to-day the biology of man's thought with its infinite linguistic code, I think we must begin by returning to those simplest algebraic formulae in which we shall find expressed our most rudimentary human relationships.

In a recent paper I referred to the absence among us as yet of scientifically controlled measures for tracing mental disharmonies to a mentally generic source1. A very few years ago, as we know, there was lacking this basis of definitive laboratory enquiry even with respect to structural disease entities. The germ theory of disease was still unknown and unsuspected. The clinician of a half-century ago dealt entirely individually with each individual illness. The disease had a name and this name constituted its status in the world of medical science. To-day within the mental sphere the clinical picture presented by the individual patient restricts itself to this same limited and casual designation. There is not yet established a definitive etiology underlying these isolated manifestations traceable to a common pathogenic root. Dementia praecox is such a designation, hysteria another, cyclothemia still another. Indeed, our clinical definitions are numberless. For science has yet to invoke a unitary principle of enquiry based upon a consensus of observers such as will trace these arbitrarily designated appearances to a common generic source 2.

But to return to 'you and me.' We all recall more or less a certain very early, all-pervading, childish mood composed of socially very simple, almost primal affect-elements. To cite certain of these organic stimuli, there was, you remember, 'nice Mama,' 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido frighten baby,' 'naughty kitty scratch baby.' We all remember the remote seductive influence of these early nursery days in which there were imposed upon the childish organism those affective impressions which were the mind's predigested food values. But note how this primitive construction of definitions or social affects is built up about the very simple, irreducible formula 'you and me,' that is to say, the self and its opposite the self within and the self without. There is no basis of conscious evaluation. There is just this hypnosis of affects induced and sponsored by Mama and Papa as the major components of our affective nursery environment. There is no thought, no judgment, no authentic

1 "The Need of an Analytic Psychiatry," paper read at the joint session of the American Psychiatric and American Psychoanalytic Associations, New York City, June 10, 1926, To be published in The American Journal of Psychiatry, Jan. 1927.

2 "Psychiatry as an Objective Science," paper read at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1925, this Journal, v, part 4.

criterion of values. There is only affective response to impressions as the outer world of behaviour relates itself to baby's feeling. This is the equipment with which as children we grow up in the midst of our social environment-this affective equipment fashioned upon the universal formula, 'you and me,' that is to say, 'your behaviour as it relates to my feeling.'

To-day, when we come to view this mental mood in cross-section, so to speak, the formulation 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido,' has become altered in proportion to the increase in the complexity of our social experiences. So that the same formula now reads, for example, 'I like Robinson,' 'I don't like Smith,' 'I understand Robinson,' 'Smith I can't make out,' 'Robinson is good,' 'Smith is bad.' That is to say, Robinson comports himself creditably, but Smith does not measure up so acceptably. Of course I do not define what it is to which he does not measure up. I do not consider whether or not my measure is a generally accepted standard, a permanent and established norm. But, reposing solely upon the suzerainty of my own feeling, 'I just don't like Smith'-and by this what I really mean is that he does not measure up to my standard.

I think we need to unearth the mechanism beneath these autogenic evaluations and discover whether there is not some, as yet, undisclosed element within them. Because I think it may be shown that our very highly complex mental evaluations in the sphere of philosophy and psychology, as of our ordinary human relationships, are built up precisely upon these underlying autocratic presumptions. It is these complex terms in the realm of our more elaborate formulations which we need to reduce to their primary 'you and me' elements. We need to reduce these social definitions, coincident as they are with such rudimentary affects as 'good Mama,' 'bad Fido,' etc., to simpler components.

For example, when I say 'I don't like Smith,' the action or movement expressed by the verb 'like' involves two terms, one of which is I and the other Smith. But it is noteworthy that in this equation, it never occurs to me to question but one of the two terms-namely, the term represented by Smith-that is to say, the term of the equation that is not I. The formula composed of the presumably neutral equation 'you and me' turns out then to be really not an equation at all, because already the terms are prejudiced and unequal. When I say 'I don't like Smith,' the implication is clear that it is Smith who deserves reproval or undervaluing because I don't like him. The 'I,' the self that does not like Smith, is exempt, you see, from all self-questioning. But who am I to be liking or not liking Smith? This is a matter into which the ego or 'I' does not look. The 'I' does not like Smith, and Smith is henceforth

anathema. And there endeth the chapter as far as Smith is concerned. The 'I,' you observe, possesses unquestionable authority. Through the apostolic succession of affects descending from the omnipotent and sovereign self-image begotten of the nursery, the 'I' is invested with papal infallibility. But, if we are really interested in studying the authenticity of our human emotions, this assumed prerogative of the 'I' must also come in for investigation. In a clear appraisement of our mental or subjective values such an investigation will, I think, appear more and more to afford rich and timely material for the laboratory of human behaviour. To return now to the equation 'good Mama,' 'good Papa'—our primary 'you and me' relationship-we shall see that 'Mama' too has her prejudices in favour of the 'I.' 'Mama' says she is good—but does the servant whom she has dismissed on a false charge think her good? Not at all. On the contrary, in the view of the mishandled maid, 'Mama' is distinctly bad. 'Papa' likewise may subtly infect baby's mind with the notion that he is good. But his business associates down town, who have suffered serious financial loss through Papa's underhand negotiations, would by no means characterize his behaviour as good. Baby, however, knows nothing of this. He does not enjoy the vantage coign of observation based upon a wide and inclusive social survey. On the contrary, Baby's experiences are arbitrarily handed him by Mama and Papa from the basis of their prejudice in favour of the 'I.' Here, it is clear, there is offered a suggestion whereby the infant's mind is early prejudiced in favour of the infant's parents. Here in this early imbued emotional reference we may discover the original relationship of one individual to another. And from this primary formulation of an artificial 'you and me' we may begin to trace the extension socially of our universally coloured affects due to this factor of prejudice in favour of the 'I1.' Here we begin to see this primary relationship at its generic source and the element of suggestion that underlies the common social factor of definition or affect. Clearly, this is not judgment; it is not criterion. It is an affect that is purely arbitrary, it is a definition that is entirely autocratic and presumptive.

If we will analyse these early mental evaluations of the individual, we shall see that they rest upon a quite unwarranted assumption. We shall see that in this attitude of the parent or nurse toward the infant, when they say 'good Papa,' 'bad Fido,' the 'good' and the 'bad' are

1 "Social Images versus Reality," paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., June, 7, 1924, The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, XIX, No. 3, October-December, 1924.

presumably assumed entirely with reference to baby as criterion. That is, Papa is good to baby-therefore Papa is good. Fido is bad to baby— therefore Fido is bad. But this is not baby's criterion at all. It is the criterion imposed by Mama and Papa on their baby. Here, in this artificial social equation is to be found, I think, the generic source of projections and of ideas of reference as they occur in the insane. But an analysis of the social mind will, I think, show that this so-called normal attitude of the nursery with reference to the infant underlies no less the normal thought processes of our so-called adult life. It will show that this early imbued emotional reference is responsible also for the presence unconsciously of these same mechanisms and reactions in the midst of our normal thought processes1. The infant that is taught projection comes in this way automatically into a habit-projection with respect to his subjective affects generally. As he grows up, the same reference to himself, formulated in the nursery as 'good Mama,' 'bad Fido,' extends to his subsequent formulation 'good Robinson,' 'bad Smith,' and this habitual social inference, based upon the unconscious suggestion of early nursery images, now dominates completely his opinions and behaviour with respect to his social environment generally.

It is my thesis then that such projections prevail with us all and that the consequence of such arbitrary social projections is inevitably an arbitrary social standard 2. It is always the individual over there-Smith, Jones or Robinson-who does not conform to my standard and who must therefore readjust himself. Likewise, it is the philosophical theory or the psychological system of Smith or Jones or Robinson that must be repudiated because it is not in line with my philosophical system or theory. Here, you see, is really an arbitrary projection based upon the prerogative of the 'I.' If I am a Methodist, Methodism is good. So I say. But what I really mean is that Methodism is good because I am a Methodist. It is on this same basis that we rest such smug assumptions as 'the deluded Freudian,' 'the worthy pragmatist,' 'the misguided behaviourist,' 'the discerning introspectionist.' We have deserving France and undeserving Germany or vice versa. Further there is the meritorious believer and the wicked non-believer and on and on ad infinitum. But in all these evaluations our equation is false, because the only term evaluated is the term predicated, that is, the term opposite 1 "Insanity a Social Problem," The American Journal of Sociology, XXXII, No. 1, Part 1, July 1926.

2 "Our Mass Neurosis," paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Atlantic City, June 3, 1924, The Psychological Bulletin, June,

1926.

the 'I,' and that solely on the basis of the subject's criterion. Clearly this again is no equation at all. In all these definitions what I fail to recognize is that my criterion with respect to these systems is organically identical with my nursery prejudices in favour of 'Mama' or in abrogation of 'Fido.' I fail to see that, due to the prerogative of the 'I,' all my elaborately constructed opinions and beliefs within the subjective sphere are as completely subordinated to an arbitrary projection to-day as in the early nursery days of 'good Mama' and 'good Papa.'

If then the social affect is always a projection, if it always leaves out of account the internal or subjective term and demands that the responsibility of correcture rest upon the external or objective component, clearly our task is to turn to component number one, that is to say, to the subjective self that projects. This is supposedly the purpose of our technique in analysing the ontogenetic factors responsible for the insanity of the individual. Why should it not also be the purpose of our technique in analysing the phylogenetic factors that underlie the social mind if, in its mood expressions, the social mind is not less prejudiced in favour of the 'I' than the individual insane? If the insane individual's slogan ego sum is the sum of his ego, is it not equally true of our social ego with its arbitrary evaluations in the sphere of religion, philosophy, politics, psychopathology and of our broader subjective predications generally?

It would appear then from this hodgepodge of social affects that the situation is quite hopeless. It would appear that the present condition of the social mind—a condition in which all is but a futile exchange of projected affects must continue to run riot as now and that the neuroses, individual and social, are irremediable. In spite of the implications I do not take this view. While I think it is true that the individual's affect is now beyond recall, that having become socially crystallized his whole conviction has gone out with it, and that he has now nothing with which to recall it, nevertheless I think it becomes possible through the adoption of a group or consensual technique of observation to create a basis for the recovery of the organism's primal integrity. It is thus possible to restore the natural continuum that was the original substrate of our mental organism prior to the artificial 'you and me' relationship first imbued through the emotional reference of the nursery period. With this socially phyletic continuum as a background, it has been experimentally demonstrated that the tendency of the individual to the projection of arbitrary affects may be objectively brought to book.

It must be clear that the remedy for the projection of an affect is the