are then confider'd, is an abstract Idea, and 'tis what we call a General or Univerfal. As fuppofe when a Circle, a Triangle and a Square, are confider'd only under the general Idea of Figure, becaufe in that they have a formal Unity, tho' otherwife a real diverfity. And foagain in the other way, as things may have different Refpects according as they are differently compared with other things, fo one and the fame Subftance, may have different Modes or Manners of Being in itself. As the fame Body may have Motion and Figure, or elfe different Figures. Now this lays another ground for Abtraction. For tho' there be a real Identity between Modes and the thing modefied, yet as Figure fuppofe may be confider'd without Body, fo Body may be confider'd without its Figure, or fometimes as having this Figure, fometimes as having that, juft as it is in Dimenfions. The former way of Abstraction I would call for diftinctions fake, Abstraction in the way of Modality, and the latter in the way of Habitude. Between which two forts of Abftractions I conceive there may be this obfervable difference. That in the way of Habitude the abftract Ideas, tho' formally diftinct, are yet really the fame not only with the things from which they are taken, but also with one another, As Rational and Animal, fuppofe have a real Identity with one another, as well as with Man. But now in the way Modality, the Modes are really diftinct from

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one another, and are really the fame, only with the Thing whofe Modes they are. But herein indeed the Identity is no lefs real than in the other Cafe. And accordingly, tho' Figure and Motion be really diftinct from each other (as Real is oppofed to Rational diftinction) yet a figured Subftance and a moveable Substance need not be fo, nor is there any arguing from the formal diftinction of their Ideas that they are fo, fince the fame Substance may admit of both thofe Modes.

19. The great Point now is, how we may know when our Ideas owe their diftinction only to Abstraction? In the way of Habitude this may be well enough known, barely by reflecting upon our own Thoughts, by confidering after what manner we think of things. Which if we heedfully do, we cannot abstract, but we must be fenfible of that Art of the Mind, whereby we do fo as well as of any other. Because we fhall then obferve that we conceive Things not completely, but only under a certain refpect or formality of Confideration, as fuppofe when we confider a Triangle only as a Figure; which (if we think of what we think of) we muft needs perceive to be an abstract Idea, because it goes not through the whole of a Triangle, that is I mean does not take in even what we intend or understand by it, but stops at that which it has in common with other Figures, from which we know a Triangle to be diftinct.

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20. Bu

20. But now in the way of Modality this perhaps may not be altogether fo eafy; because here tho' I know in the general that Mode, and the thing modified are really the fame, and confequently that diftinction of Modes is not repugnant to the Identity of that Being, whose Modes they are, and confequently again, that a Thing thus modified and a Thing thus modified, as fuppofe figured Substance and moveable Subftance, tho' distinct in their Ideas, may yet poffibly not be two diftinct Things, but only inadequate Confiderations of the fame. I fay, tho' I know all this, yet not knowing howmany ways fome Beings may be modified, or what in particular are Modes and what not, I may not be able to know always by confulting the Ideas I have of them, whether they are really different things, or whether they are in reality the fame Thing, only abstractly and incompletely confider'd. This is the great difficulty of modal Abstractions; and here I confefs 'tis fometimes pretty hard to know whether our Ideas are complete, or incomplete, abftract or intire, and confequently whether Things are really distinct or indiftinct from one another, by the formal Conceptions which we have of them.

21. But how then fhall we know if not by the formal Conceptions? Why there may be a way for this too, and fuch as will be equally ferviceable in the other Cafe. Things that are modally diftinct, or diftinct by a modal

Ab

Abstraction, that is, whose distinction is owing to the confideration of them sometimes with one Mode only, and fometimes with another, tho' the fame thing be in reality the common Subject of both; I fay things that are thus diftinct tho' they may be abstracted from one another, that is, one of them may be conceiv'd without conceiving the other, yet they cannot be conceiv'd to be one without the other. And that because they are not indeed one without the other, as being really the fame one with the other. And they cannot be conceiv'd to be any otherwise than they are. As for Inftance, Motion and Figure are Modes of extended Being. And tho' I can conceive Motion without Figure, and Figure without Motion, and abstract both from extended Being, yet I cannot understand Motion or Figure tc be without extended Being, tho' on the con trary I can easily conceive extended Being to be without Motion or any determinate Figure. Nay, further, fince Motion and Figure are fuppofed to be both Modes of extended Being, tho' I can abstract a moveable Substance from a figured Substance, yet I cannot conceive a moveable Substance to be without a figured Substance, and that because I cannot conceive Motion to be in that which has not Figure, nor Figure to be in that which is incapable of Motion. For Figure is in a Substance moveable, and Motion is in a Subftance having Figure; therefore figured Subftance cannot

be

Part II. be conceiv'd to be without moveable Subftance, nor moveable Substance without figured Substance, fince if you take away moveable Subftance, or that Subftance which is moveable, we could have no Conception of Figure; and if you take away figured Subftance, or that Substance which has Figure, we could have no Conception of Motion: Figured Substance then and movable Substance are diftin&t only by a modal Abstraction, that is, the fame Substance is really both one and the other, figured and moveable, tho' fometimes confider'd as affected with one of these Modes, and sometimes as affected with the other, as appears from the impoffibility of conceiving one to be without the other. Since if you take away figured Subftance, you take away that very Substance which should be the Subject of Motion; and if you take away moveable Subftance, you take away that very Subftance which fhould fuftain Figure. Now I fay this plainly fhews that these things are in reality the fame, and only diftinct by a Modal Abftraction, and accordingly that the Ideas whereby we conceive them are incomplete, not adequate Ideas.

22. That which is remark'd here of AbftraЯtion in the way of Modality, is no less applicable to thofe in the way of Habitude, or to any other fort of Abstractions, if any fuch there be. For as in things only modally diftinct, one cannot be conceiv'd without the other, or if the other be conceiv'd not to be, so alfo in

that