directing any Confederate officer who | which he had faithfully applied to should capture him to hang him without trial immediately; and further directing that all commissioned officers in his command be regarded as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and each of them, whenever captured, reserved for execution." Mr. Richard Yeadon, of Charleston, S. C., backed this proclamation by an offer" of $10,000 reward, payable in Confederate currency, for the capture and delivery of the said Benjamin F. Butler, dead or alive, to any proper Confederate authority. the public service. He had, of course, made himself very unpopular with the wealthy Rebels, whom he had, in proportion to their several volunteer contributions of money in aid of the Rebel cause, assessed for the support of the New Orleans poor, deprived of employment by the war; and he was especially detested by that large body of influential foreigners who, having freely devoted their efforts and their means to the support of the Rebellion, were neither regarded nor treated by him as though they had been honestly neutral in the contest. In his farewell address to the people of New Orleans, he forcibly says: "I saw that this Rebellion was a war of of the rich against the poor; a war of the the aristocrats against the middling men— land-owner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the found no conclusion to it, save in the subhands of the few against the many; and I ex-jugation of the few and the disenthrallment tion in taking the substance of the wealthy, of the many. I, therefore, felt no hesita Gen. Butler had taken 13,700 soldiers from the North for the capture of New Orleans. He had received no rëenforcements since; and he now turned over to his successor 17,800 drilled and disciplined men, including three regiments and two batteries He sent home to the of negroes. treasury the sum of $345,000; pended $525,000 in feeding the poor of New Orleans; and turned over about $200,000 to the Commissary and Quartermaster of his successor. He had collected, by taxation, ments, fines, forfeitures, and confiscations, an aggregate of $1,088,000, who had caused the war, to feed the inno cent poor, who had suffered by the war. And I shall now leave you with the proud consciousness that I carry with me the blessassessings of the humble and loyal, under the roof of the cottage and in the cabin of the slave; and so am quite content to incur the sneers of the salon or the curses of the rich." "Mr. Davis's proclamation recites the hang- ders, and not as free agents; that they, thereing of Mumford; the neglect of our Government fore, be treated, when captured as prisoners of to explain or disavow that act; the imprison- war, with kindness and humanity, and be sent ment of non-combatants; Butler's woman order home on the usual parole that they will in no manner aid or serve the United States in any caaforesaid; his sequestration of estates in west-pacity during the continuance of this war, unless ern Louisiana; and the inciting to insurrection and arming of slaves on our side, as his justifications for proclaiming― "First. That all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution. "Second. That the private soldiers and noncommissioned officers in the army of said Butler be considered as only the instruments used for the commission of crimes perpetrated by his or duly exchanged. "Third. That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States. "Fourth. That the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States, when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy. [Signed and sealed at Richmond, Dec. 23, 1862.] "JEFFERSON DAVIS." * Jan. 1, 1863. MCCLELLAN IN WASHINGTON. 107 VI. VIRGINIA-MCCLELLAN'S ADVANCE. THE rooted inaction of the Army | immediate and especial command of of the Potomac,' with the Baltimore this grand army of 200,000 men, apand Ohio Railroad obstructed and broken up on its right, and the navigation of the Potomac precluded' by Rebel batteries on its left, was stubbornly maintained, in spite of fitful, delusive promises of movement, throughout the Winter of 1861-2. Gen. McClellan, who, from his comfortable house in Washington, issued orders to all the military forces of our country, retained likewise the 'See Vol. I., p. 627–9. Capt. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as early as July 1st, 1861, notified the War Department that the Potomac would "soon be closed by the batteries of the Rebels; " and Secretary Welles reiterated the warning on the 20th of August. "In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department ***representing that the question was simply: Would the Army cooperate with the Navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed?" parently fatigued by the necessity of framing excuse after excuse for its inaction,' though the most of it remained under tents, exposed to the vicissitudes of a Winter which though it had been remarkably dry and fine, with the roads in admirable condition, until Christmas-became stormy and inhospitable soon afterward; so that the since famous Stonewall Jackson, who, for eminent ser (The foregoing note is condensed from the first Report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.) Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers to the Army of the Potomac, in a report to Gen. McClellan at the close of the Peninsula campaign, says: "One of the prominent among the causes of ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, Rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege, by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. McClellan at last agreed to spare 4,000 men for the cooperative measure; but, when Capt. Craven assembled his flotilla at the appointed time and place, the troops were not on hand. The General's excuse was that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed at Matthias Pointthe place agreed upon. Upon Capt. Fox's assurance that the Navy Department would attend to the landing of the troops, he (McClellan) agreed that they should be sent on the ing night. Again the flotilla was in readiness; again the troops were missing. No troops were "Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is then, nor ever, sent down for that purpose; the not the first case in which it has been shown only reason elicited from McClellan being that that successful war involves something more he feared it might bring on a general engage- than abstract military principles. The true poliment. Capt. Craven indignantly threw up his cy was to seize the first practicable moment to command on the Potomac, and applied to be satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural sent to sea-not wishing to lose his own reputa-fy its lavish confidence, and to take advantage longing of an impatient nation for results to justition, on account of non-cooperation on the part of the army. "In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could and should have been taken. The navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture, the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was follow-known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while they were possessed." vices in the battle of Bull Run, had, in September, been promoted to a Major-Generalship, and assigned to command at Winchester, and who had led a strong force westward, expecting to surprise and capture our detachments holding Bath and Romney, though he succeeded in taking both those places, driving out their garrisons, capturing a few prisoners, and destroying at Romney very considerable supplies, yet his unsheltered troops suffered so severely from storm and frost, while so many of his horses were disabled by falling on the icy roads, that his losses probably exceeded the damage inflicted on us; and his blow was fairly countered by Gen. F. W. Lander, who led 4,000 men southward from the Potomac, and, bridging the Great Cacapon in the night, made a dash at Blooming Gap, which he surprised, killing 13 and capturing 75 Rebels, including 17 officers, with a loss of 2 men and 6 horses. Gen. Simon Cameron had been succeeded by Hon. Edwin M. Stanton-an eminent lawyer, without pretensions to military knowledge, and of limited experience in public affairs, but evincing a rough energy and zeal for decisive efforts, which the country hailed as of auspicious augury. Two weeks later,' a War Order was issued by the President, commanding a general advance upon the enemy from every quarter on the 22d of February proximo, and declaring that "the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict 5 and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order." Four days later, a 'Special War Order No. 1' was likewise issued to Gen. McClellan, commanding him, on or before the 22d prox. aforesaid, to impel “all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac," "for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction." Though these orders are signed Abraham Lincoln, they doubtless received their initial impulse from the new Secretary of War, who had already urged Gen. McClellan to take immediate steps to "secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and free the banks of the lower Potomac from the Rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels." Gen. M. had been previously urged by the President to organize his army into four or five distinct. corps, under Generals of his own choice; which he had declined, and still declined, to do; alleging that he wished first to test his officers in active service as division commanders, so that he "might be able to decide. from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise those important commands." At length, the President issued 'General War Order No. 2,' directing the organization of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be commanded by Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes respectively, beside the forces to be left for the defense of Washington under Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, who should also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia, and a fifth, composed of the forces on the upper Potomac, to Gen. McClellan's Report. • March 8. * Jan. 1, 1862. Feb. 13. Jan. 13. Jan. 27. LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN ON ROUTES. be commanded by Gen. Nath'l P. Banks. Gen. McClellan, "in compliance with the President's War Order No. 2," made this disposi 10 tion. 1o Gen. McClellan's original plan contemplated an advance on Richmond by way of the lower Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and making a secondary base of West Point, at the head of York river; and this would seem, whether regarded abstractly or in the light of subsequent experience, to be far preferable to the route on which he ultimately decided, having its base at Fortress Monroe; but either of these, and indeed any approach to Richmond otherwise than from the north, was exposed to the serious if not fatal objection that it involved a division and dispersion of our forces, or left the National metropolis, with its enormous dépôts of arms, munitions, and provisions, to say nothing of its edifices and archives, at the mercy of the Rebels, who could hardly fail to rush upon, sack, and burn it, if our grand army were transferred bodily to the base of the Virginian Peninsula. The President, therefore, before giving his assent to Gen. McClellan's project, addressed to him the following 109 greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? "2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? by your plan than mine? 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable "4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? "5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? "Yours, truly, "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." These inquiries seem not to have been directly answered; but, in a long letter of even date, to the Secretary of War, Gen. McClellan urges the strength of the Rebel position at and around Manassas Junction; the reported fact that the fords of the Occoquan were watched by the Rebels and defended by concealed batteries on the heights in their rear, which were being strengthened by additional intrenchments; that, during our advance from the Accotink to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangster's, and Union Mills; that it would not do to divide our army by leaving a portion in front of Centerville while the rest crosses the Occoquan; that the roads in this quarter were liable, for some time yet, to be obstructed by rains and snow, so that "it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march;" and that Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true: but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's 10 March 13. "If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: "1st. Does not your plan involve a main army; for he could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there; for he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our progress, through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theater of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive measures, at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared." On the other hand, Gen. McClellan urged in favor of an advance by the route he preferred, that "It affords the shortest possible landroute to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East. "The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. "The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the Spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for, should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the Rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. "Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fortress Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. "During the whole movement, our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play." He further urged, in favor of a landing at Urbana, that "This point is casily reached by vessels of heavy dranght; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reenforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the cooperation of the navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us; for his position would be untenable with us on the southern bank of the river. Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fortress Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security-although with less celerity and brilliancy of results—up the Peninsula." The President deferred to these urgent representations, though they involved the necessity of a long delay and a heavy expense in procuring transportation by water for so great an army. The duty of obtaining the requisite vessels was devolved on John Tucker, Assistant-Secretary of War; who, on the 5th of April, reported that he had chartered therefor 113 steamers, 188 schooners, and 88 barges, and that these had-within 37 days from the time he first received the order, and most of it within 30 days-transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington, to Fortress Monroe, 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, and 74 ambulances, beside pontoon-bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for such an army; with a total loss of 9 barges and 8 mules: the former having been driven ashore in a gale when within a few miles of Fortress Monroe. He |