be referring exclusively to corrective Justice, without being aware that he is dealing only with a part of the subject.

As far as I can judge, Aristotle's treatment of the whole subject of Justice is still the best that we have. Dr. Sidgwick's treatment, however, to which reference has just been made, has of course the advantage of being more fully adapted to modern conditions of knowledge and practice.

CHAPTER III.

THE DUTIES.

I

§ 1. NATURE OF MORAL LAWS.-The Jews, by whom the moral consciousness of the modern world has been perhaps mainly determined, summed up their view of duty in the form of ten commandments. And we find in other nations also a certain more or less explicit recognition of definite rules to which a good man must adhere-rules which say expressly, Do this, Abstain from that. Now, in the moral " ought," as we have so far considered it, there are no such explicit com

1 It is hard to say whether the Jews or the Greeks have had most influence on us in this respect. See Hatch's Hibbert Lectures; and cf., for a vigorous but very paradoxical view of the same subject, Duhring's Ersatz der Religion.

2 The Greeks had no definite code of moral rules. Their earliest moral wisdom was expressed rather in brief proverbial sayings, such as μŋdèv äyav (“nothing to excess"). Among the Greeks, however, as among all early peoples, the laws of the State furnished a basis for moral obligation, just as a child's first ideas of duty are derived from the commands of its parents. The dawning of the consciousness that there is a deeper basis of moral obligation than State laws is illustrated in the Antigone of Sophocles. It was largely because the early Greeks had no clear distinction between the moral law and the laws of the State that the criticisms of the Sophists (and to some extent of Socrates) were felt to be subversive of morality. See Zeller's PreSocratic Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 404, and Socrates and the Socratic Schools, pp. 219-221. It is noteworthy also that the absoluteness of the Jewish Law showed signs of breaking down, as soon as the Jews had lost their national independence. Cf. above, Book I., chap. V.

mands contained.

There is only the general command

to realize the rational self. We must now consider what is the place of particular rules within this general commandment.

What has been said in the last chapter may help us to do this. For we have seen there that there are certain definite, though at the same time somewhat elastic and modifiable, rights that come to be gradually recognized in human societies; and these definite rights bring definite obligations along with them. Such obligations may be expressed in the form of command

ments.

It is not merely, however, in connection with these recognized rights that such obligations arise. Obligations arise in connection with all the institutions of social life, and in connection with all the relationships into which men are brought to one another. No doubt there is a certain right corresponding to all such obligations, just as there is an obligation corresponding to every right. But sometimes it is the right that is obvious, and the obligation seems to follow it, whereas in other cases it is the obligation that is more easily recognized. In the preceding chapter we have considered some of the more prominent rights and institu

I

1 Rights are also for the most part connected with definite institutions, or forms of social organization. Hence duties also tend to cluster round them. Thus, Mr. Alexander says (Moral Order and Progress, p. 253) that “Duties are the conduct . . . by which institutions are maintained": "the duty of recording a vote gives effect to the institution of parliamentary franchise." It seems an exaggeration, however, to say that all duties are related to institutions in this way. The duty of regard for life, for instance, seems to be independent of any special institutions-unless we are to describe life itself as an "institution," which would be somewhat paradoxical.

In this chapter

tions that have grown up in social life. we are to consider the more prominent obligations that have come to be recognized among men, as presenting themselves in the form of commandments, and to try to bring out the precise ethical significance of these elements in the moral consciousness. In the one case,

as in the other, it would probably be useless to attempt to give an exhaustive classification.

§ 2. RESPECT FOR LIFE.-The first commandment is the commandment to respect life, corresponding directly to the right of life. This commandment is expressed in the form, Thou shalt not kill; and its meaning is so obvious that it requires little comment. We must merely observe that the commandment which bids us have respect for life enjoins much more than the mere passive abstinence from the destruction of another's physical existence. It involves also the care of our own, and the avoidance of anything likely to injure either our own or another's physical well-being. How much this implies, we are only gradually learning. Mr. Herbert Spencer has done admirable service in emphasizing this side of moral law.1

§ 3. RESPECT FOR FREEDOM.-The second commandment corresponds to the right of Freedom. It forbids any interference with the development of another man's life, except in so far as such interference may be required to help on that development itself. It may be expressed in the form, Treat every human being as a person, never as a mere thing. In this form, it may

1. See especially his Data of Ethics, chap. xi., and The Principles of Ethics, Part III. Cf. also Clark Murray's Iutroduction to Ethics, Book II., Part II., chap. ii., and Adler's Moral Instruction lo Children Lecture XII.

be regarded as forbidding slavery, despotism, exploitation, prostitution, and every other form of the use of another as a mere means to one's own ends. This commandment and the preceding one are closely connected together. They might, in fact, be regarded as one; for the destruction of the life of another is simply an extreme form of interference with his free development. There is also a third commandment which is closely connected with these two, and which we may notice next.

§ 4. RESPECT FOR CHARACTER.—This may be stated as the commandment to respect character. It is the positive of which the two preceding are the negative. It not merely forbids us to injure our neighbour or to do anything that will interfere with his free development, but also positively bids us observe, as far as we can, what will further him. It was of this commandment that St. Paul was thinking when he said, "All things. are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient." By the ordinary negative law he was permitted to do anything that did not positively injure another; but he was conscious that, in addition to this, he ought to abstain from anything that would tend to prevent the furtherance of another in his development. To partake of certain meats would not interfere either with the life or with the freedom of any one; but, having regard to the stage of development at which they stand, we may be aware that it would be injurious to them. Of course, we might regard this principle as simply an extension of the negative principle of respect for freedom. But perhaps it is better to regard it as positive; for when we thus have regard for the stage of development at which any one stands, we shall be led not