for safety and convenience. The troops encamped in the splendid growths of oaks, and the number of axes plying, and general hum of life and activity, impressed one with the idea of stepping

into an immense ship-yard under full blast. The great blazing log fires soon warmed the wet garments, and the men slept soundly.

"On Thursday the order was circulated to stop the further advance of troops and wagons and batteries not yet up. The cavalry in part returned to their old camps. Light artillery was also sent back, and order sent to General Sumner's grand division, which had not yet moved, postponing indefinitely the orders to be ready."

"The bell is broken "-such was the figure employed to describe the depressed condition of the Federal troops at this time. At the risk of wearying the reader we shall add another paragraph upon the same subject, which finishes the picture. It is taken from the New York Times," and the article from which it is extracted is said to have greatly enraged General Halleck at the time when it was published:

"Sad, sad it is to look at this superb Army of the Potomac, the match of which no conqueror ever led-this incomparable army, fit to perform the mission the country has imposed upon it -paralyzed, petrified, put under a blight and spell; and on the other hand the noble nation bleeding to death and pouring out the rich wine of its life in vain.

"But the root of the matter is a distrust of the general conduct and ordering of things. They feel that things are at loose ends-in fact they know it, for our army is one that reads and thinks. This spirit of discontent is augmented by many causes of a special nature. For example: 1. They have not for many months been paid. Shameful and inexcusable in the Government. 2. The stagnation, ennui, disgust, suffering, sickness, and discontent of camp life in winter (without winter quarters), amid Virginia mud, cold, and rain. No small hardships, I can assure you; and it is doubtful if any European army ever had to submit to equally great ones. 3. General feeling of despondency resulting from mismanagement and our want of military success. Soldiers are severe critics and are not to be bamboozled. You may marshal your array of victories in glittering editorials—