which it carries to Human Understanding. So that it must be confidered both thefe ways by him that will exhibit a juft and complete Syftem of it. According to the firft way we have already confidered it in the former part of this Undertaking, wherein we have proved an Intelligible World, or World of Ideas eternally exifting in the Divine Mind, and truly exhibitive of all that is out of it, as alfo have explained in a competent Measure the State, Nature, and Manner of this Ideal Syftem, and that both as to the Ideas themfelves, and thofe Eternal Truths which neceffarily refult from them, and depend upon them as their Central Stay and Fundamental Ground. We have also fhewn our Divine Ideas to be the Ground of all Theory and Science, as well as of Truth, and indeed to be the formal and proper Objects of them, as being the true and very Effences of Things, thofe Intelligible Effences of theirs which are diftinct from their Exiftences, and which therefore all Science folely regards, as having a stable, permanent, and immutable Intelligibility, whether the Things themselves exist in Nature or no. Thefe and many other Things of this Abstract Kind relating to the Abfolute Confideration of the Ideal Syftem, we have already accounted for. Let us now with Reliance on the Divine Affiftance advance to the Relative part, the Application of the foregoing Principles, and fee whether upon our Ideal Foundations we can give an Account of the true man

ner

ner of Human Understanding, or at least erect an Intelligible Syftem of it.

2. 'Tis a great thing which is now taken in Hand, to explain the way of our Understanding. All Knowledge of our felves is difficult, but there are two Parts of our felves which feem most to lurk and hide from us, and to be moft unwilling to be traced and found out by us, the Heart and the Head, which are the two most intricate and puzling Pieces of the Human Frame, and that give the greatest trouble to our Metaphyfical, as well as to our Phyfical Anatomy. The Heart is deceitful above all things (fays the Holy Text) and desperately wicked, who can know it? The Motions of the Moral Heart, like thofe of the Natural, tho' eafily felt, are very hard to be difcern'd in their Springs and Principles. And tho' the Understanding feems to promife a Difcovery of it felf by its own Light, yet it has a dark fide to us ward, and that which perceives all other things, cannot fo eafily perceive it felf. Whether it is that the Soul has no Ideal View of its own Substance, as knowing it felf by a confcious Sentiment rather than by Idea, or that it fees other things by a direct Intuition, but it felf by Reflection, and that Reflex way of Perception be attended with peculiar Difficulties and Disadvantages, by reafon of the real Identity and Indiftinction of the Faculty and of the Object, which may poffibly require the greater Application and Attention for the one to dif

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cern

cern the other: But fo it is, the Understanding that fearches all things and finds fome, is blindest at home, and knows leaft of her felf and her own Functions.

3. Should we now suppose (what hereafter fhall be confider'd) that the Soul has no Idea of it felf, the prefent Inquiry may perhaps be thought not only a difficult, but a vain and impoffible Undertaking. For where our Ideas fail us, to what purpose do we difcourfe, or what fuccefs can we promise our felves if we do? But for the prevention of this Objection, 'tis to be minded that we neither pretend nor undertake here to lay open and unfold the very Nature and Effence of the Soul, (This Knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I cannot attain unto it) but only to give fome Account of the manner of Understanding, and that tho' the Soul fhould be found to have no Idea of it felf, yet it must be allowed to have a confcious Sentiment, as of its Being, fo alfo of its Operations, and to be able alfo to reflect upon them. This being the Privilege, (as * St. Austin obferves) which the Spiritual has above the Carnal Eye, that whereas the Eye of the Flesh fees other things but not it felf, the Understanding fees other things and it felf too, as being able not only to act, but to reflect upon its Actions, and fo to make it self its own Object. A Privilege peculiar to Spirit, and which exceeds the whole Power and Capacity of Matter.

*

Expof. in Evang. Foan. Tract. 47.

4. But

in us.

1

4. But before we proceed to Confider how we understand, perhaps it may be worth our while to take a Preliminary Confideration in our way concerning the Principle of Thought, and to inquire What it is that thinks or understands That we do Think is what we are inwardly confcious of to our felves, what we feel and know by a Sentiment as clear and evident as that of Pleasure or Pain. And as 'tis impoffible to prove it to another, fo we need not go to prove it to our felves, as having already such a preventing Affurance of it as no Rational Proceedure can either abate or improve. But how we think, or what it is in us that is the Principle of Thought, are Discoveries not fo eafily made, and fuch as we must be beholden for to Thought and Reflection if ever we make them.

5. Thinking is generally prefumed to be a Property belonging to the Soul. And indeed fuppofing my felf to confift of Soul and Body, 'tis fairly prefumable that 'tis my Soul that thinks. Because Thinking is the nobleft Operation that I am confcious to my self of, and it feems reasonable that the nobleft Operation of my Nature should be referr'd to the noblest Part of it. But perhaps (I speak as a Philofopher) it may be only a Suppofition that I have a Soul, as that fignifies a Principle or Substance diftinct from Matter, or if it be a real Truth, yet how does it clearly appear to me from my having a Soul, that 'tis my Soul that thinks?

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For

For may not this be as much a Presumption as the other? But I would fain have something, if I could, more convincing than a Prefumption as to both.

6. But this it will be impoffible ever to have as to either of them, if Matter be allow'd to think, or to be fo much as capable of Thought, For I cannot be affur'd of my having a Soul but by my Thinking. I do not fee it, I only feel its Operations, (if I afcribe them to the right Principle when I fay fo) and therefore fetting Revelation afide, and confidering things only in a rational way, 'tis by them that I must expect all the Satisfaction I can hope to have in this Matter. "Tis true indeed the different appearances of Life and Death, and the different States of the Body that are confequent upon them do fufficiently prove the Distinction of Soul and Body as to a grofs and popular Senfe, that is, they prove that this fenfible and vifible Subftance which we call our Body is not the whole Man, but that there is fomething befides that belongs to the Conftitution of his Nature. But whether that Something be a Subftance in its whole Kind diftinct from what we call the Body, or only a Body of a finer Mould and Contexture than the other, no Obfervation drawn from the appearances of Life or Death can fatisfy a rational Curiofity, fince all thofe things may be Mechanically accountable. No, this can be known only by our Thinking. But neither will that be a con

cluding