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to the time, which is the fact. We conceive then, that this experiment is not even corroborative of Dr. Brown's theory.

We must turn, however to the more prominent features of this theory. The muscular motions of the infant cause a series of feelings in his mind: and when his arm is resisted, there can be no other difference to himself than that the former series of feelings will be accomplished in part only, and the place of the remainder will be occupied by new feelings of the mind. The infant may, indeed, know that this change in the mental feelings was not intended by itself; but it is equally clear that the original series of feelings was not designed. There could be no volition in the case; since the feelings can be produced only by the muscular motions; and the infant is supposed to be ignorant of the existence of its muscles.* All then that the mind of the infant can know, is the existence of the feelings in itself; and it cannot know how these feelings are originated, unless we take it for granted that the mind has power to govern the parts of the body before it knows of their being. We believe that we are defensible in this position: if the mind can control the series of feelings, commence this series when it pleases, and interrupt it when so disposed, this power cannot be possessed unless the antecedents of the feelings-the muscular motions are under the direction of the will; and, besides the impossibility of the will regulating organs of the existence of which the mind is uninformed, this is contrary to Dr. Brown's own supposition that the muscular motions are instinctive. As then the feelings are equally unrestrained by, and independent of the will, there is no reason whatever why the interruption of the usual series should conduct the mind to the knowledge of things exterior to itself, more than its commencement. When any series of feelings is felt by the mind, there is the same reason for their leading it to the external cause as when this first series is replaced by another.

We think it abundantly evident, therefore, that the breaking of any series of mental affections would not lead the mind to the knowledge of things without, nor open its communication with the material world. It is probable that the necessity for some cause of the change would be felt by the mind; but this is equally true of the first affections which the mind ever experienced, there being then the greatest change possible;-from the entire absence of all feelings to their presence: and, consequently, Dr. Brown's theory is but a needless complication of what is very plain without it, if there be any foundation for the theory. If then the notion of resistance could not be acquired in the manner

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supposed by Dr. Brown, we need say nothing of extension which is less simple, and must be subsequent. It may be observed, nevertheless, that, granting to Dr. Brown the adequacy of his theory in relation to resistance, it is certainly insufficient to account for our notion of extension. Time, as we have seen, is an element in our estimation of the spaces passed over by bodies in motion; but motion is not extension, nor is time: suppose the body interposed to break off the series of feelings, when half accomplished, and that the regular series occupies a portion of time equal to a minute, the infant will then, according to Dr. Brown, conceive the resisting substance to be half a minute in length. What then can the infant understand by this conception? That the resisting substance, supposing it to know of its existence, is half as long as its series of feelings? This is the utmost extent to which the interruption of the series could lead him but Dr. Brown means something very different ;-even that the infant would discover that the resisting substance was equal to the space which his hand could pass over in the half minute, thus assuming the knowledge, the origin of which is the object of inquiry.

The account which our author gives of the manner in which we obtain the notion of breadth, involves the same assumption of the thing sought. The infant is said, by discovering that two or three of its fingers were resisted, to have formed the conception of two or three co-existing lengths; and this, says Dr. Brown, is breadth. Now, besides, that the obstacle opposed to one or two of the fingers could have no effect, but in diminishing the intensity of the mental affections, which before resulted from the motion of all the fingers, as the arresting of all of them would completely break the series, Dr. Brown's assertion is so manifestly a petitio principii, that it can deceive no one. Co-existing lengths might form a greater length than any one of them; and this is the only kind of co-existence for which the infant's mind is prepared: but admitting that the infant would conceive of the lengths as lying side by side, like its own little fingers as to position, from which, doubtless, Dr. Brown derived this part of his theory, still the notion of breadth would not be induced in its mind. Each of the co-existing lengths must be without breadth, or we assume the point in question, and therefore we may allow Dr. Brown not two or three co-existing lengths merely, but any number whatever, and he is still as far removed from breadth as when he commenced the investigation.

While on the subject of extension, it may be proper to take notice of an opinion of Dr. Brown, in regard to the sense of ↑ Ibid. p. 310.

* Vol. i. P.

298.

sight. Most writers agree that sight informs us of extension, though not of the existence of a material world: our author refuses his assent to the doctrines of his predecessors: but though we deem his argumentation in part unanswerable, we believe that his reasoning on another subject may justify us in questioning his decision here in its full extent. It appears to be a law of mind that we can perceive only one point of things without us at any one instant: we are likely to doubt of this now, when a long familiarity with things without enables us to scan their every part with a glance; and when, by long use, we have acquired such facility in the employment of our powers, that it seems the work of an instant only, to survey every part of a novel object presented to our view. The same reasons, however, would prove that there never was a time when it was necessary to dwell on every letter, since now the meaning of a whole page flashes upon us like light. Even yet, things that are new require some length of time to be properly examined, in order that we may acquire a correct notion of the relative position of the parts; inattention to which is one of the principal sources of our ability to satisfy our curiosity in a very short period. If the mind then can observe a body only in successive points, memory is.obviously necessary to our obtaining an idea of the relation of the parts, and of the extent of that body; and, that memory may be exercised, there must be some distinctive marks by which the mind may recognize the points which had previously engaged its attention. When then an object of uniform colouring is before the eye, we think it almost certain that, as there are no varieties of colour to enable the mind to distinguish the sensation caused by any one point from that caused by another, the only thing perceived would be a luminous point. To be perceived, however, this point must have extension: still the relative position of the parts of the object would be unknown. But if the colouring were variegated, this would no longer be the case. In these circumstances there would be different sensations, and the mind could compare them with each other: and, as points could not be perceived without the mind obtaining a knowledge of their direction, and as this could be remembered, the relative position of the points would thus be acquired by the mind. But we have been building on a wider foundation than Dr. Brown will concede; and on the supposition of the mind's entire ignorance as to the existence of its body, we are fully persuaded that it could not arrive at the notion of extension by sight; nor, in our opinion, by any other of the senses. But this demands a

more careful investigation.

* Vol. i. pp. 403-411.

The infant must have experienced the feelings of pleasure and pain even before birth; and must, therefore, have known its own existence; since it is an absurdity to say that a being can enjoy pleasure and suffer pain, and still does not know the existence of that which enjoys and suffers. The knowledge of its own existence must have preceded feelings of any kind; for feeling as the affection of any being, presupposes the existence of that being: and, that the being should know the feelings to be affections of itself, it must know the existence of that which is affected. To make this knowledge co-existent with the first feeling of the sentient being ;-that is, to suppose that neither antecedes the other, but that both spring into existence simultaneously* :-the known existence of the being not enabling it to ascertain that it was affected; nor its having been affected that it existed, is liable to no greater objection than that it is totally incomprehensible: this is to make the known existence and the feeling to unite in what chymists would call the nascent state. As then the mind must have known its own existence prior to all communication from without; or it would never have known it-and, since such communication must have taken place at a very early period,-certainly before birth, we are carried back for the origin of the mind's knowledge of its own existence to a time removed without any limit but the commencement of this existence; and here we must stop: and that this is the point where we should rest, is confirmed by all that we know of the thinking principle: for it is surely very strange language to say that the mind exists, and does not know it. We except, of course, the times when sleep's mysterious influence is exercised over all the faculties of the soul.

As then the mind cannot exist without being conscious of this existence, another question is, whether it could have any knowledge of the body's existence without sensation through the proper organs? It is a common thing with many writers on mental philosophy to advocate, as a natural consequence of their belief in the mind's ignorance of its own being prior to sensation, its total want of knowledge in relation to its own body. The soul is furnished with a fair and noble habitation of which all the apartments are prepared for its use, and yet is supposed to be the only being ignorant of these preparations; and is believed never to perceive them, till on its return from the first visit to the external world, when the towers and battlements of this splendid edifice attract her attention, and are recognised as her own. γίνεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, οὐδέτερον γὰρ των πρότερόν ἐστιν,

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But is this reasonable conduct to send the soul abroad to make the tour of the world ere she has examined that little kingdom in which she is so much more deeply interested? This does not resemble the wisdom of nature in her care for her children; and we are most certainly entitled to require some proof in support of such opinions. So far as reasoning will assist us, the presumption is clearly against this theory: Dr. Brown was not satisfied with the explanation that had been given of the origin of our knowledge of an external world; and attempted to remove the difficulty by proposing a new solution: and this, we flatter ourselves, has been shown to be founded on an assumption of the point in question. Since so many ingenious men, therefore, have utterly failed in their efforts to trace the connecting link between mind and external things, there is some ground for believing this to be impracticable on the principles from which they set out. They seem never to have thought of a previous question, whether the mind was necessarily unacquainted with the existence of its tenement. There is no period in infancy in which we discover in the little innocents, signs of inaccurate information respecting their limbs and other parts of the body: the new born babe will turn its eye towards the light.

Philosophers have, by a very natural re-action, rushed from the absurdity of materialism to the opposite extreme of spiritualizing all the phenomena of the human being. That the soul is not matter requires but a moment's reflection to convince the most sceptical; but it is equally certain that the body is; and as man consists of soul and body, we are not likely to escape error by confining our attention to either exclusively. It is not philosophically correct, therefore, to say, that the mind perceives, remembers and compares: it is the human being that performs these operations: and that the state of the body influences the manner of their performance, is evident from this, that a slight alteration in the condition of the corporeal frame, will incapaci tate the man for all intellectual exercises. Even when the body is most healthful, we have no facts from which to draw the conclusion that our mental operations are entirely independent of it. Viewing man then as he is, a being consisting of matter and spirit united in some mysterious manner, so that they mutually influence each other, there is no difficulty in conceiving how this man should become informed of the existence of a material world.

We wish to point out here a mistake into which Dr. Brown has fallen, while endeavouring to show what appears so obvious from the simple statement which has already been given, that taste cannot furnish any information of the existence of matter.

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