case both are valid; but if inconsistent, they must necessarily meet on the same field though enacted under widely differing powers. One must necessarily prevail, the only question being which. For answer there is only one source of direct authority, the Constitution, clause V., and section 109. Per ISAACS, J., in the Federated Saw Mill &c. Employees of Australasia v. James Moore & Son Proprietary Ltd., (1909) 8 C.L.R., 535-6.

Provisions referring to Governor.

110. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the Governor of a State extend and apply to the Governor for the time being of the State, or other chief executive officer or administrator of the government of the State.

State may surrender territory.

111. The Parliament of a State may surrender any part of the State to the Commonwealth; and upon such surrender, and the acceptance thereof by the Commonwealth, such part of the State shall become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.

States may levy charges for inspection laws.

112. After uniform duties of customs have been imposed, a State may levy on imports or exports, or on goods passing into or out of the State, such charges as may be necessary for executing the inspection 180 laws of the State; but the net produce of all charges so levied shall be for the use of the Commonwealth; and any such inspection laws may be annulled by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.

Meaning of.

§ 180. "INSPECTION LAWS."

The object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labour of a country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States. Per MARSHALL, C.J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at p. 203.

"Section 92 of the Constitution must, on any construction, include a prohibition of inter-state customs duties and the like, and section 112 plainly reads as authorizing the imposition by a State of certain charges which are not within the prohibition. Section 112 clearly recognizes State inspection laws as outside the prohibition. But if any attempt is made to convert them into instruments for the fettering of inter-state commerce, the deterrent provisoes that the net produce of inspection charges shall be for the use of the Commonwealth, and that the Parliament of the Commonwealth may annul such laws altogether, afford two effective safeguards. The truth is that, whether the charges are made on goods inspected as they pass into or out of the State, they are not taxes but merely compensation for services rendered": Per BARTON, J., in Duncan v. State of Queensland, (1916) 22 C.L.R., at p. 588.

"Inspection being a proper subject of State legislation, section 112 merely makes it clear that the States may make charges for that service even at the ports and boundaries. That is merely a question of the most convenient place at which to perform the service. There were, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, numerous laws of this class existent in the several States. There were similar laws in the Australian Colonies at the times of federation, and their number has probably increased since. Instances are to be found in the laws for the inspection and grading of butter, an operation usually conducted at the ports before shipment. The charges referred to in section 112 are those imposed for such a service. Neither the laws nor the charges for the service rendered are in any sense regulations of external or inter-state trade, though they may have some remote influence on the one or the other" Per BARTON, J., in Duncan v. State of Queensland, (1916) 22 C.L.R., at p. 589.

:

What they Connote.

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As to the argument based by counsel on section 112, that by assuming inspection laws to be valid, and by expressly conferring the power to impose inter-state inspection charges, the Convention did not mean by section 92 to do more than forbid inter-state duties I cannot accept it. It seems to me to be a fundamental error to suppose that inspection laws necessarily connote any obstruction or restriction on inter-state movement. They may obstruct or restrict and therefore the Federal Parliament has power

to annul them; but inspection laws can be of many varieties; and in assuming that they may be valid, section 112 does not exclude them from the operation of section 92 so far as they restrict interstate commerce": Per HIGGINS, in Duncan v. The State of Queensland, (1916) 22 C.L.R., at p. 637.

Intoxicating liquids.

113. All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating181 liquids passing into any State or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage, shall be subject to the laws of the State as if such liquids had been produced in the State.

See vol. I., pp. 944-8.

§ 181. "INTOXICATING LIQUIDS."

The Wilson Act.

The history of the derivation of this section from the Wilson Act of the United States was recapitulated by Mr. Justice BARTON in Fox v. Robbins, 8 C.L.R., at pp. 124-5. His Honor went on to say :—“ Now, on comparing the Wilson Act with section 113 of our Constitution, it will be seen that they are identical in substance and nearly identical in terms. It was simply thought safer by those who framed our Constitution, especially in view of the inflexible character of section 92, that such a provision should be embodied in the charter than that it should be left for future enactment by the Federal Parliament under the commerce power. The Australian provision is shorter than the American Act."

Discriminating Laws.

The unanimous decision of the Court in Fox v. Robbins, was that a West Australian law which required a greater fee for a licence to sell wine made from grapes grown in other States than for a licence to sell wine made from West Australian grapes was- -at least to the extent of the difference between the fees-invalid as a burden on inter-state commerce contrary to section 92 of the Constitution, and could not be supported by section 113. Mr. Justice BARTON said :—“ Like the Wilson Act, then, section 113 has the effect of enabling State laws, otherwise valid, to take effect on the liquors introduced from other States, at least as soon as they have reached the consignee, whether the original packages have been

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broken or opened or not. It has no greater effect, and there is no word in it which says, or which gives room for the implication, that it is meant to justify a violation of section 92 by way of discrimination. Any law of the State laying any burden on the liquor brought in, whether by tax or import, or by restriction of sale, must apply equally to the like article of the States' own production, or section 113 will not save the law": 8 C.L.R., at p. 125.

"Section 113 of the Constitution gives a State power to legislate with respect to intoxicating liquids imported into the State as fully as with respect to intoxicating liquids produced in the State, but does not authorize a discrimination between imported intoxicating liquids and those produced in State adverse to the former." Per HIGGINS, J. in Fox v. Robbins, 8 C.L.R., at p. 131.

States may not raise forces. Taxation of property of Commonweath or State. 114. A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military force, or impose any tax 182 on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth 183 impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State.

§ 182. "STATE SHALL NOT IMPOSE ANY TAX ON COMMONWEALTH PROPERTY."

Municipal Rates.

Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth, and, subsequently, certain lands and buildings within the boundaries of the City of Sydney, the property of the Government of New South Wales, became vested in the Commonwealth by virtue of sections 85 (1.) and 86 of the Constitution. Before the establishment of the Commonwealth these lands and buildings, as Crown lands in New South Wales, were liable to be rated, and were rated by the plaintiff Council under the Sydney Corporation Act of 1879, and the Sydney Corporation (Consolidating Act) of 1902. After the vesting of the lands and buildings in the Commonwealth, the plaintiff Council claimed to be entitled to be paid rates thereon by the Commonwealth. It was held by the High Court that the liability of the lands and buildings to be rated was not continued by section 108 of the Constitution, and that, therefore, by virtue of section

114, the Commonwealth was not liable to pay rates in respect of them: The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth, (1904) 1 C.L.R., 209.

Mr. Justice BARTON said:- Holding the view that the 'imposition of taxation with which we are at present concerned has taken place since Federation, I consider also that, apart from the express prohibition of section 114, the arguments of MARSHALL, C.J. in McCulloch v. Maryland, could, if necessary, be urged with much force in this case. At any rate, I venture for myself to adopt the statement and the reason of Mr. Justice FIELD, in the passages cited at the outset of my opinion": 1 C.L.R., at p. 209. 'It is familiar law that a State has no power to tax the property of the United States within its limits. This exemption of their property from State taxation-and by State taxation we mean any taxation by authority of the State, whether it be strictly for State purposes or for mere local and special objects is founded upon that principle which inheres in every independent government, that it must be free from any such interference of another Government as may tend to destroy its powers or impair their efficiency. If the property of the United States could be subjected to taxation by the States, the object and extent of the taxation would be subject to the State's discretion. It might extend to buildings and other property essential to the discharge of the ordinary business of the national Government, and in the enforcement of the tax those buildings might be taken from the possession and use of the United States." Per FIELD, J. in Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S.R., at p. 496. Cited by BARTON, J. in the Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth, supra.

§ 183. "NOR SHALL THE COMMONWEALTH.”

Federal Taxation of State Imports.

Before the establishment of the High Court the meaning of section 114 was the subject of a judicial decision given by the Full Court of New South Wales in the case of the Attorney-General of New South Wales v. The Collector of Customs of New South Wales, (1903) 3 S.R. N.S. W., 115 and 9 A.L.R., 23. This was an action to recover £994 paid by the State Government to the defendant in respect of certain customs duties levied on goods imported by the Government for the use of State railways. Justices OWEN and PRING held that the prohibition of section 114 extended not merely to State land