The Federalist, on the New Constitution, 第 1 卷
Commonly known as The Federalist Papers, this series of 85 articles or essays was written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in order to promote the ratification of the new United States Constitution. Most of them were printed in The Independent Journal and The New York Packet between October 1787 and August 1788. Later in 1788 a compilation of all the articles was published. At the time they were published, the authorship of the articles was a closely guarded secret. The Federalist explains and exposits the Constitution in clear, common language that would have been understood by most Americans at the time. Hamilton's response to the Proclamation of Neutrality and the text of the Constitution are also included in this two-volume set.
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第 60 頁 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests ; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
第 260 頁 - Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.
第 295 頁 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
第 294 頁 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
第 167 頁 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law; 7.
第 278 頁 - The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens...
第 1 頁 - It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.
第 86 頁 - They formed the design of a great confederacy which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them.
第 252 頁 - If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their off1ces during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.
第 251 頁 - It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the People of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution ; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.