thing more than this. It does interpret for us the meaning and importance of some more special rules. But assuredly neither Ethics nor anything else will tell a man what in particular he is to do. There would be an end of the whole significance of life if any such information were to be had. All action that is of much consequence has reference to concrete situations, which could not possibly be exhausted by any abstract methods of analysis. It is the special business of every human being to find out for himself what he is to do, and to do it. Ethics only instructs him where to look for it, and helps him to see why it is worth while to find it and to do it. Like all sciences, it leaves its principles in the end to be applied by the instructed good sense of mankind.1

1 It may perhaps appear that this point has been somewhat overemphasized; but I think there is a real danger of misconception here, and I have been anxious to guard against it. On the general question involved, it may be well to refer, in addition to the authori ties already cited, to Mill's System of Logic, Book VI., chap. xii., Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book IV., chaps. iv. and v., Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, Book IV., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction, Bosanquet's Civilization of Christendom, p. 160 sqq., and the article by Mr. Muirhead on Abstract and Practical Ethics" in the American Journal of Sociology for November, 1896.

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CHAPTER IV.

I

THE VIRTUES.

§ 1. RELATION OF THE VIRTUES TO THE COMMANDMENTS. When we have ascertained what are the most important commandments, we have at the same time discovered to a considerable extent what are the most important virtues. The virtuous man will be on the whole the man who has a steadfast habit of obeying the commandments. There are, however, many virtuous habits which do not correspond to any commandments that can be definitely formulated. Moreover, as the virtues are concerned mainly with inner habits of mind, whereas the commandments deal with overt acts,3 the

1 Virtue (from Latin vir, a man or hero) meant originally manliness or valour. The Greek ȧperý (from the same root as Ares, the god of war) and the German Tugend (connected with our English word "doughty") have a somewhat similar origin. The term is here employed to denote a good habit of character, as distinguished from a Duty, which denotes rather some particular kind of action that we ought to perform. Thus a man does his Duty; but he possesses a Virtue, or is virtuous. Another sense in which the term "Virtue" is used, has been already noticed above (chap. iii., § 12).

2 Mr. Alexander (Moral Order and Progress, p. 253) definitely connects the virtues, as well as the duties, with social institutions. In both cases there seems to be some exaggeration in this. Cf. Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, p. 188.

8 The Jewish commandments, as interpreted in the Sermon on the Mount, and by modern Christian thought, are of course concerned with the heart as well as with outer acts. Also the summary of the commandments in terms of love refers entirely to an inner habit of mind. But when the commandments are thus summed up, they

lines of cleavage in dealing with the virtues are naturally somewhat different from those that we find in dealing with the commandments. Hence it seems desirable to devote a separate chapter to the subject of the virtues.

§ 2. VIRTUES RELATIVE TO STATES OF SOCIETY.—The virtues which it is desirable for human beings to cultivate vary considerably with different times and places. They are more variable even than the commandments 1; because the latter confine themselves to those broad principles of conduct which are applicable to nearly all the conceivable conditions of life. At the same time, even the virtues are less changeable than they are apt at first sight to appear. The Greek virtue of courage, confined almost entirely to valour in battle, has but little correspondence to anything that is supremely important in modern life. Yet the temper of

mind which it indicates is one for which there is as much demand now as ever. And so it is also with most of the other virtues. The precise conditions of their exercise change; but the habit of mind remains intrinsically the same. Still, even the habit of mind does undergo some alteration. The kind of fortitude which is required for valour in battle is, even in its most inward aspect, somewhat different from that

cease to be particular rules. Particular rules relate to particular modes of action. Cf. Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, p. 70. For a discussion of the relation of Virtue to Duty, see Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book III., chap. ii. The following chapters of the same book contain interesting analyses of most of the particular virtues. Cf. Rickaby's Moral Philosophy, Párt I, chap. v.

1 In that broad sense in which alone, as we have seen, universally significant commandments can be laid down.

2 See Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III., chap. v.

fortitude which sustains the modern man of science, politician, scholar, or philanthropist. Hence this side of ethical study is one which each generation of writers requires almost to reconsider for itself. However instructive the great work of Aristotle may still remain on this point (and there is perhaps nothing more instructive in the whole range of ethical literature), it is yet not quite directly applicable to the conditions of modern life. In order to understand what are the most important virtues for us to cultivate in modern times, it is necessary to consider them in relation to the structure and requirements of modern society.

§ 3. THE ETHOS OF A PEOPLE.-It is for this reason that it is so important, from an ethical point of view, to study carefully what the Germans call the Sitten (the moral habitudes of thought and action) of different times and peoples. We have no English word that quite expresses this idea; but, instead of having recourse to the German, we may use a Greek term, and speak of the ethos of a people. The ethos of a people is partly constituted by definite rules or precepts. The Ten Commandments formed a very important element in the ethos of the Jews; and they have continued, 1 The English word "Manners used to have a meaning closely approximating to this, but it has deteriorated. See International Journal of Ethics, Vol. VII., no. I.

2

2 Cf. Bradley's Ethical Studies, chap. v., especially p. 156, where the following is quoted from Hegel: "The child, in his character of the form of the possibility of a moral individual, is something subjective or negative; his growing to manhood is the ceasing to be of this form, and his education is the discipline or the compulsion thereof. The positive side and the essence is that he is suckled at the breast of the univeral Ethos." Similarly on p. 169: "The wisest men of antiquity have given judgment that wisdom and virtue consist in living agreeably to the Ethos of one's people."

with certain modifications and enlargements, to form an important element in the ethos of modern European peoples. The precepts contained in the Sermon on the Mount have perhaps never been sufficiently appropriated by the world in general to be made definitely into a part of the ethos of any people; but they have undoubtedly exercised a most profound influence on the ethos of nearly all civilized nations. The ethos of

a people, then, is partly expressed in definite commands and precepts. But partly also it consists in recognized habits of action and standards of judgment which have never been precisely formulated. Thus, in England there is a general idea of the kind of conduct which is fitting in a "gentleman"; and though it might be difficult to reduce this standard to the form of definite rules, yet it has undoubtedly exercised a great influence in forming the ethos of our people.

The ethos of a people, then, we may say, constitutes the atmosphere in which the best members of a race habitually live; or, in language that we have previously employed, it constitutes the universe of their moral activities. It is the morality of our world; and on the whole the man who conforms to the morality of that world is a good man, and the man who violates it is a bad man. Mr. Bradley has even said emphatically

I

1 Ethical Studies, p. 180. So also on p. 181 he says: "We should consider whether the encouraging oneself in having opinions of one's own, in the sense of thinking differently from the world on moral subjects, be not, in any person other than a heaven-born prophet, sheer self-conceit." There is, however, some paradox in this. A man may be a moral reformer in a small way, without being exactly a "heaven-born prophet." The suffering or witnessing of wrong in some particular form, for instance, often makes a man sensitive to an evil to which most men are callous. Also the Eth.

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