The debtor, with or without moving to dissolve the sequestration, may also regain possession by filing his own bond to protect the creditor against interim damage to him should he ultimately win his case and have judgment against the debtor for the unpaid balance of the purchase price which was the object of the suit and of the sequestration. Arts. 3507 and 3508.9

In our view, this statutory procedure effects a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties. We cannot accept petitioner's broad assertion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to him the use and possession of the goods until all issues in the case were judicially resolved after full adversary proceedings had been completed. It is certainly clear under this Court's precedents that issues can be limited in actions for possession. Indeed, in Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U. S. 133 (1915) (Holmes, J.), the Court upheld such limitations in possessory actions for real property in Louisiana. See also Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U. S. 170 (1923); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972). Petitioner's claim must accordingly be narrowed to one for a hearing on the issues in the possessory action-default, the existence of a lien, and possession of the debtor-before property is taken.

As to this claim, the seller here, with a vendor's lien to secure payment of the unpaid balance of purchase price, had the right either to be paid in accordance with its contract or to have possession of the goods for the purpose of foreclosing its lien and recovering the unpaid balance. By complaint and affidavit, the seller swore

9 The debtor's bond necessary to repossess the property "shall exceed by one-fourth the value of the property as determined by the court, or shall exceed by one-fourth the amount of the claim, whichever is the lesser." Art. 3508.

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to facts that would entitle it to immediate possession of the goods under its contract, undiminished in value by further deterioration through use of the property by the buyer. Wholly aside from whether the buyer, with possession and power over the property, will destroy or make away with the goods, the buyer in possession of consumer goods will undeniably put the property to its intended use, and the resale value of the merchandise will steadily decline as it is used over a period of time. Any installment seller anticipates as much, but he is normally protected because the buyer's installment payments keep pace with the deterioration in value of the security. Clearly, if payments cease and possession and use by the buyer continue, the seller's interest in the property as security is steadily and irretrievably eroded until the time at which the full hearing is held.

The State of Louisiana was entitled to recognize this reality and to provide somewhat more protection for the seller. This it did in Orleans Parish by authorizing the sequestration of property by a judge. At the same time, the buyer being deprived of possession, the seller was required to put up a bond to guarantee the buyer against damage or expense, including attorney's fees, in the event the sequestration is shown to be mistaken or otherwise improvident. The buyer is permitted to regain possession by putting up his own bond to protect the seller. Absent that bond, which petitioner did not file in this case, the seller would be unprotected against the inevitable deterioration in the value of his security if the buyer remained in possession pending trial on the merits. The debtor, unlike the creditor, does not stand ready to make the opposing party whole, if his possession, pending a prior hearing, turns out to be wrongful. Second, there is the real risk that the buyer, with possession and power over the goods, will conceal or

transfer the merchandise to the damage of the seller. This is one of the considerations weighed in the balance by the Louisiana law in permitting initial sequestration of the property. An important factor in this connection is that under Louisiana law, the vendor's lien expires if the buyer transfers possession. It follows that if the vendor is to retain his lien, superior to the rights of other creditors of the buyer, it is imperative when default occurs that the property be sequestered in order to foreclose the possibility that the buyer will sell or otherwise convey the property to third parties against whom the vendor's lien will not survive. The danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith.

Third, there is scant support in our cases for the proposition that there must be final judicial determination of the seller's entitlement before the buyer may be even temporarily deprived of possession of the purchased goods. On the contrary, it seems apparent that the seller with his own interest in the disputed merchandise would need to establish in any event only the probability that his case will succeed to warrant the bonded sequestration of the property pending outcome of the suit. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594 (1950). The issue at this stage of the proceeding concerns possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt, the lien, and the delinquency. These are ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof; and we think it comports with due process to permit the initial seizure on sworn ex parte documents, followed by the early opportunity to put the creditor to his proof. The nature of the issues at stake minimizes the risk that the

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writ will be wrongfully issued by a judge. The potential damages award available, if there is a successful motion to dissolve the writ, as well as the creditor's own interest in avoiding interrupting the transaction, also contributes to minimizing this risk.

Fourth, we remain unconvinced that the impact on the debtor of deprivation of the household goods here in question overrides his inability to make the creditor whole for wrongful possession, the risk of destruction or alienation if notice and a prior hearing are supplied, and the low risk of a wrongful determination of possession through the procedures now employed.

Finally, the debtor may immediately have a full hearing on the matter of possession following the execution of the writ, thus cutting to a bare minimum the time of creditor- or court-supervised possession. The debtor in this case, who did not avail himself of this opportunity, can hardly expect that his argument on the severity of deprivation will carry much weight, and even assuming that there is real impact on the debtor from loss of these goods, pending the hearing on possession, his basic source of income is unimpaired.

The requirements of due process of law "are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure necessary." Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697, 710 (1945). Due process of law guarantees "no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights." NLRB v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333, 351 (1938). "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 650 (1972). Considering the Louisiana procedure as a whole, we are convinced that the State has reached a constitutional accommodation of the respective interests of buyer and seller.

Petitioner asserts that his right to a hearing before his possession is in any way disturbed is nonetheless mandated by a long line of cases in this Court, culminating in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972). The pre-Sniadach cases are said by petitioner to hold that "the opportunity to be heard must precede any actual deprivation of private property." 10 Their import, however, is not so clear as petitioner would have it: they merely stand for the proposition that a hearing must be had before one is finally deprived of his property and do not deal at all with the need for a pretermination hearing where a full and immediate post-termination hearing is provided. The usual rule has been "[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate." Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See also Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 632 (1905); Springer

10 Petitioner relies particularly on: Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956); New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293 (1953); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220 (1946); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 294 U. S. 63 (1935); United States V. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457 (1934); Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 (1933); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1908); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907); Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409 (1897); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (1894); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 (1876); Ray v. Norseworthy, 23 Wall. 128 (1875); Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (1874); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (1864). Brief for Petitioner 10-11.