The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate ArmiesU.S. Government Printing Office, 1881 |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 100 筆
第 40 頁
... attack , although it is more than probable that the Navy unassisted can accomplish the result . If these works are taken , the city of New Orleans necessarily falls . In that event , it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the ...
... attack , although it is more than probable that the Navy unassisted can accomplish the result . If these works are taken , the city of New Orleans necessarily falls . In that event , it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the ...
第 42 頁
... attack ; but there is a vast difference between that and the effi- ciency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected , studied , and fortified . In the ...
... attack ; but there is a vast difference between that and the effi- ciency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected , studied , and fortified . In the ...
第 43 頁
... attack on Nashville and Richmond , as nearly at the same time as possible . I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves , and then seeking for the most decisive results . I do not wish to waste life ...
... attack on Nashville and Richmond , as nearly at the same time as possible . I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves , and then seeking for the most decisive results . I do not wish to waste life ...
第 45 頁
... attack us , for his position would be untenable with us on the southern bank of the river . Should circumstances render it not ad- visable to land at Urbana , we can use Mob Jack Bay ; or , the worst coming to the worst , we can take ...
... attack us , for his position would be untenable with us on the southern bank of the river . Should circumstances render it not ad- visable to land at Urbana , we can use Mob Jack Bay ; or , the worst coming to the worst , we can take ...
第 117 頁
... attacked in front and rear ( considering that an attack from the rear could not be carried on for more than two or three days , even if General Floyd's column was cut off from the ferry ) , the Legion would be strengthened every day ...
... attacked in front and rear ( considering that an attack from the rear could not be carried on for more than two or three days , even if General Floyd's column was cut off from the ferry ) , the Legion would be strengthened every day ...
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常見字詞
advance arrived Assistant Adjutant-General attack August Baltimore battery bridge Brig brigade Brigadier-General camp Capt Captain cavalry Centreville Colonel column Commanding Division companies corps Cotton Hill Creek cross Department detachment direction dispatch duty Edwards Ferry enemy enemy's Fairfax Court-House field fire flank Floyd force Fort Monroe front Gauley guard guns HDQRS HEADQUARTERS ARMY Hill honor HOOKER horses immediately infantry instant intrenchments JOSEPH HOOKER Kanawha killed Leesburg Lieut Lieutenant Lieutenant-Colonel Major-General Manassas March 13 Maryland MCCLELLAN ment miles militia morning Mountain move movement night November o'clock p. m. obedient servant occupied officers Ohio Pennsylvania pickets Pohick Church Poolesville position Potomac railroad re-enforcements rear rebels received regiment respectfully retreat rifled river road Romney ROSECRANS scouts Secretary of War sent side skirmishers tion troops turnpike U. S. Army vicinity wagons Washington Western Virginia WILLIAMS woods wounded York Volunteers
熱門章節
第 41 頁 - That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the Greneral-in-Chief. with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
第 50 頁 - That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.
第 42 頁 - Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River-, mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.
第 40 頁 - In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the" eastern bank of the river above the city, it may be necessary...
第 56 頁 - That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria, to move down the Potomac, and, 3d.
第 220 頁 - I have the honor to be, colonel. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, LEWIS RICHMOND, AAG...
第 639 頁 - President and a unanimous cabinet express their own and the nation's sympathy in his personal affliction, and their profound sense of the important public services rendered by him to his country during his long and brilliant career, among which will ever be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to the Constitution, the Union, and the flag when assailed by parricidal rebellion. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
第 41 頁 - Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.
第 54 頁 - Halleck have command of said department. Ordered also^ That the country west of the Department of the Potomac, and east of the Department of the Mississippi, be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont.
第 42 頁 - In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?