Opinion of the Court

416 U.S.

the continuously increasing complexity of the federal tax system.15

B

Petitioner next argues that Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., supra, does not constitute an all-encompassing reading of the Act. Petitioner contends, on the basis of prior precedents, that § 7421 (a) is subject to judicially created exceptions other than the "under no circumstances" test announced in Williams Packing. But the Court's unanimous opinion in Williams Packing indicates that the case was meant to be the capstone to judicial construction of the Act. It spells an end to a cyclical pattern of allegiance to the plain meaning of the Act, followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from that meaning, and followed in turn by the Court's rediscovery of the Act's purpose.

During the first half century of the Act's existence, the Court gave it literal force, without regard to the character of the tax, the nature of the pre-enforcement challenge to it, or the status of the plaintiff. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., at 613-614; Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 189 (1883); Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 447 (1903); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118 (1916); Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16 (1922).16 Occasionally, however, the Court noted in

15 In addition to repeatedly re-enacting the Anti-Injunction Act, Congress reaffirmed the Act's purpose by adding the federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act. See n. 7, supra.

16 The Anti-Injunction Act was written against the background of general equitable principles disfavoring the issuance of federal injunctions against taxes, absent clear proof that available remedies at law were inadequate. E. g., Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 109-110 (1871); Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591 (1891); Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U. S. 32 (1898). See

dictum that unspecified extraordinary and exceptional circumstances might justify an injunction despite the Act. E. g., Dodge v. Osborn, supra, at 122; Bailey v. George, supra, at 20. In 1922, the Court seized upon these dicta and permitted pre-enforcement injunctive suits against tax statutes that were viewed as penalties or as adjuncts to the criminal law. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386 (1922). Shortly thereafter, however, the Court made clear that Hill, Lipke, and Regal Drug were of narrow scope and had no application to pre-enforcement challenges to truly revenue-raising tax statutes. Graham v. Du Pont, 262 U. S. 234 (1923).17 Thus, the Court's first departure from a literal reading of the Act produced a prompt correction in course.

California v. Latimer, 305 U. S. 255, 261-262 (1938) (Brandeis, J., for a unanimous Court):

"[The delay inherent in pursuing remedies at law], it is urged, is a special circumstance which justifies resort to a suit for an injunction in order that the question of liability may be promptly determined. If the delay incident to such proceedings justified refusal to pay a tax, the federal rule that a suit in equity will not lie to restrain collection on the sole ground that the tax is illegal, could have little application. For possible delay of that character is the common incident of practically every contest over the validity of a federal tax." (Footnote omitted.)

Since equitable principles militating against the issuance of federal injunctions in tax cases existed independently of the Anti-Injunction Act, it is most unlikely that Congress would have chosen the stringent language of the Act if its purpose was merely to restate existing law and not to compel litigants to make use solely of the avenues of review opened by Congress. For this reason, it is not surprising that the early cases interpreting the Act read it at face value.

17 As noted earlier, the Court has also abandoned the view that bright-line distinctions exist between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes. See n. 12, supra.

In the 1930's the Court decided Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498 (1932), and Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938), the cases relied on most heavily by petitioner. Standard Nut set forth a new definition of the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances test, which was followed in Regents. In Standard Nut the Court stated that the Act is merely "declaratory of the principle" of cases prior to its passage that equity usually, but not always, disavows interference with tax collection; thus, the Act was to be construed "as near as may be in harmony with [equity doctrine] and the reasons upon which it rests." 284 U. S., at 509. Through this interpretation, the concept of extraordinary and exceptional circumstances was reduced to the traditional equitable requirements for issuance of an injunction.

Standard Nut was such a significant deviation from precedent that it was referred to by a commentator at the time as "a tribute to the tenacity of the American taxpayer" and "little short of phenomenal." 18 Read literally, the Court's opinion effectively repealed the Act, since the Act was viewed as requiring nothing more than equity doctrine had demanded before the Act's passage. The incongruity of this position has not escaped notice.19 It undoubtedly led directly to the Court's re

18 Gorovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases, 10 Taxes 446 (1932). Mr. Justice Stone, joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis, underlined the tension between Standard Nut and prior precedent: "Enacted in 1867, [the Anti-Injunction Act], for more than sixty years, has been consistently applied as precluding relief, whatever the equities alleged." 284 U. S., at 511.

19 E. g., Lenoir, Congressional Control Over Suits to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 3 Ariz. L. Rev. 177, 195 (1961).

"In effect [Standard Nut] says that if special circumstances exist which bring the case within some acknowledged head of equity juris

examination of the requirements of the Act in Williams Packing, the second time the Court has undertaken to rehabilitate the Act following debilitating departures from its explicit language. See Graham v. Du Pont,

supra.

Williams Packing switched the focus of the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances test from a showing of the degree of harm to the plaintiff absent an injunction to the requirement that it be established that the Service's action is plainly without a legal basis. The Court in essence read Standard Nut not as an instance of irreparable injury but as a case where the Service had no chance of success on the merits. 370 U. S., at 7. And the Court explicitly held that the Act may not be evaded "merely because collection would cause an irreparable injury, such as the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise." Id., at 6. Yet petitioner's argument that we should find Williams Packing inapplicable turns, in the last analysis, on its claim that to do otherwise would subject it to great harm. The Court rejected that consideration in Williams Packing itself, and we reject it as a reason for finding that case not controlling. Under the language of the Act, the degree of harm is not a factor, and as a matter of judicial construction, it does not provide a meaningful stopping point between Standard Nut and Williams Packing. Acceptance of petitioner's irreparable injury argument would simply diction, [the Anti-Injunction Act] does not apply, and the Court may issue an injunction. But in the absence of such circumstances the Court will lack equity jurisdiction because there will be no basis for such jurisdiction. To say that [the Act] applies only in such cases seems a little absurd. It is tantamount to saying that [the Act] forbids the courts to issue injunctions only when they would not have the authority to issue them anyway! It denies any force whatever to [the Act] except as declaratory of an equitable rule previously followed by the courts."

revive the evisceration of the Act inherent in Standard Nut.

C

Assuming, arguendo, the applicability of § 7421 (a) and Williams Packing, petitioner contends that forcing it to meet the standards of those authorities will deny it due process of law in light of the irreparable injury it will suffer pending resort to alternative procedures for review and of the alleged inadequacies of those remedies at law. The Court dismissed out of hand similar contentions nearly 60 years ago,20 and we find such arguments no more compelling now than then.

This is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different. If, as alleged in its complaint, petitioner will have taxable income upon the withdrawal of its § 501 (c) (3) status, it may in accordance with prescribed procedures petition the Tax Court to review the assessment of income taxes. Alternatively, petitioner may pay income taxes, or, in their absence, an installment of FICA or FUTA taxes, exhaust the Service's internal refund procedures, and then bring suit for a refund. These review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's revocation of tax-exempt status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibility. See, e. g., Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,

20 See Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 122 (1916):

"There is a contention that the provisions requiring an appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue after payment of the taxes and giving a right to sue in case of his refusal to refund are wanting in due process and therefore there is jurisdiction [to issue injunctive relief prior to the assessment or collection of any tax]. But we think it suffices to state that contention to demonstrate its entire want of merit."