CHAP. V.] ITS SIGNIFICATION. 281 in the House of Representatives voted for a resolution, to vote against which, on this occasion, would have by implication cast a direct censure on the President's reply to Adet, and this, too, at a period when that minority had come to claim that it was not only the "Administration party," but that it comprised the exclusively trusted political friends of the President. It is easy to conjecture why a Federal majority in the Senate should have felt the necessity of acquiescing in the same course to an extent sufficient to save appearances, and yet let its genuine feelings towards France break out in the vote on the amendment.' Nor would it be difficult to imagine at just such a juncture, charged with a recent act of undue partiality to England and unfriendliness to France-and when the treaty of London was about to run the gauntlet of a Republican House of Representatives-that the President should have used pretty high-colored language of official courtesy, in accepting the banner of France from the hands of Adet. Indeed, by common consent, there may always be, in diplomatic language, a certain latitude of friendly profession, which is construed to have no definite meaning beyond the conventional expression of friendly civility. But there are some limits required by custom and by decency, in even diplomatic exaggeration. Those limits are undeniably reached, when every conventional expression demanded by custom to evince civility and friendly regard is fully exhausted. To go beyond this into specific, insincere assertions, and to seek to give them additional force by warm declarations of concurring personal feelings and wishes, is gratuitous, and becomes as much an intentional and improper attempt at deception in diplomacy, as if the misrepresentation was made in the intercourse of private life. General Washington would never have been guilty of an approach to this kind of deception. Anybody who has read the preceding reply to Adet, will want no proof that it was not And with the exception of John Adams, they generally felt a correlative admiration for England. Mr. Adams's admiration stopped with the political system-even that he thought could be improved. But his feelings against France and its revolution were, nevertheless, as strong as those of his political associates. He who would test the accuracy of the views we have here taken of the feelings of the Federal leaders, has the most ample opportunities for so doing in the now published Works of John Adams, Hamilton, Wolcott, Ames, etc. etc. Ames's lamentations, of which we have given some specimens, had, anterior to this epoch, reached their full flow! Of the Federal leaders, whose works have not been separately published, numerous glimpses will be found in their letters, in Gibbs's Memoirs of the Administra tions of Washington and John Adams, and in Hamilton's Works. Never did picture gal leries preserve main characteristic lineaments better. 282 PRESIDENT'S FEELINGS TOWARDS FRANCE. [CHAP. V. imposed on him by a majority of his Cabinet-that it was gall and wormwood to that majority. In any case, he voluntarily made himself responsible to truth and to history. Can any one point out an instance where to attain a diplomatic object, or serve a personal turn, this great and pure statesman stooped to misrepresent not only his country's but his own opinions and feelings? Is there any specimen extant of an affirmative and gratuitous string of warmly-worded, hollow allegations, on his part, which would scandalize the memory of any potentate of Christendom, hardly excepting the Emperors of the lower Greek Empire, or the former petty princes of northern Italy, who studied their State maxims in the pages of Machiavel's Il Principe? Did not General Washington also admit in his "notes" on Monroe's "View," that he had instructed that Minister to express corresponding official and personal sentiments towards France? 2 What is the inference to be drawn from all these facts? Clearly and unmistakably, in our judgment, that the President's declarations to Adet were sincere. He felt the doubts and fears in respect to the event of things in France he had expressed to Jefferson, but in his heart he felt towards France what he solemnly declared on this occasion. The reply to Monroe shows -it avows-his causes of dissatisfaction with that power. None of these were political-none of them imply that sympathy or partiality for England scarcely disguised by a majority of his Cabinet, and by nearly all the chiefs of the party who had supported his Administration during the late crisis. If General Washington, as the Republicans asserted, heard but one sideif he was surrounded by a Cabinet who colored and distorted every fact in regard to our relations with France and Englandif he was led to misapprehend the respective character of those relations-who had the Republicans to thank for it, in part, but themselves? Had they not refused his solicitations to fill seats 1 Unless they (Pickering, McHenry and Wolcott) were ready for political effect, at the moment, to sanction sentiments directly at variance with their well-known opinions. It is due to them to say that the reader who studies the minute history of the period, will, we think, be satisfied that the Cabinet could never have sanctioned the President's speech to Adet. It was not probably submitted to their advice. It would be reasonable to suppose he put these sentiments in their strongest light before Jefferson, as we find him more bitterly complaining of the conduct of England to Hamilton than to the former. The motive for this, where it was his object to moderate the feelings and actions of the sides, and preserve a middle and prudent ground, would be obvious. CHAP. V.] FORCED FROM HIS POLITICAL NEUTRALITY. 283 in his Cabinet? Had they not taken an attitude of uncompromising opposition to a purely Executive measure to which he was committed, which could not be fairly said to be political in its bearing, and which was in every respect legitimate and honorable in the light of an experiment? They had a right to differ with him in regard to the ratification of the treaty. But had they any right, as sensible men, because he presumed to differ with them on that subject, to impeach his political motives? Had they any right, as prudent politicians, to force him into an attitude of party antagonism, by treating him as a party opponent? General Washington was literally forced out of his neutrality, and into the arms of a party who never agreed with his principles, or his cardinal maxims of practical policy. He was thrown among men who had one creed when they addressed him, and a totally different one when they privately addressed each other. The prestige of his great name was wantonly or most foolishly thrown away; the oracle was surrendered to false pythonesses, who would make its sanctity the authority for their own designing responses. All this we aver the Republicans brought upon themselves by a zeal which was too hot to be controlled by prudence and decorum. They rushed upon the buckler of the giant, and they and their country dearly paid the consequences! The reaction caused by the attacks of the Republicans on the President set its first currents against Monroe. Pickering sounded the charge. As true, as brave, as high principled, and as patriotic a man as there was in the United States, was denounced everywhere by the Federalists in language, much of which could only apply to a knave without any ties or pride of country, and presenting about an equal compound of the fool and the ruffian. General Washington's strictures have been alluded to. We will not farther recall them. They were made in moments of excitement, when Pickerings and Wolcotts were acting as the informers and witnesses. Had Washington lived longer, he would have recalled his imputations on an integrity which in spotlessness resembled his own. They were not unusual specimens of the tone of our early partisan conflicts. John Adams wrote Elbridge Gerry, from the Presidential chair, May 30th, 1797: "I had no share in the recall of Monroe, and therefore am not responsible for 284 PARTY VIOLENCE. [CHAP. V. the reasons of it. But I have heard such reports of his own language in France at his own table, and the language of those he entertained and countenanced, and of his correspondences with Bache, Beckley, etc., and his communications through the Aurora, that I wonder not at his recall. His speech at his audience of leave is a base, false, and servile thing. Indeed, it was Randolph who appointed him. He was, in Senate, as dull, heavy, and stupid a fellow as he could be consistently with malignity and inveteracy perpetual. A more unfit piece of wood to make a Mercury could not have been culled from the whole forest." And Mr. Adams then goes on to hint that by some means, not explained, but clearly not honest ones, Monroe's "confidential correspondents and intimate acquaintances" have suddenly become rich, and "roll in wealth!" It presents a curious specimen of human, and particularly of political "sea change," to snatch a glimpse down the future and see Mr. Adams, as a member of the Electoral College of Massachusetts, voting for this stupid and malignant if not corrupt "fellow" for President of the United States. Nor shall the Colossus, rampant or couchant, in this instance monopolize the inconsistency. We shall see the whole party which now denounced Monroe so violently, not only for his conduct in France, but for defending himself against the censures of the Cabinet, also supporting him for a second Presidency, with the talismanic words, "The Washington-Monroe Policy," inscribed on their party banners. But Monroe was not long the most prominent object of attack during the events we have been describing. A mightier form loomed up on the same side, amidst the smoke of the conflict. The press poured its steady volleys on him. Champions sought fame by individually and rancorously assailing him. Reptiles were fostered and caressed because they transcended all the decencies of previous party warfare, to pour out disgusting calumnies on his private character. The hasty and angry words of his contemporaries against each other and against him, have been passed over by those who have picked up and perpetuated every warm phrase of his to prove his bitterness of heart, and his personal hostility towards great and good men from whom he chanced to be separated in those warm political contests! The faults of the CREED are still avenged on the head of its PROPHET! For this letter entire, see APPENDIX, No. 13. CHAPTER VI. 1796. Treaty of London returned ratified-President proclaims it as in full force, without THE treaty of London was a long time in returning with the This was distinctly conceded by the leading Federalists. Ses Uriah Tracy to Oliver |
