Nothing can more fully prove that the fruit of all such contrivances was mere words without knowledge, an empty show of science without the reality, than the ostentatious and absurd way in which the inventors and their votaries talk of these inventions. They would have us believe that in these is contained a complete encyclopedia, that here we may discover all the arts and sciences as in their source, that hence all of them may be deduced à priori, as from their principles. Accordingly, they treat all those as no better than quacks and empirics who have recourse to so homely a tutoress as experience.

The consideration of their pretensions hath indeed satisfied me that the ridicule thrown on projectors of this kind, in the account given by Swift* of a professor in the academy of Logado, is not excessive, as I once thought it. The boasts of the academist, on the prodigies performed by his frame, are far less extravagant than those of the above-mentioned artists, which in truth they very much resemble.†

So much for the third and last cause of illusion that was taken notice of, arising from the abuse of very general and abstract terms, which is the principal source of all the nonsense that hath been vented by metaphysicians, mystagogues, and theologians.

* Gulliver's Travels, part iii.

† At what an amazing pitch of perfection doth Knittelius, a great admirer both of Lully and Kircher, suppose that the adepts in this literary handi craft may arrive. The assiduous and careful practice will at length, according to him, fully instruct us: "Quomodo de quacunque re proposita sta tim librum concipere, et in capita dividere, de quacunque re extempore disserere, argumentari, de quocunque themate orationem formare, orationem mentalem per horam dies et septimanas protrahere, rem quamcunque describere, per apologos et fabulas proponere, emblemata et hieroglyphica, invenire, de quacunque re historias expeditè scribere, adversaria de quacunque re facere, de quacunque materia consilia dare, omnes arguitas ad unam regulam reducere, assumptum thema in infinitum multiplicare, ex falso rem demonstrare, quidlibet per quidlibet probare, possimus." Quirinus Kuhlmanus, another philosopher of the last century, in a letter to Kircher, hath said, with much good sense, concerning his coffer, "Lusus est ingeniosus, ingeniose Kirchere, non methodus, prima fronte aliquid promittens, in recessu nihil solvens. Sine cista enim puer nihil potest respondere, et in cista nihil præter verba habet; tot profert quot audit, sine intellectu, ad instar psittaci et de illo jure dicitur quod Lacon de philomela, Vox est, prætereaque nihil." Could anybody imagine that one who thought so justly of Kircher's device was himself the author of another of the same kind? He had, it seems, contrived a scientific machine that moved by wheels, with the conception of which he pretended to have been inspired by Heaven, but, unfortunately, he did not live to publish it. His only view, therefore, in the words above quoted, was to depreciate Kircher's engine, that he might the more effectually recommend his own. "Multa passim," says Morhoff concerning him (Polyhistor, vol. i., lib. ii., cap. v.), de rotis suis combinatoriis jactat, quibus ordinatis unus homo millies mille, imo millies millies mille scribas vincat; qui tamen primarius rotarum scopus non est, sed grandier longe restat: nempe notitia providentiæ æternæ, orbisque terrarum motus." And again: "Nec ullus hominum tam insulso judicio præditus

ན་

WHEN IS OBSCURITY APPOSITE, IF EVER IT BE APPOSITE, AND WHAT KIND?

HAVING fully considered the nature of perspicuity, and the various ways in which the laws relating to it may be transgressed, I shall now inquire whether, to be able to transgress with dexterity in any of those ways, by speaking obscurely, ambiguously, or unintelligibly, be not as essential to the perfection of eloquence as to be able to speak perspicuously.

*

Eloquence, it may be said, hath been defined to be that art or talent whereby the discourse is adapted to produce the effect which the speaker intends it should produce in the hearer. May not, then, obscurity, on some occasions, be as conducive to the effect intended, as perspicuity is on other occasions? If the latter is necessary in order to inform, is not the former necessary in order to deceive? If perspicu

est, qui hac institutione libros doctos, novos, utiles, omni rerum scientia plenos, levissima opera edere non potest." How much more modest is the professor of Logado. "He flatters himself, indeed, that a more noble, exalted thought than his never sprang in any other man's head," but doth not lay claim to inspiration. Every one knows," he adds, "how laborious the usual method is of attaining to arts and sciences; whereas, by his contrivance, the most ignorant person, at a reasonable charge, and with a little bodily labour, may write books in philosophy, poetry, politics, law, mathematics, and theology" (no mention of history), "without the least assistance from genius and study." He is still modest enough to require time and some corporeal exercise in order to the composing of a treatise; but those artists propose to bring a proficient "statim librum concipere" instantly, "levissima opera," with little or no pains. I shall conclude with laying before the reader the opinion of Lord Verulam concerning the Lullian artan opinion that may, with equal justice, be applied to the devices of all Lully's followers and imitators: "Neque tamen illud prætermittendum, quod nonnulli viri magis tumidi quam docti insudarunt circa methodum quandam, legitimæ methodi nomine haud dignam, cum potius sit methodus imposturæ, quæ tamen quibusdam ardelionibus acceptissima procul dubio fuerit. Hæc methodus ita scientiæ alicujus guttulas aspergit, ut quis sciolus specie nonnulla eruditionis ad ostentationem possit abuti. Talis fuit ars Lulli, talis typocosmia a nonnullis exarata; quæ nihil aliud fuerunt, quam vocabulorum artis cujusque massa et acervus: ad hoc, ut qui voces artis haberant in promptu, etiam artes ipsas perdidicesse existimentur. Hugus generis collectanea officinam referunt veteramentariam, ubi præsigmina multa reperiuntur, sed nihil quod alicujus sit pretii."-De Augm. Scien., lib. vi., cap. ii. I shall only observe, that when he calls this art a method of imposture, he appears to mean that it puts an imposition upon the mind, not so much by infusing error instead of truth, as by amusing us with mere words instead of useful knowledge. *Book i., chap. i.

ity be expedient in convincing us of truth and persuading us to do right, is not its contrary, obscurity, expedient in effecting the contrary; that is, in convincing us of what is false, and in persuading us to do wrong? And may not either of these effects be the aim of the speaker?

This way of arguing is far more plausible than just. To be obscure, or even unintelligible, may, I acknowledge, in some cases, contribute to the design of the orator, yet it doth not follow that obscurity is as essential to eloquence as the opposite quality. It is the design of the medical art to give health and ease to the patient, not pain and sickness; and that the latter are sometimes the foreseen effects of the medicines employed, doth not invalidate the general truth. Whatever be the real intention of a speaker or writer, whether to satisfy our reason of what is true or of what is untrue, whether to incline our will to what is right or to what is wrong, still he must propose to effect his design by informing our understanding; nay, more, without conveying to our minds some information, he might as well attempt to achieve his purpose by addressing us in an unknown tongue. Generally, therefore, this quality of style, perspicuity, is as requisite in seducing to evil as in exciting to good; in defending error as in supporting truth.

I am sensible that this position must appear to many no other than a paradox. What! say they, is it not as natural to vice and falsehood to skulk in darkness, as it is to truth and virtue to appear in light? Doubtless it is in some sense, but in such a sense as is not in the least repugnant to the doctrine here advanced. That therefore we may be satisfied of the justness of this theory, it will be necessary to consider a little farther the nature both of persuasion and of conviction. With regard to the former, it is evident that the principal scope for employing persuasion is when the mind balances, or may be supposed to balance, in determining what choice to make in respect of conduct, whether to do this or to do that, or at least whether to do or to forbear. And it is equally evident that the mind would never balance a moment in choosing unless there were motives to influence it on each of the opposite sides. In favour of one side, perhaps, is the love of glory, in favour of the other the love of life. Now, which ever side the orator espouses, there are two things that must carefully be studied by him, as was observed on a former 'occasion; the first is, to excite in his hearers that desire or passion which favours his designs; the second is, to satisfy their judgments that there is a connexion between the conduct to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. The first is ef

Book i., chap. vii., sect. iv. See the analysis of persuasion.

་

fected by communicating natural and lively ideas of the object; the second by arguments from experience, analogy, testimony, or the plurality of chances. To the communication of natural and vivid ideas, the pathetic circumstances formerly enumerated* are particularly conductive. Now to the efficacious display of those circumstances, nothing can be more unfriendly than obscurity, whose direct tendency is to confound our ideas, or, rather, to blot them altogether; and as to the second requisite, the argumentative part, that can never require obscurity which doth not require even a deviation from truth. It may be as true, and, therefore, as demonstrable, that my acting in one way will promote my safety, or what I regard as my interest, as that my acting in the contrary way' will raise my fame. And even when an orator is under a necessity of replying to what hath been advanced by an antagonist, in order to weaken the impression he hath made, or to lull the passion he hath roused, it is not often that he is obliged to avail himself of any false or sophistical reasoning, which alone can render obscurity useful. Commonly, on the contrary, he hath only to avail himself of an artful exhibition of every circumstance of the case that can in any way contribute to invalidate or to subvert his adversary's plea, and, consequently, to support his own. Now it is a certain fact, that in almost all complicated cases, real circumstances will be found in favour of each side of the question. Whatever side, therefore, the orator supports, it is his business, in the first place, to select those circumstances that are favourable to his own plea, or which excite the passion that is directly instrumental in promoting his end; secondly, to select those circumstances that are unfavourable to the plea of his antagonist, and to add to all these such clearness and energy by his eloquence as will effectually fix the attention of the hearers upon them, and thereby withdraw their regards from those circumstances, equally real, which favour the other side. In short, it is the business of the two antagonists to give different or even opposite directions to the attention of the hearers; but then it is alike the interest of each to set those particular circumstances, to which he would attract their notice, in as clear a light as possible; and it is only by acting thus that he can hope to effectuate his

purpose.

Perhaps it will be urged, that though, where the end is persuasion, there doth not seem to be an absolute necessity for sophistry and obscurity on either side, as there is not on either side an absolute necessity for supporting falsehood, the case is certainly different when the end is to convince

* Book i., chap. vii., sect. v. The explication and use of those circumstances.

the understanding. In this case, whatever is spoken on one side of the question, as it is spoken in support of error, must be sophistical; and sophistry seems to require a portion of obscurity, to serve her as a veil, that she may escape discovery. Even here, however, the case is not so plain as at first it may be thought. Sophistry (which hath sometimes been successfully used in support of truth) is not always necessary for the support of error. Error may be supported, and hath been often strenuously supported, by very cogent arguments and just reasoning.

But as this position will probably appear to many very extraordinary, if not irrational, it will be necessary to examine the matter more minutely. It is true, indeed, that in subjects susceptible of demonstrative proof, error cannot be defended but by sophistry; and sophistry, to prevent detection, must shelter herself in obscurity. This results from the nature of scientific evidence, as formerly explained.* This kind of evidence is solely conversant about the invariable relations of number and extension, which relations it evolves by a simple chain of axioms. An assertion, therefore, that

is contrary to truth in these matters, is also absurd and inconceivable; nor is there any scope here for contrariety of proofs. Accordingly, debate and argumentation have no footing here. The case is far otherwise with moral evidence, which is of a complex nature, which admits degrees, which is almost always combated by opposite proofs, and these, though perhaps lower in degree, as truly of the nature of proof and evidence as those whereby they are opposed. The probability, on the whole, as was shown already,† lies in the proportion which the contrary proofs, upon comparison, bear to one another; a proportion which, in complicated cases, it is often difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to ascertain. The speakers, therefore, on the opposite sides have each real evidence to insist on; and there is here the same scope as in persuasory discourses, for all the arts that can both rivet the hearer's attention on the circumstances of the proof favourable to the speaker's design, and divert his attention from the contrary circumstances. Nor is there, in ordinary cases, that is, in all cases really dubious and disputable, any necessity, on either side, for what is properly called sophistry.

The natural place for sophistry is when a speaker finds himself obliged to attempt the refutation of arguments that are both clear and convincing. For an answerer to overlook such arguments altogether might be dangerous, and to treat them in such a manner as to elude their force requires the most exquisite address. A little sophistry here will, no doubt, be thought necessary by one with whom victory hath more

*Book i., chap. v., sect. ii.

† Book i., chap. v., sect. ii