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the military retained confidence in the security of the contingency plans.
The responsibility for review, however, should not be confused with the responsibility for authorship. Authorship would continue to rest with the unified and specified commands and the OJCS. If it were not to become a nuisance and were not to lose the confidence of the JCS, the office would have to exert authority to mandate changes in contingency plans only when an overriding policy consideration suggested the necessity. The office would lose all credibility if it started to rewrite contingency plans or to insist that minor changes be made for no clearly overriding reason. o Option 6B -create a joint OSD/OJCS office to review contin
gency plans. The same general criteria would apply to this option as to Option 6A. Precisely where the review office is based may be less important than how it is organized and how it functions, but only if its findings were clearly made part of the iterative strategy-policy-resources decision process. This option, through its joint OSD/OJCS nature, does offer the potential for much greater interplay of civilian and military officials. If this office ever lost the confidence of the JCS, great pressures to abolish it would result.
On the other hand, OSD review of contingency plans would be very different than that of OJCS. OSD reviewers would focus on ensuring that political assumptions of the contingency plans are consistent with national security policy and that the options presented in such plans are politically realistic. In contrast, OJCS would focus on the quality of the military strategy of the contingency plans. Given the different scope of these reviews, it does not appear that it would be useful to attempt to combine them. G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the conclusions and recommendations of this chapter concerning the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The conclusions result from the analyses presented in Section D (Problem Areas and Causes). The recommendations are based upon Section F (Evaluation of Alternative Solutions). Excluded from this list are recommendations that are more appropriately presented in subsequent chapters.
Conclusions 1. Mission integration is the
principal organizational goal of the Department of Defense.
Conclusions 2. Mission integration is nec
essary in both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD: the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands.
3. Mission integration at the
policymaking level of DoD needs to be substantially improved; DoD has failed to develop the extensive, supplemental integrating devices that it needs to achieve effective mission integration.
4. The functional organization 4A. Establish three mission-orient
of OSD is a major impedi- ed under secretary positions for ment to the promotion of (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) NATO mission integration at the defense, and (3) regional defense policymaking level.
and force projection.
4B. Assign to the office of each mis
sion-oriented under secretary portions of current policy and program analysis offices that have corresponding mission-related responsibilities and cells of functional specialists in resource areas.
4C. Establish an office for low in
tensity warfare and special operations within the office of the under secretary for regional defense and force projection.
Conclusions 5. Close coordination between
newly established missionoriented offices (recommendation 4A) and function-oriented offices would be beneficial, especially during the transitional period.
Recommendations 5A. Recommend to the Secretary of
Defense that he consider the creation of a mission-function matrix organization which would include the offices of the three mission-oriented under secretaries and five functional offices: Assistant Secretary (Strategic Planning); Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Under Secretary (Research and Engineering); Under Secretary (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support); and Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).
6. Many OSD offices are inad- 6A. Group assistant secretaries and
equately supervised and co- lesser officials in OSD under new ordinated, primarily due to or existing under or assistant the Secretary of Defense's secretaries (in line with recomexcessive span of control. mendation 4A) in order to
streamline the organization and to reduce the Secretary of Defense's span of control from 24 to 13 senior OSD and Defense Agency officials.
6B. Create the position of Under
Secretary of Defense (Readiness, Sustainability, and Support) to help streamline the organization.
7. Improvements to OSD orga
nizational arrangements and decision-making procedures should emphasize both structural change and enhancement of the defense management skills of senior officials.
Recommendations 8. OSD suffers from inexperi- 8A. Require that OSD political ap
enced political appointees pointees have strong defense and poor continuity in its
management credentials. senior management positions.
8B. Seek a longer commitment of
service from OSD political appointees.
8C. Alter Federal tax laws with re
spect to forced sale of assets by appointed OSD officials to permit the gain from such sale to be reinvested in similar assets without applying tax on the gain at the time of the forced sale.
9A. Reduce the size of the OSD
9. OSD is engaged in some
degree of micro-management of internal Service programs; OSD's functional structure is a cause of this micro-management problem.
9B. Reorient OSD's attention away
from functional micro-management and toward mission integration by creating mission-oriented offices (recommendation 4A).
9C. Hold Service Secretaries more
accountable for conformance to guidance from and decisions by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.
10. Planning and program- 10A. Create mission-oriented under
ming in OSD are unilateral, secretaries who would be asnot coalition, oriented.
signed responsibility for coalition matters in their mission areas (recommendation 4A).
11. The absence of OSD 11A. Create an OSD office, staffed
review of non-nuclear con- by a combination of civilian offitingency plans is incon- cials and military officers, to sistent with the principle review contingency plans. of civilian control of the military.