CHAPTER III.

CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.

§ 1. GENERAL REMARKS. We now understand, in some degree, what is meant by Will, Desire, Motive, Intention, and what is the nature of the relationship between these; and we are now prepared to consider the nature of Character and its relation to Conduct. In discussing this, we are naturally led to the famous question about the Freedom of the Will; for this concerns the relationship between Character and Conduct. And in considering this, it seems necessary also to explain the terms Circumstance and Habit. Accordingly I intend first to present four sections, dealing respectively with Character, Conduct, Circumstance, and Habit, then to explain the significance of the Freedom of the Will, and finally to sum up about the nature of Voluntary Action.

§ 2. CHARACTER. We have seen that Character means the complete universe or system constituted by acts of will of a particular kind. Character is on the whole the most important element in life from the point of view of Ethics, as we shall see more fully in the sequel.

The accidental dominance of a good purpose at this or that moment is of comparatively little consequence unless it is an indication of the habitual dominance of

a certain universe. Hence Aristotle rightly laid emphasis rather on the formation of Good Habit1i. e., in the language we have here adopted, on the establishment of a continuously dominant universe-than on the mere presence of a Good Will at any given moment. Will is, indeed, the expression of character, but it is the expression of it under the limitations of a particular time and place; and much may remain latent in the character which it would be necessary to take into account in forming a complete moral estimate of a given individual. This is well expressed in Browning's Rabbi Ben Ezra

"Not on the vulgar mass

Called 'work' must sentence pass,

Things done, that took the eye and had the price;

But all, the world's coarse thumb

And finger failed to plumb,

So passed in making up the main account;

All instincts immature,

All purposes unsure,

That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount.

Thoughts hardly to be packed

Into a narrow act,

Fancies that broke through language and escaped :

All I could never be,

All, men ignored in me,

This, I was worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped."

At the same time, it is true that "the tree is known by its fruit." The good character necessarily expresses itself in good acts of will.

§ 3. CONDUCT.

The term conduct is sometimes used

1 Ethics, Book II. chap. v.

in a loose sense to include all sorts of vital activities, or at any rate all vital activities which are directed to an end. It is in this sense, for instance, that the term is employed by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Consequently he speaks of the conduct of molluscs, &c.2 But this seems to be an inconvenient extension of the meaning of the term. Although the activities of molluscs are no doubt adjusted to an end, yet we cannot regard them as purposeful activities. A purposeful activity is not merely directed to an end, but, as Kant put it, directed by the idea of an end. Now even the higher animals, in so far as they are guided by mere instinct,3 cannot be supposed to have any such idea. They move towards certain ends, but they do not will these ends. They have an end, but they have no purpose.4 Now Mr. Spencer admits that purposeless acts are not to be included in conduct. Hence it seems best to

confine the term conduct to those acts that are not merely adjusted to ends, but also definitely willed. A person's conduct, then, is the complete system of such acts, corresponding to his character.

§ 4. CIRCUMSTANCE.-We have said that conduct corresponds to character. But of course the particular acts which are performed by an individual depend not only on the nature of the systematic unity of his con

1 Data of Ethics, chap. i.

2 Ibid., chap. ii.

3 It may well be doubted whether they ever have such an idea. Darwin, however, who is certainly a high authority, seems disposed to attribute some consciousness of the adaptation of means to end even to such very humble creatures as earthworms.

4 It might be convenient to use the term purposive, as distinguished from purposeful, to denote action (such as instinctive movements) in which an end may be seen to be involved, but in which there is no definite consciousness of the end aimed at.

Hence it

sciousness, but also on the conditions or environment within which his life happens to be passed. is sometimes said that a man's conduct depends upon his character and circumstances. We must now consider what exactly is to be understood by circumstances.

In the first place, we must note that, if we are to understand the ethical significance of a man's circumstances, we must clear our minds of that view according to which circumstances are simply the external environment in which a man's life is passed. Understood in this sense, any contemporary event might be called a circumstance-e. g. the position of the planets, the state of the tides, the direction of the wind, &c. But for most purposes (unless we are believers in Astrology), such conditions are not to be classed as circumstances at all. Again, the geological formation of the country in which a man lives is seldom worth reckoning as a circumstance; though the presence of gold or coal or iron may be a circumstance of considerable importance. Riches or poverty, health or disease, are generally circumstances of more importance; and so are, in general, a man's social surroundings. From such considerations as this we may see that it is not so easy as it might at first appear to determine what a man's circumstances are, in any sense that is ethically significant. Circumstances in this sense are not anything external to the man, but only external conditions in so far as they enter into his life. What are to be reckoned circumstances in this sense, is a question that depends on the character of the man. Hence it is somewhat misleading to speak as if character and circumstance were two co-ordinate factors in human life;

since it depends largely on character whether anything is to be reckoned a circumstance or not.'

Again, are we to say that the fact that a man has a good memory, or a good temper, or a good understanding, or a good reputation, is an element in his character or in his circumstance? Such facts depend largely on the systematic constitution of a man's conscious life, and so belong to his character; yet, on the other hand, they may be regarded as circumstances by which he is helped or hindered in the conduct of his life. Even the fact that a man has already formed a good habit of action-say, a habit of punctuality—may be a favourable circumstance with reference to his future development. Thus it is to a considerable extent a question of the point of view from which a thing is regarded, whether it is to be described as an element of character or of circumstance. Probably by far the greatest part of any man's present circumstance is simply the expression of what his past character has been.

Hence, when we say that a man's actions are the result of his character and his circumstance, we must remember that two men living to all appearance in the same general conditions may in reality be in wholly different circumstances. What stimulates one may depress another, just as "the twilight that sends the hens to roost sets the fox to prowl, and the lion's roar which gathers the jackals scatters the sheep." What

1 Some suggestive remarks on this point will be found in a paper on "Character and the Emotions," by Mr. A. F. Shand, in Mind, new series, Vol. v., No. 18. The relationship between character and circumstance has also been brought out, in a profound and suggestive way, by Mr. Bosanquet, in Aspects of the Social Problem.

2 Art. "Psychology" in Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 42.