with his right drawn up a little on the south side of the Nashville pike, while his left remained fortified in the bend of the river, already described. Our position was greatly advanced on the left and centre, but otherwise remained the same. On that day General Bragg issued the following address to his army:

"The General commanding is happy to announce to the troops the continued success of our arms yesterday. Generals Wheeler and Wharton, with the cavalry, again assaulted the enemy's line of communication, capturing over two hundred wagons and other stores. Twice have we now made the circuit of the enemy's forces, and destroyed his trains, and not less than six hundred wagons, and three thousand mules have fallen into our hands. * * Our success continues uninterrupted. One more struggle, and the glorious victory already achieved will be crowned by the rout of the enemy, who are now greatly demoralized. The General commanding has every confidence that his gallant troops will fully meet his expectations."

*

*

It was confidently believed that the enemy would have retreated on the night of the 31st, but as he did not, it was concluded to wait and see if he would make any attack. The day consequently passed off quietly, excepting some slight skirmishing.

On the second of January, the ill-omened Friday, the attitude of the two armies remained the same during the morning, and without incident, except some shelling on our right.

By three o'clock it was determined to assault the enemy's stronghold on the bend of the river. It was a desperate determination. Unfortunately, Gen. Bragg had given the enemy nearly two days to re-organize and concentrate his baffled army, so that he might the more effectually make a stubborn resistance.

The enemy had taken up a position at a point near the bend of the river where it takes a westerly course. Here rises a high ridge covered by a skirt of woods, on which the enemy

had planted their artiilery, supported by a line of infantry. Behind this ridge, and in the woods and rocky ravines, lay concealed also a large force of the enemy. Further to the enemy's left was another skirt of woods, which the enemy also occupied, outflanking our front nearly one thousand yards. Near the first skirt of woods mentioned, is a ford of the river, the opposite banks of which, from its elevated position, overlooks and commands the ridge above described on this side, or the south and east bank of the river, while one mile further down the river is another ford. It was at this commanding position in the river bend where the enemy had made his citadel, having massed his batteries of artillery and infantry in such a skillful manner as to protect his centre on the Nashville pike, and his extreme left, which now extended on our side of the river. Such was the position of the enemy on our extreme right on the morning of that memorable day of slaughter, the 2d of January.

Gen. Breckenridge was ordered to carry by assault, the position of the enemy on the ridge already described. He formed his division in two lines, changing front from his former position to nearly a right angle, and facing in the direction of the river. General Hanson's brigade, with Palmer's, now commanded by Gen. Pillow, formed the first line, with Pillow on the right; the second line being formed by Preston's and Gibson's, two hundred yards in the rear. Colonel Hunt's regiment, of Hanson's brigade, was left to support Cobb's battery on the hill. From the enemy's commanding position across the river, he was enabled to see all of our movements, and, consequently, prepared to resist us. Between General Breckenridge's division and the enemy's batteries on the ridge was an intervening space of eight hundred yards, extending over an open field skirted by woods, along which the enemy's skirmishers were in such force as almost amounted to a line of battle.

The attack was to be made at 4 o'clock, and a signal gun was to announce the hour. In those battalions stood the noble

soldiers of Florida, Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee and North Carolina in battle array, firm and inflexible, awaiting the signal for combat. The report of a cannon had not died upon the ear before the bugle from Hanson's brigade sounded a charge. The brigades moved rapidly forward through the thinned woods until gaining the open fields, the men having been instructed not to deliver their fire until close upon the enemy, and then to charge with the bayonet. On came Pillow, followed by Preston; forward hurried Hanson, followed by Gibson. From the moment of gaining the field the enemy's artillery from the ridge opened a sweeping fire, and a whirlwind of Minnie balls from their infantry, with shot and shell, filled the air. Our men were ordered to lie down for a few minutes to let the fury of the storm pass. Then the cry from Breckenridge-" Up, my men, and charge !"-rang out. With the impetuosity of a torrent they rushed forward to the woods sloping the ridge. On dashed Wright's battery of Preston's brigade at a furious gallop, and soon opened fire upon one of the enemy's batteries about three hundred yards. to our right. The enemy, awed by the mad bravery of our men, recoiled; their ranks thinned rapidly, notwithstanding they received reinforcement after reinforcement. Their left wing, which already outflanked us on our right, was driven back towards the river bank, the 20th Tennessee capturing some two hundred prisoners. The contest now raged fierce and bloody. It was one continuous roar of musketry and artillery. Facing the storm of death, our heroes charged with fury, and so effective was the firing of our lines, that we carried the ridge with a wild demoniac yell, driving the enemy from it, with his artillery, down the hill side and across the river. Captain Wright soon reached the top of the ridge with his battery, and opened on the enemy with spherical case. At this time the concentrated fire of the enemy became terrible and appalling. A sheet of flame was poured forth from their artillery on the hills on the opposite side of the river overlooking our left and front and from their batteries on the river

bank, while the opposite side also swarmed with their infantry, who poured in on us a most murderous fire. Still our men never quailed, but pressed forward and crossed the river, the enemy making frightful gaps in our ranks, but which were immediately closed up. Here it was that in less than half an hour over two thousand of our brave soldiers went down! The utter hopelessness of carrying the opposite heights, and of contending against the overwhelmingly superior numbers of the enemy without artillery or reinforcements to support us, having been fully tested, General Breckenridge ordered his division to fall back. It was nearly dark when the conflict closed, and during the night he occupied a portion of the field in advance of that he occupied during the day.

It was after the capture of the enemy's position on the ridge, when our men drove him across the river with terrible slaughter of his forces, that the noble Hanson fell mortally wounded, exclaiming: "Forward-forward, my brave boys, to the charge;" and afterwards, when brought from the field, he said with his flickering breath: "I am willing to die with such a wound received in so glorious a cause." We had held the enemy's position on the ridge for about half an hour, Captain E. E. Wright's battery doing admirable execution, when that gallant officer fell at his guns mortally wounded, the enemy having charged within seventy-five yards of his pieces.

The final repulse of Breckenridge was a sad blow to our hopes. The prudence of this terrible attack upon the impregnable position of the enemy has been seriously questioned, and military critics of the battle of Murfreesboro' have also found room for censuring the neglect of Gen. Bragg in not previously securing the hillocks in the bend of Stone's River, which he permitted the enemy to occupy. As it happened, it was a bad repulse, and the vivid recollections of the "bloody crossing of Stone's River," in which in less than one hour two thousand of our men were killed and wounded, long survived in our army. It lost us the vantage ground we had gained over the enemy on the 31st and greatly depressed our troops. But for

this, we would still have held Murfreesboro'. On the 3d the rain fell in torrents, and as our troops were worn out and nearly exhausted, it was determined to fall back that night, and not run the risk of meeting the enemy's reinforcements, which, it was reported, he was receiving. Everything had previously been provided for the retreat. It was conducted with order and composure.*

Sunday morning Rosecranz moved into Murfreesboro', and Gen. Bragg retired to the position of Tullahoma. This place is in Coffee county, Tennessee, situated on Rock creek, and offers admirable means of defence. It is seventy-one miles

* In his official report of the battle, Gen. Bragg makes the following statement on the subject of the first day's operations, relative to their check and the failure to break the enemy's centre:

"To meet our successful advance, and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by two o'clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force in Lieutenant-General Hardee's front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had by this time become almost blended, so weakened were they by losses, exhaustion and extension to cover the enemy's whole front. As early as 10 o'clock, A. M., Major-General Breckenridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to Lieut. Gen. Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy crossing Stone's river in heavy force, in his immediate front, and on receiving the second order, he informed me that they had already crossed in heavy force, and were advancing to attack his lines. He was immediately ordered not to await attack, but to adɣance and meet him. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon road, about five miles in Breckenridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with his cavalry brigade, save two regiments detached with Wheeler and Wharton, was ordered forward immediately to develop any such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made, at his request, to reinforce him. Before they could be carried out, the movements ordered disclosed the fact that no force had crossed Stone's river; that the only enemy in our immediate front then was a small body of sharpshooters; and that there was no advance on the Lebanon road. These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field, which with proper precaution could not have existed, withheld from active operations three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had re-established his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions.