which has been characteristic of our ships wherever such moderate freeboard is practicable. In the very long and fine lined ship, however, with concentration of weight nearer the extremities, it is desirable, for seagoing reasons, as already stated, to raise the forecastle; but the Japanese are apparently so impressed with the desirability of limiting the elevation of their top weights and devoting as much weight as possible to armor and armament that they appear to be willing to make some sacrifice in freeboard. They have, therefore, maintained aproximately the same freeboard in their new and larger battle ships as seemed sufficient for their older and shorter vessels; and surely the Japanese have the advantage of great experience so far as concerns the essential requirements of battle ships under modern battle conditions.

From all of the foregoing, I have no hesitancy whatever in stating that the freeboard forward on American battle ships now in commission, with the sole exception of the Kearsarge and Kentucky, is ample to meet all the requirements of the batteries of those vessels under any conditions of sea which are likely to be met with in naval actions. The experience of the Japanese battle ships in the battle of the Sea of Japan leaves no possible ground for doubt upon that score, the Japanese battle ships, be it remembered, being somewhat inferior in freeboard and gun height and having less effective distribution of water-line armor than a large majority of the battle ships of the United States Atlantic Fleet.

With respect to the distribution of water-line armor in our battle ships, as compared with foreign battle ships of the same date of design, attention is invited to the cross sections of typical battle ships of the United States and foreign navies shown in Appendix VII. The cross sections speak for themselves, and I have already described the care with which these cross sections have been prepared, all available data being consulted.

It is especially noteworthy that the water-line armor protection of practically all of the battle ships of the United States Atlantic Fleet is equal, or superior, to that of Admiral Togo's flagship Mikasa; that the armor above the water-line belt for the Virginia class, and the Connecticut and Louisiana, is of the same thickness as that of the Mikasa; that the armor above the water-line belt on the Vermont, Kansas, and Minnesota is 1 inch thicker than that of the Mikasa; that the height of the upper edge of the main-belt armor above the load water line on the five vessels of the Connecticut class is 1 foot 9 inches greater than the corresponding height of the belt armor on the Mikasa; also that the upper edge of the main-belt armor of all other battle ships in the United States Atlantic Fleet is more than 6 inches higher out of water at the designed load displacement than the upper edge of the main water-line belt armor of the Mikasa. Moreover, the main water-line belt and upper side belt of the Japanese battle ships Kashima and Katori, which were in course of construction for the Japanese navy at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, were practically identical with that of the Mikasa. Again, the distribution of main water-line belt and other side armor of the Aki, one of the latest Japanese battle ships, designed in 1906 after the close of the war, is almost identical with that of the United States battle ship Vermont, designed in 1904, except that the upper edge of the main-belt armor of the Aki lacks 9 inches of being as high above

the designed load water line as the corresponding armor of the Vermont. The Japanese have had very considerable experience as to the necessity of certain dispositions of armor, guns, freeboard, etc., so that I have no hesitancy in predicting, in view of the foregoing statement as to armor distribution, that the battle ships of the United States Atlantic Fleet could give a most excellent account of themselves in any naval encounter in which they might become engaged. The plans and tabular data accompanying this report are so complete and so self-explanatory that it does not seem necessary to make further comment with respect to the alleged insufficiency of free board, water-line armor protection, etc., of battle ships of the United States Navy. As a matter of interest, however, there will be attached to this report, as an appendix, some extracts from foreign periodicals which clearly indicate the high esteem in which American designs of battle ships have been held by foreign naval critics. The following quotation from the Chief Constructor's recent testimony before the Naval Committee of the House gives a statement of the reason for locating the water-line armor protection in the manner followed by American, British, and Japanese designers:

The consensus of opinion among naval designers, and those naval officers who have given very considerable attention to the subject, appears to be that the lower edge of the main water-line belt armor at the designed load displacement should be immersed about 5 feet. It should be remembered that this is the immersion at the designed load displacement or trial displacement, as it is usually called in our service and not the deep load displacement. This depth of submergence is, of course, more or less arbitrary and is based upon the amount of weight which can be devoted to armor protection, and is governed to a certain extent also by the beam of the ship. The subject of weight is a very serious one for naval designers, and the immersion of the lower edge of the armor belt has been limited to 5 feet, not because that is ample, in the judgment of the designer, under all conditions, but because it is all that can be permitted under the allowance of weight for armor protection, and, under ordinary conditions, it should give ample protection. If the vessel were very light it would not give satisfactory protection under ordinary conditions of rolling, but that risk must be taken. When, on the other hand, the vessel is deep loaded, the protection of the vessel under conditions of fairly heavy rolling is good, but even then a roll of 10° would cause the lower edge of the armor to come out of water. It is thus obvious that protection of the water line is limited by the weight of armor which can be used for this purpose, and is more or less a compromise.

Mr. BUTLER. Why do you want this protection below the water?

Admiral CAPPS. Because of the action of the sea. As the ship rolls the armor tends to emerge. Moreover, in a perfectly smooth sea-and I can show you dozens of photographs indicating this fact-the formation of waves at right angles to the line of travel of the vessel when going at high speed will cause an exposure of the side of the vessel below the average water level of 3 or 4 feet, and this in smooth water.

Mr. BUTLER. And when the ship rolls back it will expose what we call the skin of the ship?

Admiral CAPPS. It is very apt to expose the skin of the ship. There will doubtless be many times during a naval action, in rough weather, when the bottom below the armor belt will be exposed; and while a hit at the water line or below the water line is apt to be rare (and this is the experience of naval battles so far) such a hit must always do very serious damage when penetration ensues, because there is a likelihood of hitting boilers or engines or magazines; and even if vital portions of the vessel are not struck, the vessel is much more easily flooded through an underwater opening in the bottom. It is thus apparent why protection below the water to a moderate extent is relatively of far greater importance than protection above the water line, and armor distribution is governed accordingly.

In the case of the Connecticut class, for instance, the heavy belt is 9 feet 3 inches wide and extends, at designed displacement, from 5 feet below to 4 feet

3 inches above. Above the main belt there are two other belts, the lower 6 inches thick, the upper 7 inches thick. For the Vermont, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Mississippi, and Idaho both upper belts are 7 inches thick. Moreover, the belt immediately above the water-line belt is reenforced by deep coal bunkers. In other words, a shot striking just above the main belt on the Minnesota would have to pass through 7 inches of armor, nearly 1 inch of structural plating, and then nearly 20 feet of coal, if the upper bunkers are full. This very substantial protection above the heavy water-line belt is usually entirely ignored by critics, although it is worthy of note that this upper belt armor protection of the Minnesota and class is as heavy or heavier than the main water-line armor protection of thirteen important battle ships in the British navy built or purchased during the past ten years. So far as concerns the intake of water, it must be remembered that a shot hole just above the water line can only admit small quantities of water, which can easily be taken care of by the pumps of the water-tight subdivision of the hull; whereas damage below the water line and especially below the protective deck is much more serious, since water then flows in quite freely under a "head" and may easily be beyond the capacity of the pumps.

In this connection, I would like to say right here that none of the allegations as to insufficient water-line armor have any bearing upon the South Carolina and Michigan and the North Dakota and Delaware, because the upper belt of those ships has a mean thickness equal to that of the main water-line belt of the Minnesota and class, being 10 inches thick at the bottom and 8 inches thick at the top; moreover, these vessels have a compartmental subdivision which will afford ample protection and stability even under conditions of serious underwater damage. Also, if compartments on one side of the ship are flooded, as Mr. Butler suggested a few moments ago, so that under ordinary conditions a change of trim of the ship would result, there would be no such continuing change of trim in these vessels, since complete arrangements have been made for flooding the opposite compartments and restoring the vessel to an approximate "even keel."

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would explain the length of this armor belt; and also state how our distribution of armor compares with the distribution of armor on the British and Japanese ships.

Admiral CAPPS. In general, the distribution of armor on ships of the same date, Japanese, English, and American, is very similar. The actual lengths of the belts on our ships have been calculated and are given in the table already alluded to. This sort of data for foreign vessels is not readily accessible, but we have fairly reliable information which has been gleaned from various sources, and, so far as our information goes, the armor protection of ships of the United States Navy is quite equal to and in many instances surpasses that of English and Japanese battle ships. In this connection it may be noted with considerable interest that in the South Carolina class, which are vessels of nearly 2,000 tons less displacement than the British Dreadnoughts, the weight assigned to armor and hull is practically the same as that allowed for the Dreadnought. It is almost certain, therefore, that the armor protection of the South Carolina is superior to that of the Dreadnought. The armor protection of the Delaware is also superior to that of the latest British and Japanese battle ships, so far as our information indicates. The armor protection of the Minnesota is very similar indeed to that of British vessels of the King Edward class. While the belt above the main belt on the King Edward is 1 inch thicker than the corresponding belt in the Minnesota, the Minnesota's main belt is 1 foot 3 inches wider than that of the King Edward, and therefore there is 1 foot 3 inches more of the Minnesota's main belt out of water at the designed load displacement. Armor displacement, like other elements of warship design, is a compromise, but the fundamental principles which govern its location are the same in all cases and in all countries.

The plans and tabular data accompanying this report, in conjunction with such explanations as appeared necessary in the text, will, I feel sure, conclusively demonstrate that "freeboard," "gun heights,” appropriate water-line armor distribution," and other seagoing necessities of battle ships have always received most earnest and intelligent consideration by naval officers charged with the grave respon

sibility of developing the best battle-ship designs for the United States Navy, and that an adequate development of these qualities has always been provided, having in view the state of advancement of naval matériel at the time of the approval of the designs in question.

I will now proceed, as briefly as possible, to a consideration of the most serious misrepresentations contained in a recent magazine article contributed by a writer who claims unusual knowledge of, and familiarity with, the vessels of the United States Navy.

It is obvious, however, that a reasonable brevity in this report will make it wholly impracticable to consider, in detail, all of his misleading statements. In order that there may be no necessity for referring directly to the article in question, quotations therefrom will be given, followed by such comments as may appear appropriate.

The writer of the article, after indicating the tragic results which would follow an outbreak of war which found our Navy unprepared,

continues:

This article will show some of the reasons why the American Navy is unprepared for war. It will be a statement of facts, not of opinions.

A careful perusal of this report, and an examination of the tabular statements and plans herewith transmitted, will doubtless convince the impartial reader that this particular magazine writer has great difficulty in distinguishing between facts and his own unsubstantiated and erroneous opinions.

Under the caption of "A fleet with main armor under water," this critic informs us that

A modern battle ship is a simple thing in its big general principles. Two points are essential in its protection-a shell-proof armor, which guards its water line and high, shell-proof turrets which lift up its guns just above the wash and spray of the waves. An X-ray photograph of its heavy armor would show a monitor with high turrets. The lower part of the smokestacks, the minor gun positions, the conning and signal towers, are all protected; but these two major points are the essentials in the armor of a battle ship.

Obviously, the most important feature of all must be the belt along the water line. A wound upon a turret may silence that one turret's guns. A hole upon the water line will cripple or sink the ship. Of all the Russian follies which came to light in the great battle of Tsoushima, that sealed the fate of the Russian-Japanese war, one stands out especially. The Russian battle ships, when they went into that fight, were overloaded until the shell-proof armor of their water line was underneath the water. They were not battle ships at all. Within a year afterwards our Navy awoke to a realization of a startling fact: The ships of the battle fleet of the United States are in exactly the same condition as the Russian ships at Tsoushima-not temporarily, but permanently.

The Chief Constructor, after twenty-eight years' service in the Navy, twenty-two of which have been devoted to special preparation for and performance of the duties of a naval constructor, regrets that he can not concur in the foregoing opinion as to the simplicity of a battle ship. A greater familiarity with the subject would perhaps lead the critic to modify his opinion, and perhaps even tend to make him concur in the opinions of many highly trained men of large experience, both as naval architects and naval officers, that, instead of a modern battle ship being a "simple thing," it is, in reality, a most complicated structure.

This magazine critic asserts that the most important feature of all "must be the belt along the water line." That the belt along the water line is a most important feature may be accepted without dis

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pute. There are many other qualities, however, of equally great importance. He also asserts, with great assurance, that "a hole along the water line will cripple or sink the ship." The size and location of this hole, the subdivision of the ship, and the facilities for disposing of water entering under these conditions will unquestionably determine whether or not such a wound would " cripple or sink the ship." It may be stated with assurance, however, that no properly designed modern battle ship would have its buoyancy seriously impaired-and certainly could not be sunk-by a single or even several shot holes along the water line." On the contrary, the behavior of the Russian ships in the battle of the Sea of Japan indicates conclusively how difficult it is to sink a battle ship by gun fire even when the vessel is heavily overloaded with an excess of stores, coal, etc., which carried the heavy armor belt far below the position which it might reasonably be expected to occupy under the stress of battle. As a matter of fact, despite the very unusual and quite unnecessary condition of overloading under which the Russian ships went into battle, it is worthy of special note that it was only after nearly an hour of heavy, concentrated fire by the Japanese that the Osliabia foundered, this vessel being the first of the Russian battle ships to succumb to gun fire. The large majority of the other Russian vessels which were ultimately. sunk, foundered as a result of torpedo attack or the opening of sea valves by their own crews, and not gun fire. It is also noteworthy that the next ship after the Osliabia which foundered as a direct result of gun fire, had successfully resisted vital injury by gun fire for more than five hours-a profound tribute to the ability of the damaged battle ship to remain afloat even under the serious disadvantages of overloading which prevailed on vessels of the Russian fleet at the battle of the Sea of Japan.

It has already been stated in this report, and in fact is perfectly well known to those who have given any serious consideration to the subject of water line and above water line armor protection of battle ships, that a wound above the main armor belt is of minor consequence as compared with one through the main water line armor belt or below the main armor belt, for the simplest of all reasons: 1st, a shell penetrating the upper armor belt would be above the protective deck and would explode in coal bunkers, in all probability, if it exploded at all. The fragments of such a shell could not, under ordinary conditions, seriously affect the vital portions of the ship. Moreover, the inflow of water through a hole in the armor above the main belt, at or above the water line, would be gradual and quite within the control of the ship's pumps. Penetration through the main armor belt below the water line, however, or penetration of the hull entirely below the main armor belt, would open the vessel to an inflow of water under a "head," and, while in the best designed ships, the flow of water through 12-inch holes, even under these conditions, could be taken care of by the pumps or the compartmental subdivision of the ship, it is possible that fragments of a shell so entering would strike portions of the motive machinery or boilers, or other vital apparatus, and seriously affect the efficiency of the vessel. For this reason, with a given amount of armor, it is imperative that the greatest protection should be given to the water line of a vessel in wake of machinery, boilers, and magazines, and that the lower edge of this armor belt should be sufficiently below the load water line as