REHNQUIST, J., concurring 416 U.S. whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring. So ordered. The Court says that use of state court certification procedures by federal courts "does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Ante, at 391. It also observes that "[w]e do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory," ante, at 390391, and further states that "[i]ts use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." Ante, at 391. I agree with each of these propositions, but I think it appropriate to emphasize the scope of the discretion of federal judges in deciding whether to use such certification procedures. Petitioners here were defendants in the District Court. That court, applying applicable New York choice-of-law rules, decided that Florida law governs the case and, finding that the respondents' complaint requested relief which would extend the substantive law even beyond New York's apparently novel decision in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494, 248 N. E. 2d 910 (1969), dismissed the complaint on the merits. The Court of Appeals agreed that Florida law applied, but held that Florida law would permit recovery on the claim stated by respondents. The opinion of the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the majority's analysis of Florida law, added in a concluding paragraph that in light of the uncertainty of Florida law, the Florida certification procedure should have been utilized by the Court of Appeals. On rehear 386 REHNQUIST, J., concurring ing, petitioners requested the Court of Appeals to utilize this procedure, but they concede that this is the first such request that they made. Thus petitioners seek to upset the result of more than two years of trial and appellate litigation on the basis of a point which they first presented to the Court of Appeals upon petition for rehearing. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 329 (1964). The authority which Congress has granted this Court to review judgments of the courts of appeals undoubtedly vests us not only with the authority to correct errors of substantive law, but to prescribe the method by which those courts go about deciding the cases before them. Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U. S. 247 (1953). But a sensible respect for the experience and competence of the various integral parts of the federal judicial system suggests that we go slowly in telling the courts of appeals or the district courts how to go about deciding cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, cases which they see and decide far more often than we do. This Court has held that a federal court may not remit a diversity plaintiff to state courts merely because of the difficulty in ascertaining local law, Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943); it has also held that unusual circumstances may require a federal court having jurisdiction of an action to nonetheless abstain from deciding doubtful questions of state law, e. g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25 (1959); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U. S. 593 (1968) (per curiam). In each of these situations, our decisions have dealt with the issue of how to reconcile the exercise of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon the federal courts with the important considerations of comity and cooperative federalism which REHNQUIST, J., concurring 416 U.S. are inherent in a federal system, both of which must be subject to a single national policy within the federal judiciary. At the other end of the spectrum, however, I assume it would be unthinkable to any of the Members of this Court to prescribe the process by which a district court or a court of appeals should go about researching a point of state law which arises in a diversity case. Presumably the judges of the district courts and of the courts of appeals are at least as capable as we are in determining what the Florida courts have said about a particular question of Florida law. State certification procedures are a very desirable means by which a federal court may ascertain an undecided point of state law, especially where, as is the case in Florida, the question can be certified directly to the court of last resort within the State. But in a purely diversity case such as this one, the use of such a procedure is more a question of the considerable discretion of the federal court in going about the decisionmaking process than it is a question of a choice trenching upon the fundamentals of our federal-state jurisprudence. While certification may engender less delay and create fewer additional expenses for litigants than would abstention, it entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by the federal court. See Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 363 U. S. 207, 226-227 (1960) (dissenting opinion). The Supreme Court of Florida has promulgated an appellate rule, Fla. Appellate Rule 4.61 (1967), which provides that upon certification by a federal court to that court, the parties shall file briefs there according to a specified briefing schedule, that oral argument may be granted upon application, and that the parties shall pay the costs of the 386 REHNQUIST, J., concurring certification.* Thus while the certification procedure is more likely to produce the correct determination of state law, additional time and money are required to achieve such a determination. If a district court or court of appeals believes that it can resolve an issue of state law with available research materials already at hand, and makes the effort to do so, its determination should not be disturbed simply because the certification procedure existed but was not used. The question of whether certification on the facts of this case, particularly in view of the lateness of its suggestion by petitioners, would have advanced the goal of correctly disposing of this litigation on the state law issue is one which I would leave, and I understand that the Court would leave, to the sound judgment of the court making the initial choice. But since the Court has today for the first time expressed its view as to the use of certification procedures by the federal courts, I agree that it is appropriate to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases in order that the Court of Appeals may reconsider certification in light of the Court's opinion. *Fla. Appellate Rule 4.61 (1967) provides in part: "f. Costs of Certificate. The costs of the certificate and filing fee shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by this Court. "g. Briefs and Argument. The appellant or moving party in the federal court shall file and serve upon its adversary its brief on the question certified within 30 days after the filing of said certificate in the appellate court of this state having jurisdiction. The appellee or responding party in the federal court shall file and serve upon its adversary its brief within 20 days after the receipt of appellant's or moving party's brief and a reply brief shall be filed within 10 days thereafter. "h. Oral Argument. Oral argument may be granted upon application and, unless for good cause shown the time be enlarged by special order of the Court prior to the hearing thereon, the parties shall be allowed the same time as in other causes on the merits." PROCUNIER, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, ET AL. v. MARTINEZ ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. 72-1465. Argued December 3, 1973-Decided April 29, 1974 Appellees, prison inmates, brought this class action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the Director of the California Department of Corrections and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorneyclient interviews with inmates. The mail censorship regulations, inter alia, proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." The District Court held these regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment, void for vagueness, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process, and it enjoined their continued enforcement. The court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of correspondence and that the author of the correspondence be allowed to protest the decision and secure review by a prison official other than the original censor. The District Court also held that the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates abridged the right of access to the courts and enjoined its continued enforcement. Appellants contend that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Held: 1. The District Court did not err in refusing to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Pp. 400-404. 2. The censorship of direct personal correspondence involves incidental restrictions on the right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents and is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) it must further one or more of the important and substantial governmental interests of security, order, and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) it must be no greater than is necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest involved. Pp. 404-414. |