« 上一頁繼續 »
the whole Chivalric tradition and the growth of the worship of the Virgin. This analysis leads him to the conclusion that the religious significance of woman is due to the fact that woman embodies the soul of man. She is the personification of his unconscious. Hence the service of woman is the service of the soul. Having thus brought the religious conceptions of East and West into harmony with the concepts of modern psychology the author returns to a discussion of the significance of the reconciling symbol in Spitteler's poem, and he is now able to show that notwithstanding its classical mythological setting, the problem which the poet's intuition has seized is essentially the religious problem. It is the poet's unconscious response to the world's need.
It is quite impossible to make an objective judgment of this inspiring contribution to the most urgent problem of our time. As far as my knowledge goes it is the first serious attempt to bridge the gulf between psychology and religion. As long as science is wholly confined to the world of objective facts, and religion to the realm of subjective experience, an impassable gulf must divide them. To bridge this gulf both science and religion must relinquish their absolute claims. The acceptance of the relativity of the idea of God inevitably involves the relativity of the claims of empirical science. To empirical science the religious problem is a closed door, because it denies to subjective reality the same validity it gives to the world of concrete facts. Psychology, if it is to deserve the name, must advance beyond the limits of empirical science and enquire into the nature of man as a subject. The idea of God, or "supreme psychic value," is a psychological fact which demands a psychological formulation. This extension of the realm of science does not necessarily mean an encroachment upon the essential values of religion. Science is knowing, religion is being, and these are for ever incommensurable states. What the religious emotion may be in itself is as much beyond the limits of intellectual cognition as is the essence of feeling. But the religious process, regarded merely as a process should fall within the range of science, and Jung's formulation of the "transcendent function" is the first attempt to embrace the religious process in a scientific concept. With this concept nothing mysterious is intended, but merely a combined function of conscious and unconscious elements or, as in mathematics, a common function of real and imaginary factors. In religious symbolism it is expressed as the God-renewal emerging from the conflict of the opposites. Bergson expresses the same idea when he says "the idea arises from the edge of conflict." Jung regards this function as a basic psychological principle by which successive transformations of the libido take place. The result of the conflict between a conscious and unconscious antithesis finally emerges as a new attitude. But this can only take place when the ego stands resolutely detached from either side, for when it becomes identified with either side the opposite is again repressed and the conflict begins again, albeit on a new level.
In Chapter VI Jung discusses the type-problem in psychiatry with special reference to Otto Gross' hypothesis of the primary and secondary functions and the two corresponding types or personalities which Gross describes.
Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the type-problem in aesthetics particularly with regard to the two typical attitudes described by Worringer as "feeling into" and "abstraction."
In another chapter a work by Fourneaux Jordan is analysed (Character as seen in Body and Parentage) from the point of view of typical characters and the whole question of the criteria of judgment is carefully discussed.
The Apollonian-Dionysian antithesis elaborated by Nietzsche in his "Birth
of Tragedy" is the subject of another chapter and throughout the book there are numerous references to Nietzsche's psychology and ideas. Nietzsche as the advocate of power, and Wagner as the advocate of love are clearly figures of immense significance for minds of the present epoch, for the clash of these two elemental forces represents in a very special degree the problem of our time. Pragmatism and William James' characterological classification are the principal themes in the chapter on the type-problem in modern philosophy. James' characters are seen to fall broadly within the categories of extravert and introvert but they are criticized as being conceived too exclusively from the intellectual standpoint.
The chapter on the type-problem in biography deals principally with the biographies of famous scientific investigators as treated by Ostwald, who succeeds in establishing two distinct types, the Classic and the Romantic, which are shown to correspond with the extraverted and introverted attitudes. But it is in his general description of types that Jung's amazing psychological finesse is most in evidence. With absolutely sure touch he draws in the general character while omitting the particular and individual. From thousands of individuals he has selected just those characters which are typical. Every feature of these Galtonesque portraits bears witness to a range of psychological experience and an intuitive capacity that is surely unique in the literature of science.
In every type-portrait the conscious attitude is tellingly contrasted with the attitude of the unconscious. The conscious man is, as it were, distinguished from his shadow, and so completely has Jung taken into account his own psychological disposition that it would be hard to tell from these portraits to which type he himself belonged. This fact is itself the best evidence for the whole argument of the book which the author eloquently summarizes in his conclusion, wherein he reasons, that in view of the basic heterogeneity of the psyche no common ground of understanding can be reached in any sphere until the problem of types has been generally recognized. Not only is the recognition of this problem essential for the purpose of regulating acute differences in standpoint, it is also the pre-condition of any general comprehension of that immense query, alike in medicine as in every other branch of knowledge, which we vaguely term the "individual factor."
Not the least valuable contribution of this great work is the final chapter containing fifty-seven comprehensive definitions of the principal psychological concepts employed by the author. This is an example which other writers in this sphere would be wise to follow, especially in view of the fact that a great deal of the literature has to undergo the process of translation, thereby inevitably introducing an added element of ambiguity and doubt as to the exact meaning of the author's original concept.
This work is an important departure from the general view-point of psychoanalytical literature, which tends to regard the psychic process from the standpoint of the basic uniformity of its elements, and to disregard the equally essential heterogeneity of the differentiated psyche. It is an attempt to consider the psyche as a whole and not merely the elementary mechanisms into which psychic activity can be resolved. The book has a range of view and a wealth of thought which is liable to evade the grasp of a specialized mentality. Like every great work it is proof against every superficial attempt to glean its content, the essence of which may indeed require the lapse of many decades for its full significance to be generally appreciated.
H. G. BAYNES.
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. By Prof. SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D. Authorised English Translation by JOAN RIVIERE, with a Preface by ERNEST JONES, M.D. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. pp. 395. Price 18s.
In giving us this translation of Freud's Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, Mrs Riviere has done a signal service to psychology and conferred upon English readers an inestimable boon. Not a little of the misunderstandings which have accompanied the spread of Freud's views in Englishspeaking countries may be traced to the faulty and inadequate translations of psycho-analytical literature which have often been offered to English readers. This volume is one of the few translations of Freud's works which make us feel that the translator is at home in both languages, and the consequent ease in understanding what the author means is very welcome.
This translation has been before the public for over a year and is no doubt well known to most of our readers. Both to the beginner and to the advanced student it has proved the most helpful single work of Freud; for not only does it present, in the first and second sections, an incomparable account of the foundations on which psycho-analytical practice and theory have been built up, but, in the last section, it brings to our notice the most recent developments of the science in its application to the treatment of the neuroses. Here also we find adumbrations of some of those more speculative hypotheses which of late years have set the seal on Professor Freud's reputation as one of the profoundest thinkers of our time.
It had originally been our intention to review this book in the ordinary way, as we might review any other volume issuing from the press. But a little consideration made it plain that this would be an almost impossible task. A merely descriptive notice would have been an impertinence to our readers, for all the fundamental conceptions contained in the book have been known to us for many years through the earlier works of Freud himself and those of other psycho-analysts. On the other hand, a critical notice would have been an impertinence to Professor Freud, for all that is new in the book is for a time exempt from criticism; and until what is new has been put to the test of experience we may ask, in the author's words, "Of what use is the most excellent judgement where there is no knowledge of the subject under debate?"
T. W. M.
Remembering and Forgetting. By T. H. PEAR, M.A., B.Sc., London; Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1922. pp. xii + 242. Price 7s. 6d. net.
"It was necessary to compress into a few lectures enough information about ordinary remembering and forgetting to enable officers of the R.A.M.C. to estimate the abnormality of these functions in their patients. It might have been better if the book had appeared in that shape" (p. vii). We are inclined to agree. Additions-made, at least partly, to help the uninitiated, interest the general reader and "appeal to the athlete, the mathematician, the musician and the writer" (p. xii) "have naturally obscured the original outlines of the Med. Psych. III
book" (p. vii). Lectures framed to supply in minimum time the needs of wartime officers of the R.A.M.C. might possibly have been made the foundation of a useful contribution to medical psychology: their use as the basis of a popular account of remembering and forgetting is hard to understand.
The body of the book is divided into nine chapters of which the first deals with the question "What is memory?" and the last is entitled "How we forget." In between are three chapters on mental imagery, "the apparatus of the memory," and four on dreams. The discussion of mental imagery is continued in an interesting appendix of four chapters that stamp in the impression that, for the book, a better title than "Remembering and Forgetting" would be "Imagery and the Dream." The study of memory is often side-tracked into the image-hunt, but four chapters on the dream in a short work on memory needs explanation. Part of that explanation is the peculiar interest of the dream in psychopathology; but there is another reason. In "the structural study of the dream" the author sees another way of studying the relation between image and meaning which has not been given the attention which it deserves" (p. 66).
Visual imagery forms the basis of discussion and illustrations drawn from the author's own experience of this form of imagery are particularly interesting. The mutual intolerance of people who use different forms of imagery is noticed in several places and is dealt with at some length in the appendix on “The Intellectual Respectability of Muscular Skill" (pp. 220 f.). Outstanding work on "Varieties of Mental Imagery" is mentioned and the monograph of Dr Mabel Fernald1 is specially commended (pp. 21 f.). Kinaesthesis is dealt with at some length, the author dwelling on and apparently accepting Professor Washburn's conclusion that kinaesthetic imagery is in reality "movement sensation resulting from the actual slight performance of movements" (p. 26).
Considering the function of imagery we find "the chief function of imagery seems to be the conveyance of meaning" (p. 44) and "the image plus its meaning is nowadays generally known as the idea" (p. 48) This leads to a discussion of "the relative independence of image and meaning" (p. 48) and ends in consideration of the important question of "imageless awareness" which for the author would seem to be "awareness with the minimum of imagery" (p. 58 n.). Washburn's theory is apparently accepted: "Imageless thought would occur when the problem set... was comparatively easy...the thinker though actually solving a question the apparent difficulty of which would impress the non-philosophical outsider, might do so without being clearly aware of the mechanisms which he employed though actually these might be the movements of speech muscles or of those used in gesticulation.... Possibly the professional thinkers who acted as subjects in the experiments which are claimed to have established the existence of imageless thought were so accomplished that the problems set them had been half solved months or years before they appeared in the thought experiments. On the theory which we are considering the movements which accompanied such 'imageless' thoughts would have been feeble, and, like all kinaesthetic experiences, difficult to localise and to name" (p. 65). References are given to several discussions of the question, the last mentioned being that of Professor R. S. Woodworth. Now,
1 "The Diagnosis of Mental Imagery," Psychological Review, Monograph Supplement, No. 56.
2 "A Revision of Imageless Thought," Psychological Review, 1915, xxii. 1–27.
to prove a negative is impossible. Hence in the long run the 'imageless' thinker must be content with the definite declaration: I am aware of the presence of meaning unaccompanied by any awareness of necessary accompanying imagery; and remain an unbeliever in the doctrine of the necessity of the image until the exponents of the doctrine can convincingly convict him of error. It is possible that in essence the idea is meaning; that this meaning may or may not be accompanied by imagery and that, instead of the image being essential for meaning, it may be but tentative experiment in ways and means of conveying the idea (ie. the meaning) to another, or of using it in some other way. Such a supposition would seem to receive inconsiderable support from experiments such as those of T. V. Moore1 in which the reaction time for awareness of 'simple meaning' is found to be considerably shorter than that for awareness of imagery.
In 'imageless thought' meaning is, at least, the dominating partner, and imagery, if present, is highly elusive. At the opposite pole stands the dream with its vivid imagery and elusive shifting manifest meaning, sometimes, possibly always, screening a more elusive latent meaning. It is to the dream that the author turns in his search for the relation between image and meaning. 'Perhaps...the wildest, maddest dream is merely a conglomeration of actual memories" (p. 69). "Freud goes so far as to say that all dream images, whether recognised as composite or not are in reality made up of memories and that not only is their combination effected according to definite principles but that in the dream the combination itself performs definite functions of great biological importance" (p. 79). The facts and theories relating to these 'definite functions' are set aside as outside the scope of the book, but we are shown the difference between directed and free association and invited to accept the doctrine that in 'free' association "unconscious directive tendencies take over the function of guiding our thoughts and that in this way by freely associating from any part of the manifest content of our dream we can discover the underlying latent material of which it is the representative in consciousness" (p. 80). A method of dream analysis is outlined and introduces a short account of psychoanalysis.
The stimulus theory of the dream is dealt with as the only alternative to Freud's theory and is dismissed as inadequate. In many cases where a stimulus is clearly recognized on waking the stimulus had been present for many nights before the particular one on which it 'caused' the dream: it "usually does little more than to ignite a train previously laid” (p. 75) and, quoting from Nicoll, "the physical disharmonies do not in themselves explain the dream. They act as sensitizers" (p. 76). The argument is not conclusive. The question is not: What is the material used in shaping the dream? but: Would there have been this dream if there had not been this stimulus? It seems reasonable to conclude that dreams obtained by experimental means such as the "tensors" and "detensors" of Cubberley's work would not have occurred in the absence of the stimulus and that the nature of the memory revived in the dream is controlled by the nature of the stimulus. At the other extreme there are, possibly, dreams in which the stimulus is from within the mind and all material
1 "The Temporal Relations of Memory and Imagery," Psychological Review, 1915, XXII. 177-225.
"The Effects of Tensions of the Body Surface upon the Normal Dream," British Journal of Psychology (Gen. Sect.), 1923, XIII. 243–65.