eral Burnside was persuaded to submit it to the Presi dent, who, after consultation with his Cabinet, decided to relieve General Burnside, instead of approving the Order; and, on the twenty-eighth of January an Order was issued by the Secretary of War relieving Burnside from the command, "At his own request;" and Hooker, whom he had proposed to "ignominiously dismiss," became his successor. The same Order relieved General Sumner, at his own request, and also General Franklin, without assigning any reason therefor.

GLOOMY

CHAPTER XXVI.

WINTER-REBEL

RAIDERS-DESERTERS AND

ABSENTEES-IM

PROVED MORALE UNDER HOOKER-OPENING OF CAMPAIGN-STRENGTH
OF ARMIES-RENDEZVOUS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE-WHAT IT WAS-
CONGRATULATORY ORDER-ADVANTAGE OF THE INITIAL SUCCESS LOST
-HOOKER SURPRISED THAT LEE DID NOT RETREAT-A CAMPAIGN OF
MANOEUVRES LEE STUDYING THE CHESS-BOARD-MAKES HIS MOVE-
WHY DID HOOKER TARRY IN THE WILDERNESS-MOVES OUT AND RE-
TURNS-HOOKER'S STATEMENT OF IT-HOOKER BELIEVES LEE IS RE-
TREATING WHEN HE IS MARCHING TO ATTACK HIM-THE ERROR OF RE-
TURNING TO THE WILDERNESS-HOOKER FORMS LINE OF BATTLE.

THE winter of 1862-3 proved a very disastrous one for
the Army of the Potomac, and its misfortunes imparted
a gloom to the prospects of the Federal cause which
was felt throughout the loyal portion of the country no
less than in the army itself. It seemed impossible for
the Administration to find a competent commander for
that unfortunate army.
"Failure!" had been written
against the name of every man who had been placed at
its head. Would such be the record of the dashing
soldier to whose hands the baton had now been trans-
ferred?

During this winter the rebel cavalry amused itself by riding "rough-shod" over the country in rear of the Federal Army, capturing small parties of Union soldiers, carrying off horses and wagons, burning railroad bridges, and destroying army supplies, in all directions. Desertions from the Union Army were reported to be at the rate of two hundred a day, and there seemed to be no way to stop them. Citizens despairing of success, and regarding the Army of the Potomac as consigned to slaughter, aided their relatives to escape from it by every means in their power-chief among which was smuggling civilians' clothes to them; and, arrayed in

these, their escape was not difficult. General Hooker testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the rolls showed 2,922 officers and 81,964 men absent from the army, a large proportion of whom could not be accounted for. This aggregate must have included all absentees from the first organization of their commands. It is not unlikely that many of them had been killed or captured on the Peninsula and in Pope's campaign, and not accounted for, while many others may have been in hospital. The effect of "General Order No. 162, A. of P., 1862," was to place men in the attitude of deserters who might be dead on the battle-field, or prisoners, or in hospital. After such marches and battles as those on the Peninsula and in Pope's campaign, it was not always possible to account for every man, and a number of men were dropped from the rolls of the "Ulster Guard," under that Order, who subsequently reported, and whose absence was the result of sickness or capture.

Hooker was the army's beau-ideal of a soldier in all physical qualities, and he soon made a very perceptible improvement in the morale of his command. He visited all portions of the army, and infused a good deal of his own confident spirit into his officers and men. Desertions ceased, and the army began to grow as recruits came forward, and when the season for active operations arrived, Hooker found himself at the head of one of the finest armies the Government had ever put in the field. In infantry it numbered one hundred thousand men; in artillery ten thousand, and its cavalry was thirteen thousand strong. All arms were in the very best condition of spirits, and in complete preparation for the coming campaign. Confidence and an eagerness for the fray had taken the place of hopelessness, and a desire to escape the service--the rank and file had come to believe in their new commander.

Hooker designed to open the campaign about the

1863.]

middle of April, and on the thirteenth he despatched the cavalry under General Stoneman, to proceed up the Rappahannock, cross the river above the rebel picketline, and sweep down in rear of Lee's army. When this movement began to make itself felt, the infantry columns were to cross the river and turn the Confederate position. Soon after the cavalry set out, a heavy storm came on, rendering the river impassable, and the movements were suspended.

Two weeks elapsed before the water and roads were in a condition to justify a renewal of operations. Then, on Monday, April twenty-seventh, the 11th Corps, under General Howard; the 12th, under General Slocum ; and later on the same day, the 5th Corps, under General Meade, left their camps on the right of our line, and set out for Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock, seventeen miles above Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the 2d Corps, General Couch, were to march at sunrise on the 28th, to the vicinity of Banks' Ford, four miles above Fredericksburg, and from these, one brigade and one battery were to be sent to United States Ford, eight miles above Fredericksburg. These two divisions were not to show themselves along the river bank. The Third Division of this Corps was to remain in camp at Falmouth, and picket the river along that line, and be in readiness to repel any attempt of the enemy to cross. The 1st Corps, General Reynolds; the 3d, General Sickles; and the 6th, General Sedgwick, were to take positions to cross the river below Fredericksburg-the 6th Corps, at what was called Franklin's crossing, being the point at which General Franklin crossed at the battle of Fredericksburg, and the 1st Corps at Pollock's Mills, a short distance below. The 3d Corps was to be ready to cross at either point in support of the 1st or 6th, as might become necessary. The cavalry was to cover the right flank of the corps assigned to cross the

river at Kelly's Ford, and to raid on Lee's communications with Richmond.

When these operations were inaugurated, and during their continuance, the Confederate Army numbered less than fifty thousand men. Two divisions of Longstreet's Corps were at Suffolk, and did not return until after the battles of Chancellorsville. Walter H. Taylor, Lee's Assistant-Adjutant General, gives the strength of the Rebel Army at this time as follows: Anderson and McLaws' commands, 13,000; Jackson's, including the divisions of A. P. Hill, Rhodes (late D. H. Hill's) and Trimble, 21,000; Early, 6,000; and cavalry and artillery, 7,000. Hooker appreciated his own superiority of numbers, and in his orders to General Slocum, who, as senior officer, had command of his own and the 11th Corps, he said: "You will have nearly 40,000 men, which is more than he (Lee) can spare to send against you." It could have been only in view of the very great disparity in numbers that Hooker adopted what are ordinarily considered rash and unjustifiable tactics, by dividing his army into two nearly equal parts, and then separating the right and left wings by at least a day's march, with a difficult and capricious river between them. He was liable to be whipped in detail, and the result proved that it was within the compass of possibilities for Lee to have fallen upon either wing and defeated it before it could be supported by the other. But Lee, was in doubt as to Hooker's real purpose, and the disposition he had made of his army until the morning of May first, and by that time General Hooker had re-enforced his right wing by ordering up the Third Corps, and the two divisions of the Second Corps, which had been lying near Banks' and United States Fords. This left the First Corps, General Reynolds, and the Sixth, General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while one division of the 2d Corps remained in its camp at Falmouth.

The corps dispatched to the extreme right crossed