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TENNESSEE NOTE.—The judicial power of the state is vested by the constitution in one supreme court, in such circuit and chancery courts as the legislature shall establish, in the judges of the courts and in justices of the peace. Municipal courts and courts to be held by justices of the peace may also be established by the legislature.
The supreme court must consist of five judges of whom not more than two shall reside in any one of the three grand divisions of the state. They must be thirty-five years of age and residents of the state five years and are elected by the qualified voters for eight years. The jurisdiction of the court must be appellate only, and is subject to further regulation by law. The court must be held at Knoxville, Nashville and Jackson.
The judges of both supreme and inferior courts are liable to impeachment and to removal by concurrent vote of two-thirds of all the members to which each house is entitled. Justices of the peace are liable to indictment in such courts as the legislature may direct, and on conviction must be removed from office by the court.?
The legislature has provided that cases appealed from the chancery courts, unless involving more than one thousand dollars or involving the constitutionality of a statute, a contested election, ejectment or state revenue, and all civil cases appealed from the circuit (or common law) courts, shall be heard by a Court of Civil Appeals, created by statute.3 The court of civil appeals may certify cases to the supreme court for final determination and the supreme court may order any case to be removed to it for review.
The circuit courts established by the legislature number at present twenty-three and there are in addition eight separate criminal courts. The chancery courts number sixteen. Those in the larger cities sit at one place only, but throughout the country districts, chancellors and circuit judges hold court at a number of different county-seats. The jurisdiction of the circuit and chancery courts is in large measure concurrent.*
Art. VI. For procedural rules, see sections 9 and 10.
1 Except that it may possess such other jurisdiction as the supreme court had at the time of the adoption of the constitution.
2V, 4, 5; VI, 6.
*Acts of 1877, ch. XCVII. provides that the "jurisdiction of all civil causes now triable in the Circuit Court, except for injuries to person, property or char
nliquidated damages, are . . . conferred upon the Chancery Court, which shall have and exercise concurrent jurisdiction thereof along with the Circuit Court."
THE STATE BUDGET.1
"A BUDGET," says Professor Seligman, "is a periodical financial statement made by the government, containing a report and an estimate of the expenses and revenues."2
Less compactly, but with similar purport, Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland has defined the term “budget” to mean
a plan for financing an enterprise or government during a definite period, which is prepared and submitted by a responsible executive to a representative body (or other duly constituted agent) whose approval and authorization are necessary before the plan may be executed.
Though he does not specifically mention the requirement of a report,* Dr. Cleveland is very insistent upon the point that · the legislature shall hold the budget-making authority, the executive, strictly responsible for the correct execution of every financial measure. To accomplish this, he says,
the legislature must do three things: viz.: (1) It must provide a means of enabling representatives to find out whether the executive has acted within his past authorizations and conducted the business efficiently; (2) it must provide a means of enabling representatives to inquire into the requests for future grants; (3) since the purpose of a representative system is to make the government responsible and responsive to the people, it must provide a means of reaching the people, of letting the people know what has been done and what is proposed and of getting controversies between a majority of representatives and the executive before the electorate for final decision.
"With provision made for these three things,” he continues,
General References: Stourm, René, Le Budget (the best authority) ; Adams, H. C.. Science of Finance; Adams, E, D., The Control of the Purse; Agger, E. E., The Budget in the American Commonwealths; Lowrie, S. G., The Budget ; Public Budgets (Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, whole No. 151, Nov., 1915).
2From the writer's class notes (Columbia University). .
Director, Bureau of Municipal Research, New York City.--Evolution of the Budget Idea in the United States, Annals, op. cit., 15. See also Dr. Cleveland's article, Constitutional Provision for a Budget, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, V, 141.
*j. e., in this article. He does in Proceedings of Academy of Political Science, V, 144.
the representative system is adapted to the ends and purposes of a democracy; without provision for these three things the representative system is not adapted to the ends and purposes of a democracy.
The most potent method, he believes, for securing them, while not neglecting adequate independent audit of all financial transactions, with right of judicial interference where the facts so demand, and
for enabling representatives to inquire into requests for future grants, and obtain exact informtion about what has been done as well as what is proposed, is to require the executive to appear personally before the representatives of the people at the time he makes his request for funds to answer questions and details.
The method which has been found to be most effective for keeping the people in touch with public affairs and for having questions in issue settled by the electorate, is to make provision whereby each representative can openly question the executive and every item can be separately debated and voted on. And in case the executive is not supported to make further provision, the electorate may promptly retire either the executive or the opposing majority. What this means is, that a budget which is to serve its constitutional purpose must not only be an executive proposal submitted to a representative body, but it must be submitted under such rules of procedure that each representative may have a right to personally and publicly make inquiry of the executive concerning any matter or detail of the business in hand and also bave the right openly and publicly to oppose any part of the plan which, in his opinion, is against the general welfare of the state. And the only procedure which has been found effective for doing this is to require that the estimates and the budget be considered and discussed in committee of the whole house with the executive present.
This thoroughly complete and scientific conception of the budget has never been realized in the practice of an American state. It is, however, perfectly exemplified by the English budget system and to a varyingly less extent by the systems of the other European countries and by those of a few American cities, following the lead of New York.
5Concerning certain state efforts at budgetary reform, see infra.
In N. Y. City the budget is prepared by the Board of Estimate-consisting of the Mayor, Chairman (3 votes); the Comptroller (3 votes); the President of the Board of Aldermen (3 votes); the Presidents of the Manhattan and Brooklyn Boroughs (2 votes each) ; Bronx, Queens and Richmond Boroughs (one vote each)-and submitted to the Aldermen, by whom it can be reduced but not increased.
The New York constitutional convention of 1915, however, framed a clause around the idea, as follows:
198. Proposed New York Budget Clause.
On or before the fifteenth day of November in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixteen and in each year thereafter the head of each department of the state government except the legislature and judiciary, shall submit to the governor itemized estimates of appropriations to meet the financial needs of such department, including a statement in detail of all moneys for which any general or special appropriation is desired at the ensuing session of the legislature, classified according to relative importance and in such form and with such explanation as the governor may require.
The governor, after public hearing thereon, at which he may require the attendance of heads of departments and their subordinates, shall revise such estimates according to his judgment.
Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature certified by the presiding officer of each house and of the judiciary certified by the comptroller shall be transmitted to the governor before the fifteenth day of January next succeeding for inclusion in the budget without revision but with such recommendation as he may think proper.
On or before the first day of February next succeeding he shall submit to the legislature a budget containing a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues. It shall contain all the estimates so revised or certified and shall be accompanied by a bill or bills for all proposed appropriations and reappropriations, clearly itemized; it shall show the estimated revenues for the ensuing fiscal year and the estimated surplus or deficit of revenues at the end of the current fiscal year together with the measures of taxation, if any, which the governor may propose for the increase of the revenues. It shall be accompanied by a statement of the current assets, liabilities, reserves and surplus or deficit of the state; statements of the debts and funds of the state; an estimate of its financial condition as of the beginning and end of the ensuing fiscal year; and a statement of revenues and expenditures for the two fiscal years next preceding said year, in form suitable for comparison. The governor may, before final action by the legislature thereon, amend or supplement the budget.
A copy of the budget and of any amendments or additions thereto shall be forthwith transmitted by the governor to the comptroller.
The governor and the beads of such departments shall have the right, and it shall be their duty when requested by either house of the legislature, to appear and be heard in respect to the budget during the consideration thereof, and to answer inquiries relevant thereto. The procedure for such appearance and inquiries shall be provided by law. The legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted by the governor except to strike out or reduce items therein ; but this provision shall not apply to items for the legislature or judiciary. Such a bill when
passed by both houses shall be a law immediately without further action by the governor, except that appropriations for the legislature and judiciary shall be subject to his approval as provided in section nine of article four.?
Neither house shall consider further appropriations until the appropriation bills proposed by the governor shall have been finally acted on by both houses ; nor shall such further appropriations be then made except by separate bills each for a single work or object, which bills shall be subject to the governor's approval as provided in section nine of article four. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the governor from recommending that one or more of his proposed bills be passed in advance of the others to supply the immediate needs of government.
Forming, as it does, the very center around which the strug. 01190t of gle for constitutionalism in government has been waged from the Budgetthe beginning, the control of the purse by the people is naturally the cardinal political tenet of Englishmen and Americans, and is universally assumed where not expressly recognized in state constitutions. To make good this control has been and is a constant problem for students and statesmen, and is, as already seen, the object of a budget,—the advocates of which systematic method of financial procedure realize that the greatest tyrant at present is irresponsibility and the consequent extravagance and waste of public resources. This irresponsibility is, in all probability, a more potent evil than the greed of any conceivable despot.
A great deal of laborious effort has been expended on the s200 subject of financial control by state constitutional conventions stitutional of and, though comprehensive provisions for budgets and for bud- Revenue and getary methods are entirely lacking in adopted constitutions, numerous provisions are found which propose to regulate both revenue and appropriations and to secure the people against arbitrary action on the part of their governmental agents.”
"Art. IV, sec. 9, was not changed in substance by the convention. It contains the ordinary provisions relating to the veto and repassage of bills and authorizes the governor to veto items in appropriation bills.
Art. 1. (See. supra, p. 94.) Discussed by Chas. A. Beard, Annals, op. cit.. 64. The New York City Bureau of Municipal Research brought the whole matter effectively before the Convention. See Municipal Research, Nos. 62 and 68.
'Concerning this see Agger, op. cit., and Lowrie, op. cit Both of these works use the term to cover the financial practices by which money is raised and expended according to the constitution of the particular state. "Budget," with them, therefore, has not precisely the same definition as herein.