BOOK III.

THE MORAL LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

THE SOCIAL UNITY.

§ 1. THE SOCIAL SELF.-We have seen that the true self is the rational self. stand what this means.

We must now try to under

And, first of all, we have to

add that the true self is the social self. Up to this point we have spoken of the individual almost as if he might be an isolated and independent unit. But every individual belongs to a social system. An isolated individual

is even inconceivable. Aristotle said truly that such a being must be "either a beast or a god.' Such a being could have no ideal self. He must either have realized his ideal like a god, or have no ideal to realize like a beast. For our ideal self finds its embodiment in the life of a society, and it is only in this way that it is kept before us. Not only so, but even the realization of our ideal seems to demand a society. For to have a perfectly rational self would involve that our universe should have a perfectly rational content. Now the only possible universe with a rational content seems to be a universe of rational beings. Hence we

1 Politics, I. ii. 14: "He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god (ή θηρίον ἢ θεός).”

Eth.

18

must go even beyond the saying of Aristotle, and say that even a God must be social. Even a God must have a rational universe in relation to Himself, and must consequently create, or, in Hegelian phrase, go out of Himself into a world of rational beings. But this is perhaps too abstruse a subject to be more than hinted at here. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that it is in relation to our fellow-men that we find our ideal life. "Where two or three are gathered together, there am I in the midst of them." The "I" or ideal self is not realized in any one individual, but finds its realization rather in the relations of persons to one another. It embodies itself in literature and art, in the laws of a state, in the counsels of perfection which societies gradually form for themselves.

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§ 2. SOCIETY A UNITY.-Society, therefore, must be regarded as a unity-in fact, as we shall see shortly, as an organic unity. The parts of it are necessary to each other, as the parts of an animal organism are; and it is in all the parts in relation to one another, rather than in any one of them singly, that the true life is to be found. "We are members one of another." The ideal life of one requires others to complement it, and it is by mutual help that the whole develops towards perfection. This we shall see more fully in the sequel.2

1 I do not mean to imply that this saying was originally intended to bear the sense here ascribed to it. But I think it has frequently been used by religious men to express that consciousness of unity, and of elevation into a higher universe, which arises when a number of men gather together in a common spirit and with a common aim for the advancement of their moral lives. Clifford's "tribal self" contains a similar idea. (See above p. 115.)

2 See sections II and 12 below. The present section is intended only as a preliminary statement.

§ 3. EGOISM AND ALTRUISM.-This fact leads us to introduce a certain modification into the view of the moral life that has been presented up to the present point. We have spoken of the great end of the moral life as self-realization. But since an individual is a member of a social unity, his supreme end will be not simply the perfecting of his own life, but also of the society to which he belongs. To a great extent the one end will indeed coincide with the other. Yet there appears, at least primâ facie, to be a certain possibility of conflict. Now when we seek simply our own individual ends, this attitude is called Egoism; while the term Altruism is used to denote devotion to the ends of others. It is of great importance to consider the precise relation of these two attitudes to one another.

§ 4. MR. SPENCER'S CONCILIATION.-A good deal of attention has been given to this subject by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and he has endeavoured to show how a con**ciliation may be effected between the two attitudes. He points out that either of them, if carried to an extreme, is self-destructive. If every one were to seek only his own ends, this would be a bad way of securing the ends even of any one individual. For each one stands frequently in need of help. On the other hand, if every one were to devote himself entirely to the good of others, this would be fatal to the good of others. For if each one neglected himself, he would deteriorate in his ability to help others. This point is worked out in a very interesting way by Mr. Spencer,

1 Data of Ethics, chaps. xi. and xiv. Cf. Stephen's Science of Ethics, chap. vi., Dewey's Outlines of Ethics, pp. 70-1, and Muirhead's, Elements of Ethics, pp. 164-5.

and he comes to the conclusion that what we should aim at is neither pure Egoism nor pure Altruism, but a compromise between them. He thinks also that the more completely society becomes developed, the more will the two ends tend to become identical.

§ 5. SELF-REALIZATION THROUGH SELF-SACRIFICE.—The truth seems to be, however, that there is even less opposition between Egoism and Altruism than that which Mr. Spencer recognizes. We can realize the true self only by realizing social ends. In order to do this. we must negate the merely individual self, which, as we have indicated, is not the true self. We must realize ourselves by sacrificing ourselves.1 The more fully we so realize ourselves, the more do we reach a universal point of view-i. e. a point of view from which our own private good is no more to us than the good of any one else. No doubt it must always be necessary for us to take more thought for our own individual development than for that of any one else; because each one best understands his own individual needs, and has the best means of working out his own nature to its perfection. But when this is done from the point of view of the whole, it is no longer properly to be described as Egoism. It is self-realization, but it is selfrealization for the sake of the whole. In such selfrealization the mere wishes and whims of the private self have been sacrificed, and we seek to develop ourselves in the same spirit and for the same ends as thosc in which and for which we seek to develop others. When we live in such a spirit as this, the opposition between Egoism and Altruism ceases. We seek neither

1 Cf. Caird's Hegel, pp. 210-218.

our own good simply nor the good of others simply, but the good both of ourselves and of others as members of a whole. Looking at the matter, therefore, from this point of view, it might be better to describe. the ultimate end as the realization of a rational universe, rather than as self-realization.

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§ 6. ETHICS A PART OF POLITICS.-We must recognize, in short, that man is, as Aristotle expressed it, "a political animal," and that Ethics cannot be satisfactorily treated except as a part of Politics-i. e. as a part of the study of Society. Our duties and our virtues. are at every point dependent on our relations to one another. This fact was more clearly recognized by some of the ancient Greek thinkers than it has been by many in modern times-for, in modern times, partly on account of the influence of Christianity, we have come to think more of the independence of the individual. It may be well, therefore, to glance for a moment at the way in which Ethics was regarded by Plato and Aristotle.

§ 7. PLATO'S VIEW OF ETHICS.-Plato was so strongly impressed with the social nature of man, and with the necessity of studying his life in relation to society, that, in his study of Ethics, instead of inquiring into the characteristics of a virtuous life in an individual, he endeavoured first to determine the characteristics of a good state. Having found what these are, he considered that it would be perfectly easy to infer what are the characteristics of a good man. Accordingly, the great ethical treatise of Plato is the Republic, in 1" ПodɩTikov Sŵov" (Politics, I. ii. 9).

2 Partly also, no doubt, because our wider international relationships have made it impossible for us to regard any one social system as a complete and exclusive unity in itself.