Naturalization, &c.

Coin money.

Counterfeiting punished.

Post offices &c.

Copy right

and patent.

Inferior courts.

4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, (i) and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States: (j) 5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures:

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States:

7. To establish post offices and post roads: (k)

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries:

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court:

10. To define and punish piracies (7) and felonies committed on Piracies, &c. the high seas, and offences against the law of nations:

Declare war.

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water: (m)

12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money Raise armies, to that use shall be for a longer term than two years: Navy. 13. To provide and maintain a navy:

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces:

4. Under the power to regulate commerce, congress has power to lay an embargo, though not limited in its duration.-United States v. Brigantine William, 2 Hall's Law Jour. 255. See also allusion to this subject Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 192. See note (v) to 10, 2, of this article.

(i) The individual states have a constitutional right to pass naturalization laws, provided they do not contravene the rule established by the authority of the union.-Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 294. United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370. Quere?

2. It now, however, seems to be settled, that by the constitution, the power of naturalization is exclusively vested in congress and cannot be exercised by the states.-Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 269. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 49.

(j) A state has authority under the constitution of the United States, to pass a bankrupt law, provided it does not impair the obligation of contracts, and provided there be no act of congress in force to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy conflicting with such law. While such act of congress is in force, the power of the states to pass any conflicting law, is suspended.Sturges v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

(k) Upon the subject of the power of congress to make internal improvements in the states, see

message of President Jefferson, Dec. 2, 1806, 5 Wait's state papers, 458; President Madison's, Dec. 3, 1816, March 3, 1817, 12 Niles' Reg. 25; Resolution of house of representatives, Dec. 15, 1817, 13 Niles' Reg. 287; President Monroe's, May 4, 1822, Niles' Reg. for Aug. 1822; and the message of President Jackson, May 27, 1830.

(1) The constitution having conferred on congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence against the United States.-U. States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 630.

2. The crime of piracy is constitutionally defined by congress in an act referring to the law of nations for a definition of that crime.-U... States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 159.

(m) The power of making "rules concerning captures on land and water," which is superadded in the constitution to that of declaring war, is not confined to captures which are extraterritorial, but extends to rules respecting enemy's property found within the territory, and is an express grant to congress of the power of confiscating enemy's property found within the territory at the declaration of war, as an independent substantive power not included in that of declaring war.--Brown v. The United States, 8 Cranch, 110.

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions: (n)

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, (o) reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress.

17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings: (p) And

(n) In the state of Connecticut, the Governor claimed the right to judge whether the exigency existed, which would authorize a call of the militia or any portion of it, into the service of the Union. In Massachusetts, the Governor consulted the Judges of the Supreme Court of

that state as to the true construction of the above clause, and they determined that the commanders in chief of the militia of the states have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution exist, so as to require them to place the militia or any part of it in the service of the United States, at the requisition of the President, and that when the exigencies did exist, the militia could not be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the President of the United States.8 Mass. Rep. 548.

2. These questions, which arose in times of party excitement, were put to rest by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Martin v. Mott, in 1827, in which it was

determined that the authority, to decide whether

the exigencies contemplated in the constitution and the act of congress of 1795, have arisen, is exclusively vested in the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.

(0) Militia men drafted, detached and called forth by the President, into the service of the United States, are not considered as being in that service, or in the character of national militia, until they are mustered at the place of rendezvous, and until then, the state retains a right concurrent with the government of the Union to punish for a refusal or neglect to obey the call. After entering the service of the United States,

the authority of the general government is exclusive.—Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. 1 Kent's Com. 2d Ed. 265.

(p) After a district has been ceded by a state, in pursuance of the above clause, the state

courts cannot take cognizance of any offences
committed within it-the inhabitants of such dis-
trict cannot exercise any civil or political privileges
under the laws of the state, nor are they bound
by the laws of the state. The local power which
congress acquires, carries with it the incidental
right to make that power effectual; and congress
may therefore provide for the pursuit and arrest
of a criminal escaping from one of these districts
after committing a felony there; or punish a per-
son for concealing out of the district a felony
committed within it.-4 Kent's Com. 403.
hens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 426-9. Common-
wealth v. Cleary, 8 Mass. Rep. 72. Same v.
Young, 1 Hall's Jour. of Jurisprudence, 53.

Co

2. The proviso or reservation usually annexed by a state to her consent, "that all civil and crim

inal process issued under the authority of the state may be executed on the land so ceded, in like manner as if the cession had not been made," does not imply the reservation of any concurrent legislation or jurisdiction, nor retain to the state the right to punish for acts done within the ceded lands. The effect of such proviso is to prevent the ceded lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice, for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state. -1 Kent's Com. 402, and cases there cited.

3. The land on which Fort Niagara is erected, never having been actually ceded by the state of New York to the United States, still belongs to that state, and its courts have jurisdiction of all

for

18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and Make laws carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers proper necessary and vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, proper, &c. or in any department or officer thereof. (q)

of the powers of congress.

SECTION 9.

1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the Limitations states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred Importation and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, of persons after 1808. not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be susHabeas corpus. pended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

crimes or offences against the laws of the state, committed within that fort or its precincts, though it has been garrisoned by the troops of the United States, and held by them since its surrender by Great Britain, pursuant to the treaties of 1783 and 1794. The United States cannot acquire the right of exclusive legislation by mere occupancy, there must be a cession by the state for that purpose. The People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225.

(9) The power of congress to give the priority to debts due to the United States is derivable from the above clause. Congress must possess the choice of means, which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the general government or in any department or officer thereof.U. States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358.

2. Under this clause also, congress may provide a punishment for a crime, the object of which is to subvert by violence the laws and institutions of the government, but which falls short of treason, such as a conspiracy to levy war.--Ex parte Bollman v. Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 126.

3. There is nothing in the constitution of the United States similar to the articles of confederation, which exclude incidental or implied powers. If the end be legitimate and within the scope of the constitution, all the means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and not prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect. The power of establishing a bank is not a distinct end of government, but the means of carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. The act of 19th of April, 1816, to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, is a law in pursuance of the constitution.-McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.

as a sanction to any law it may pass in pursuance 4. The right of congress to annex a punishment of an express grant of power, is not among the enumerated powers; but is a right incidental to the power and conducive to its beneficial exercise, and may be used, although not indispensably neand post roads,' draws to it the incidental and cessary. Thus the power 'to establish post offices implied power of carrying the mail along the post road; and from this implied power again, has been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the mail. falsifying a record or process of a court of the of the punishment of the crimes of stealing or U. States, or of perjury in such court.—Ibid, 416.

So

5. Congress has, by the above clause, exclusive authority to regulate the proceedings in the courts of the United States; and the states have no authority to control those proceedings, except so far as the state process acts are adopted by congress, or by the courts of the United States under of Kentucky therefore, concerning executions, the authority of a law of congress. The statutes ecution, that certain bank notes will be received which require the plaintiff to endorse on the exin payment, and on his refusal, authorize the defendant to give a replevin bond for the debt payable in two years, are not applicable to executions issuing on judgments rendered by the courts of the United States.-Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1.

6. The act of assembly of Kentucky, of 21st Dec. 1821, which prohibits the sale of property taken under executions, for less than three-fourths of its appraised value, without the consent of the owner, does not apply to a venditioni exponas issued out of the circuit court for the district of Kentucky.-The Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.

8. No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed. 4. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. (r)

5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any tion duty, or state. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce preference or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another: nor shall commerce vessels bound to or from one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

7. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, nobility to be without the consent of the congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

1. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; cmit bills of of the powers credit; (s) make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, (t)

or law impairing the obligation of contracts; (u) or grant any title of nobility.

(u) A law of a state, authorizing the Governor to convey lands, is an executory contract, and when the contract becomes executed by a conveyance, and sales are made by the grantees, to purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice of fraud or corruption, a subsequent act of the legislature of the same state annulling such law, on the ground that it was made without constitutional authority, because some of the members of the legislature were guilty of corruption in its passage, is a violation of the above clause of the constitution, and void.-Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 135. 5 Hall's Law Jour. 354 to 457, where may be found the documents relative to the Yazoo question.

2. In the year 1758, the then colony of New Jersey purchased for a tribe of Indians certain lands within the limits of the colony, and enacted that they should not thereafter be subject to any tax. By virtue of an act of 1801, the Indians sold these lands; but in this act, there was no privilege of exemption from taxes. It was settled that the act of the legislature of New Jersey, passed October, 1804, repealing so much of the first law as granted an exemption from taxes, impaired the obligation of contracts, and was void. -New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.

3. The act of 1776 of the Virginia legislature, confirming the rights of the Episcopal Church to all its lands and other property, vested an indefeasable title; and the subsequent statutes of 1798 and 1801, of that state, repealing the first act and vesting the property of the church in the state, or in third persons, are unconstitutional and void.-Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52.

4. So, if the legislature of a state should grant to the towns of such state glebes of land for religious worship, it cannot afterwards repeal the act so as to divest the right of the towns under the grant. Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292.

5. The charter granted by the British Crown, in the year 1769, to the Trustees of Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, was a contract within the meaning of this clause of the constitution; and the laws passed by New Hampshire in 1816, reorganizing the corporation, without the consent of the Trustees, impaired the obligation of the contract, and were void.-Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.

6. So a law discharging a bankrupt or insolvent debtor from his debts, impairs the obligation

of contracts, and so far as respects the discharge, is unconstitutional and void.-Sturges v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

7. And this is the case, although the contract was entered into subsequent to the passage of the law.-McMillan v. McNiel, 4 Wheat. 209.

8. And although the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of the same state at the time the contract was made and so continued until the suit was commenced in the court of the state. Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 134.

9. It is now held, however, that a bankrupt or insolvent law of a state, discharging the person of the debtor and his future property, does not impair the obligation of contracts, so far as respects subsequently contracted debts, though otherwise as to debts contracted prior; though the discharge cannot be pleaded in bar of any action brought by a citizen of another state in the courts of the United States, or of any other state than that where the discharge was obtained.-Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

10. The ultimate opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, in the above case of Ogden v. Saunders, was concurred in and adopted by the three Judges, who were in the minority on the general question of the constitutionality of state insolvent laws. So far then as decisions upon the subject of such laws have been made by the Supreme Court, they are to be deemed final and conclusive.-Boyle v. Zacharie and Turner, 6 Peters, 348.

11. A state may pass laws discharging debtors from imprisonment, limitation laws which are not retrospective, and usury laws affecting future contracts, without impairing the obligation of the contract-Sturges v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. 206.

12. The present constitution of the United States did not commence its operation until the first Wednesday in March, 1789, and the above provision of the constitution with respect to impairing the obligation of contracts, does not extend to a state law enacted before that day, and operating upon rights of property vested before that time.-Owings v. Speed, 5 Wheat. 420.

13. The compact between Virginia and Kentucky, whereby the latter became a state, is a contract within the meaning of the constitution; and the act of the Kentucky legislature of 1812, concerning occupying claimants of land, conferring