ceptira) of impressions, or for the passive perception.* power of combination he appropriates to the former: “quæ singula et simpliciter acceperat imaginatio, ea conjungit et disjungit phantasia." And the law by which the thoughts are spontaneously presented follows thus: "qua simul sunt a phantasia comprehensa, si alterutrum occurrat, solet secum alterum repre

of seventy. He also published, amongst other works, one on the Soul.De Anima, lib. iv. Lugd. Bat. 1555, 8vo. and one on Natural Philosophy— De Philosophia Naturali, lib vi. 8vo.

John Lewis Vives was born in 1492 at Valencia in Spain, died at Bruges, according to Thuanus, in 1541: was first patronized by Henry VIII. of England, who made him preceptor in Latin to the Princess Mary, and afterwards persecuted by him for opposing his divorce. He was a follower of Erasmus, and opponent of the Scholastic Philosophy. His works, which are of various kinds, theological, devotional, grammatical, critical, as well as philosophical, were printed at Basle in 1555, in two vols. fol. The Treatise De Anima et Vita is contained in vol. ii. pp. 497–593.—S. C.]

* [Et quemadmodum in altrice facultate videre est inesse vim quandam, que cibum recipiat, aliam quæ contineat, aliam quæ conficiat, quæque distribuat et dispenset: ita in animis et hominum et brutorum est functio, quæ imagines sensibus impressas recipit, quæ inde Imaginativa dicitur: est quæ continet hæc, Memoria; quæ conficit, Phantasia: quæ distribuit ad assensum aut dissensum, Extrimatrix. Sunt enim spiritalia imagines Dei, corporalia vero spiritalium quædam veluti simulachra: ut mirandum non sit, ex corporalibus spiritalia colligi, ceu ab umbris aut picturis corpora expressa. Imaginativæ actio est in animo, quæ oculi in corpore, recipere imagines intuendo: estque velut orificium quoddam vasis, quod est Memoria. Phantasia verò conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simplicia Imaginatio acceperat. Equidem haud sum nescius, confundi duo hæc a plerisque, ut Imaginationem Phantasiam, et vice versa hanc Imaginationem nominent, et eandem esse functionem quidam arbitrentur. Sed nobis tum ad rem aptius, tum ad docendum accommodatius visum est ita partiri: propterea quod actiones videmus distinctas, unde facultates censentur. Tametsi nihil erit quandoque periculi, si istis utamur promiscue. Accedit his sensus, qui ab Aristotele communis dicitur, quo judicantur sensilia absentia: et discernuntur ea, quæ variorum sunt sensuum: hic sub Imaginationem et Phantasiam venire potest. Phantasia est mirifice expedita et libera: quicquid collibitum est, fingit, refingit, componit, divincit, dissolvit, res disjunctissimas connectit, conjunctissimas autem longissime separat. Itaque nisi regatur, et cohibeatur a ratione, haud secus animum percellit ac perturbat, quam procella mare. Jo. Ludovici Vivis, De Anima et Vita. Lib. i. Opera, tom. ii. p. 509. Basil, 1555.-S.C.] [Maasz, p. 344. Note. Vives De Anim. i. s. d. cogn. intern. Phantasia conjungit et disjungit ea, quæ singula et simpliciter, acceperat imaginatio. Imagination, according to Vives, says Maasz, is the capability of perceiving an impression.-S. C.]

sentare."*

To time therefore he subordinates all the other exciting causes of association. The soul proceeds a causa ad effectum, ab hoc ad instrumentum, a parte ad totum;" thence to the place, from place to person, and from this to whatever preceded or followed, all as being parts of a total impression, each of which may recall the other. The apparent springs "saltus vel transitus etiam longissimos," he explains by the same thought having been a component part of two or more total impressions. Thus "ex Scipione venio in cogitationem potentia Turcica, propter victorias ejus de Asia, in qua regnabat Antiochus."§

But from Vives I pass at once to the source of his doctrines, and (as far as we can judge from the remains yet extant of Greek philosophy) as to the first, so to the fullest and most perfect enunciation of the associative principle, namely, to the writings of Aristotle; and of these in particular to the treatises De Anima, and 66 De Memoria," which last belongs to the series of Essays entitled in the old translations Parva Naturalia. In as much as later writers have either deviated from, or added to his doctrines, they appear to me to have introduced either error or groundless supposition.

* [De Anima i. sect. d. cited by Maasz in a note ibid. Vives proceeds thus-unde sedes illæ existunt in artificio memoriæ, quippe ad aspectum loci de eo venit in mentem, quod in loco scimus evenisse, aut situm esse: quando etiam cum voce aut sono aliquo quippiam contingit lætum, eodem sono audito delectamur: si triste tristamur. Quod in brutis quoque est annotare: quæ si quo sono vocata gratum aliquid accipiunt, rursum ad eundem sonum facile ac libenter accurrunt : sin cædantur, sonitum eundem deinceps reformidant, ex plagarum recordatione.—Lib. ii. Opera, tom. ii. p. 519.—S. C.]

[De Anima ii. sect. d. mem. et record.―Cited by Maasz in a note, Ibid. -S.C.]

[Ibid. ibid. See Maasz, pp. 345-6. That the springs are only "apparent" is explained by Maasz, commenting on the words of Vives, Sunt (in phantasia) transitus quidam longissimi, immo saltus.—S. C.]

§ [Cited by Maasz from the same place, p. 346.—S. C.]

|| [This collection, τὰ μικρὰ καλούμενα Φυσικά, which is connected with the treatise in three books, on the Soul (as Trendelenburg distinctly shows in the Preface to his elaborate commentary on that work of Aristotle), contains the books On Sense and Things Sensible, On Memory and Recollection On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep (каľ úñνоν), On Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, On Respiration, and On Life and Death.-S. C.]

VOL. III.

K

In the first place it is to be observed, that Aristotle's positions on this subject are unmixed with fiction.* The wise Stagyrite speaks of no successive particles propagating motion like billiardballs, as Hobbes ;† nor of nervous or animal spirits, where inanimate and irrational solids are thawed down, and distilled, or filtrated by ascension, into living and intelligent fluids, that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain, as the followers of Des Cartes, and the humoral pathologists in general; nor of an oscillating ether which was to effect the same service for the nerves of the brain considered as solid fibres, as the animal spirits perform for them under the notion of hollow tubes, as Hartley teaches

-nor finally (with yet more recent dreamers), of chemical compositions by elective affinity, or of an electric light at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ of inward vision, which rises to the brain like an Aurora Borealis, and there, disporting in various shapes,—as the balance of plus and minus, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established,-images out both past and present. Aristotle delivers a just theory without pretending to an hypothesis; or in other words a comprehensive survey of the different facts, and of their relations to each other without supposition, that is, a fact placed under a number of facts, as their common support and explanation: though in the majority of instances these hypotheses or suppositions better de

* [Maasz has also said (p. 345) speaking of Vives, that, though he set forth correctly the theory of association, he yet did not exhibit it with such entire purity as Aristotle. Mr. Coleridge, however, is comparing the wise Stagyrite with Hobbes, Des Cartes, Hartley and others—Maasz is comparing him with Vives-observing that this author not only came after Aristotle in perceiving and expressing the general law of imagination, but, what is the principal thing, did not state the theory of association so consistently and purely as the former, because he made exceptions to the same, which are such in appearance only: though he thinks it may be assumed in his favor, that his language is incorrect rather than his conception of the subject. Mr. Coleridge, on the other hand, is objecting to the physical dreams, which modern metaphysicians introduced into the survey of psychological facts delivered by the sager ancient. He imputes to them an error in principle, while Maasz remarks upon a statement at variance with a law correctly laid down.-S. C.]

[See Human Nature, chaps. ii. and iii. Hobbes does not use the expressions in which Mr. C. describes his doctrine, but speaks much of motions produced in the brain by objects.-S. C.]

serve the name or úлолоiησɛîç, or suffictions.* He uses indeed the word vnosis, to express what we call representations or ideas, but he carefully distinguishes them from material motion, designating the latter always by annexing the words 8 Tол иατà τóлоv.† On the contrary in his treatise De Anima, he excludes place and motion from all the operations of thought, whether representations or volitions, as attributes utterly and absurdly heterogeneous.‡

The general law of association, or, more accurately, the common condition under which all exciting causes act, and in which they may be generalized, according to Aristotle is this.§ Ideas

* [The discussion of Maasz on the part performed by Aristotle in explaining the general law of the Imagination extends from p. 319 to p. 335, from sect. 90 to 94 inclusively.-S. C.]

[See Maasz, p. 321. He refers generally to the treatise De Anima, Lib. ii. cap. iii. and in particular to the words in s. 3, ’Evíois dè πpòs TOÚTOLS ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν. "But some, beside these things, have also the faculty of motion according to place."

In the third and fourth chapters of the first book the subject of motion, KaTÙ TÓTOV, is discussed, and the opinions of other philosophers that it is properly attributable to the soul refuted. Sections 3 and 4 of Lib. i. cap. iii. speak distinctly on this point: and so do sections 8–11 of cap. iv. In the latter the philosopher says: "That the soul can not possibly be harmony, neither can be turned about in a circle is manifest, from the aforesaid. But that it may be removed per accidens-contingently,—may so move itself, even as we have declared, is possible: inasmuch as that, in which it is, is capable of being moved, and that (in which it is) may be moved by the soul: but in no other way is it possible for the soul to be moved according to place."

Maasz discusses Aristotle's use of the term kivious in sections 91-2, pp. 321-333. He observes that it was not unusual with the Greek philosophers to use the word for changes of the soul, and that Plato, for example, says expressly, κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, in the Theætetus, § 27. (Opera Bekker. Lond. Sumpt. R. Priestley, 1826. Vol. iii. p. 412.)—S. C.]

+ [I. c. 3 in initio. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψευδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι, οἵαν φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ, ἣ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν.—Cited by Maasz, p. 322.-Ed.

[For perhaps not only it is false that the being of the soul is such as they suppose, who affirm that it is a thing which moves or is able to move itself; but it may be that it is a thing to which motion can not possibly belong. Translation.-S. C.]

§ [See Maasz, pp. 324-5-6. In proof that Aristotle had a right conception of the common law of Association, though he did not call it by that name, and had not discovered all its fruitfulness, he cites from the treatise

by having been together acquire a power of recalling each other; or every partial representation awakes the total representation of which it had been a part.* In the practical determination of this common principle to particular recollections, he admits five agents or occasioning causes; 1st, connection in time, whether simultaneous, preceding, or successive; 2d, vicinity or connection in space; 3d, interdependence or necessary connection, as De Memoria, cap. ii. the following sentences:—ovμ3aívovoi & al dvaμvýseis, ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἤδε μενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε—thus translated or paraphrased by Maasz-"The Representations come after one another to the consciousness, when the changes" (or movements) "of the soul thereto belonging are of such a nature that one arises after the other." (I believe the stricter rendering to be-Recollections take place because it is the nature of the mind that its motions follow one another.)—ένια Ιδόντες ἀπαξ μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν, ἢ ἕτερα πολλάκις.

-"But such a connection among the changes of the soul, whereby one succeeds another, arises, though it be not necessary, through a kind of eustom. For the production of this, however, it is sufficient, if we have only once perceived the objects of the representation together." (This is a collection from the words of Aristotle rather than their direct sense, which seems to be as follows: "The sequence of the mental motions is sometimes a necessary one, and this, as is evident, must always take place; sometimes it is one that arises from custom, and this takes place only for the most part. Some men, by once thinking of a thing, acquire a babit more than others by thinking ever so often. Therefore we remember some things, that we have seen but once, better than other things, that we have seen many a time.")

"Still plainer, perhaps," says he, "speaks the place which follows the above; as thus: ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινά κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν, μεθ ̓ ἣν ἐκείνη ἔιωθε.“ A representation is called up (we remember it), as soon as changes of the soul arise, with which that" (change or movement) "belonging to the said representation has been associated."-S. C.]

[See Maasz, p. 326. "Thus, representations which have been together, call forth each other, or: Every partial representation awakens its total representation."

"This rule holds good for the succession of representations generally, as well when we reflect upon a thing and strive to remember it, as when that is not the case; it avails, as I have just now expressed, for the voluntary and involuntary series of imaginations. This Aristotle expressly asserts, and hereby we see, in what universality he had conceived the law of association." He quotes in support of this the following sentence from the treatise De Memoria, cap. ii. Ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτῳ, καὶ μὴ ζητοῦντες δ οὕτως ἀναμιμνήσκονται, ὅταν μεθ' ἑτέρων κίνησιν ἐκείνη γίνηται. In this way men try to recollect, and, when not trying, it is thus they remember; some particular movement (of mind) arising after some other.-S. C.]