strument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. This is certainly not such a case. It is said the Colonial and State Legislatures have been in the habit of passing laws of this description for more than a century; that they have never been the subject of complaint, and, consequently, could not be within the view of the general Convention. The fact is too broadly stated. The insolvent laws of many, indeed, of by far the greater number of the States, do not contain this principle. They discharge the person of the debtor, but leave his obligation to pay in full force. To this the constitution is not opposed. But, were it even true that this principle had been introduced generally into those laws, it would not justify our varying the construction of the section. Every State in the Union, both while a colony and after becoming independent, had been in the practice of issuing paper money; yet this practice is in terms prohibited. If the long exercise of the power to emit bills of credit did not restrain the Convention from prohibiting its future exercise, neither can it be said that the long exercise of the power to impair the obligation of contracts, should prevent a similar prohibition. It is not admitted that the prohibition is more express in the one case than in the other. It does not indeed extend to insolvent laws by name, 1819. Sturges V. Crowninisbeld. 1819. Sturges Crowninshield, The prohibi because it is not a law by name, but a principle which is to be forbidden; and this principle is described in as appropriate terms as our language affords. Neither, as we conceive, will any admissible rule of construction justify us in limiting the prohibition tution the under consideration, to the particular laws which gainst the States making have been described at the bar, and which furnished tion constitution a any law im pairing the ob- such cause for general alarm. What were those laws? We are told they were such as grew out of the ligation of con tracts, does not extend to pa per money or general distress following the war in which our inde tender laws, because these pendence was established. To relieve this distress, subjects are expressly pro vid d for; nor paper money was issued, worthless lands, and other is it to be li mited to instal property of no use to the creditor, were made a ten ment or sns pension laws, der in payment of debts; and the time of payment, because the terms of the stipulated in the contract, was extended by law. prohibition are general and These were the peculiar evils of the day. So much comprehen sive, and esta mischief was done, and so much more was appre blish the prin violability of ciple of the in hended, that general distrust prevailed, and all confiin dence between man and man was destroyed. To contracts every mode. laws of this description therefore, it is said, the prohibition to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts ought to be confined. Let this argument be tried by the words of the section under consideration. Was this general prohibition intended to prevent paper money? We are not allowed to say so, because it is expressly provided, that no State shall "emit bills of credit;" neither could these words be intended to restrain the States from enabling debtors to discharge their debts by the tender of property of no real value to the creditor, because for that subject also particular provision is made. Nothing but gold and silver coin can be made a tender in payment of debts. It remains to inquire, whether the prohibition under consideration could be intended for the single case of a law directing that judgements should be carried into execution by instalments? This question will scarcely admit of discussion. If this was the only remaining mischief against which the constitution intended to provide, it would undoubtedly have been, like paper money and tender laws, expressly forbidden. At any rate, terms more directly applicable to the subject, more appropriately expressing the intention of the Convention, would have been used. It seems scarcely possible to suppose that the framers of the constitution, if intending to prohibit only laws authorizing the payment of debts by instalment, would have expressed that intention by saying "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." No men would so express such an intention. No men would use terms embracing a whole class of laws, for the purpose of designating a single individual of that class. No court can be justified in restricting such comprehensive words to a particular mischief to which no allusion is made. The fair, and, we think, the necessary construction of the sentence, requires, that we should give these words their full and obvious meaning. A general dissatisfaction with that lax system of legislation which followed the war of our revolution undoubtedly directed the mind of the Convention to this subject. It is probable that laws such as those which 1819. Sturges v. Crowninshield. 1819. Sturges V. Crownin shield. have been stated in argument, produced the loudest tracts." If, as we think, it must be admitted that this intention might actuate the Convention; that it is not only consistent with, but is apparently manifested by, all that part of the section which respects this subject; that the words used are well adapted to the expression of it; that violence would be done to their plain meaning by understanding them in a more limited sense; those rules of construction, which have been consecrated by the wisdom of ages, compel Statutes of us to say, that these words prohibit the passage of usury laws, un- any law discharging a contract without performance. By way of analogy, the statutes of limitations, limitation and less retroactive in their effect, do not impair the obligation and against usury, have been referred to in argument; of contracts. and it has been supposed that the construction of the constitution, which this opinion maintains, would apply to them also, and must therefore be too extensive to be correct. We do not think so. Statutes of limitations relate to the remedies which are furnished in the courts. They rather establish, that certain circumstances shall amount to evidence that a contract has been performed, than dispense with its performance. If, in a State where six years may be pleaded in bar to an action of assumpsit, a law should pass declaring that contracts already in existence, not barred by the statute, should be construed to be within it, there could be little doubt of its unconstitutionality. So with respect to the laws against usury. If the law be, that no person shall take more than six per centum per annum for the use of money, and that, if more be reserved, the contract shall be void, a contract made thereafter, reserving seven per cent., would have no obligation in its commencement; but if a law should declare that contracts already entered into, and reserving the legal interest, should be usurious and void, either in the whole or in part, it would impair the obligation of the contract, and would be clearly unconstitutional. This opinion is confined to the case actually under consideration. It is confined to a case in which a creditor sues in a Court, the proceedings of which the legislature, whose act is pleaded, had not a right to control, and to a case where the creditor had not proceeded to execution against the body of his debtor, within the State whose law attempts to absolve a 1819. Sturges V. Crowninshield. This opinion confined to the case actually under consi deration. |
