Baden Long-Wear Made-to-Measure SHIRTS Why pay $2 to $3 for a ready-made misfit NECK REINFORCEMENT BADEN shirts wear twice as as long as other shirts as result of our exclusive, patented neck reinforcement as shown in illustration-no holes all around neckband before shirt is half worn out. One test order will make you a permanent BADEN customer. Send for descriptive booklet, measurement blank and beautiful assortment of samples free. Know the comfort and satisfaction of wearing perfectly fitting, neat looking long wearing custom-made BADEN Shirts. No agents. Entire output sold direct to wearer. Write us today. Dept. 157 BADEN SHIRT CO. ST. JOSEPH, MO. FOR SALE-FINE SETS Encyclopedia of Evidence, 15 vols., $100.00 40.00 Wigmore's Evidence, 5 vols., buckram, 22.50 WEST VIRGINIA LAW BOOK EXCHANGE Wheeling, W. Va. University of Michigan Three years' course leading to the degree of LL. B. The degree of Juris Doctor (J. D.) open to graduates of approved universities and colleges. Regular session October to June, inclusive. Credit towards either degree may be obtained through work in the summer session of ten weeks. Law library of about 33,000 volumes. A fourth year of work leading to the degree of Master of Laws and permitting of specializations has been organized. For announcements, address, DEAN, DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Valversity of Michigan, Box X. Ann Arbor. Mich. AMASA M. EATON, A.M., LL. B., Specialist on the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and Adviser in Cases thereunder See Central Law Journal, Oct. 17, 1913; Michigan Law Review, Dec., 1913; Yale Law Journal, Feb., 1914; Central Law Journal, Feb. 20, 1914; University of Pennsylvania Law Review, April, 1914. N. Y. Supplement Wanted Anyone having a second-hand edition of N. Y. Supplement for sale, please write No. 412-418 Templeton Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, stating terms. Your Subscription is Invited T HE late Hon. U. M. Rose was a speaker and writer of unusual distinction. Though often pressed to write for publication he declined to do so except as to some very interesting and learned articles which he contributed to the Southern Law Review many years ago. He delivered addresses before diversified audiences from New York to Colorado. It is believed that many people would be glad to have a collection of these addresses, including his address at the last Hague Conference, together with a memoir of Judge Rose. His life story is full of human interest from the time when as a boy of fourteen he started work on the farm until his death, a foremost member of the American Bar and the First Citizen of Arkansas. His addresses have a flavor all their own, both in thought and diction. His after dinner speeches were both humorous and eloquent. They are as unusual as his handwriting, which was legible and distinguished and unlike any other. We have asked Mr. George B. Rose of Little Rock if he would be willing to prepare a memoir and make a collection of addresses of his father, and he has consented. We will undertake the publication if sufficient orders are received to justify the expense, which will be considerable. The volume will be hand somely printed and bound and of about 400 pages. The price will be $3.00. Please order by early mail such copies as you desire. The work of preparing the manuscript is practically completed. We hope to publish in June. An early response is requested. ADDRESS: GEORGE I. JONES Publisher 202 South Clark St., CHICAGO, ILL. Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 15, 1914. A TRADE-MARK IN A FAMILY NAME. Trade-mark rights consist in the owner of a trade-mark marking his goods in an exclusive way to the trade. But if his trade-mark is originally descriptive of quality of the goods, or geographical or comes from a family name, it is not a trade-mark by adoption, but becomes such by being applied exclusively to goods so that any other using the mark on his goods interferes with, or palms off the latter as the goods of, the owner of the acquired trade-mark. This seems to be the consensus of authority on this subject. But the acquired trade-mark seems to have been regarded as advancing to its status as a trade-mark with a limitation not attachable to an adopted trade-mark. It labors always under the difficulty, that it may never acquire the full status of an adopted trade-mark. It can never claim that it has taken away all right from others to describe their goods as having the quality expressed in a descriptive term, or that the goods originate from a certain locality, or that the family name embodied in a trade-mark may not be used by another of the same name. It does seem, however, that second or subsequent users of a descriptive, or geographical mark or of a family name are greatly limited in their rights and that they can never build up such designation into a trade-mark or trade-name that is absolute or unqualified. We are moved now to speak thus in view of a recent decision by Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where a family. name took on trade-mark rights in connection with the manufacture of a piano. Stix, Baer & Fuller D. G. Co. v. American Piano Co., 211 Fed. 271. The facts show that Wm. Knabe began the manufacture of a piano in 1837, which became famous as the "Knabe." In course of time this trade-mark became vested in the American Piano Company. The grandsons of Wm. Knabe organized a corporation in 1911 for the manufacture and sale of pianos, and the American Piano Company sought an injunction to restrain them from using the name "Knabe" either singly or in combination. upon pianos, in advertisements or otherwise in the piano business. The Knabes were first connected with the successors of Wm. Knabe and retired to form this corporation. The district court enjoined a departinent store having a contract with the corporation formed by the grandsons "from making any oral representation or using or permitting to be used in connection with the sale of pianos, in any catalogue, placard, circular, advertisement, or otherwise, descriptive of pianos manufactured by (this corporation) any statement or representation calculated to induce the public to believe" that these pianos were Knabe pianos. This injunction was objected to as being too broad and the Circuit Court of Appeals modified it by allowing defendant to advertise their piano as the "Knabe Bros." piano and to distinguish it from the "Knabe" piano in a "notice" to be embodied in their circulars, catalogues and advertisements. A case in Northern District of Ohio required that the corporation in which the dry goods company dealt should place on the fall boards of its pianos the following language: "The Knabe Bros. Company. This piano is not the original 'Knabe,' but is made under the supervision of E. J. and Wm. Knabe, III., grandsons of the original Wm. Knabe, I." This case attempts to apply the decision in the Hall Safe cases reported in 208 U. S. 267 and ibid 551, where it was ruled there was nothing to prevent other Halls from using their name in trade as to the same class of articles, provided they explain that their article is not that of the original manufacturer. They may explain that they are "sons of the first Hall and brought up in their business by him and otherwise may state the facts." All of this is right, but, if it arises out of the fact that the grandsons are using a similar trade-mark because it is their surname, it seems all wrong. By the use of the tradename they do what is calculated to confuse the products of the original manufacturer with theirs. name have no more right to attach a confusing mark to a new product than those of a different family might. The decision speaks of a "duplicity" in the name "Knabe" pianos, but it seems to us that the duplicity arises out of the fact that the court confuses the doing of business of the later Knabes with the raming of their products. If the original Knabe had called his piano some other name than "Knabe" or it had acquired some other name, that other name certainly could not be infringed upon by the later Knabes, though it may have been at geographical or descriptive name. When the court speaks of its being "a grievous perversion of the law of unfair trade to use its doctrines so as to convert a tradename into a patent right," we see little application for such a statement. We remember in the Singer case of this Justice White said something kind where a trade-mark was claimed in the name of a patented article after the patent had expired, but that is a different thing from claiming legitimate operation for a trade-mark right. For example, the Ohio court required the corporation to state that "this piano is not an original Knabe," but Circuit Court of Appeals says this is error, because the word original tends "to characterize the defendant's product as inferior to that of complainant and is unduly prejudicial to it." But why should this be taken into account, if the acquired signification needed to be distinguished in this way, and an, infringer of the same name merely has the right to, do business in his own name, but not call his products after his name? We interpret the Hall Safe cases as meaning that there is nothing to be claimed against the younger Halls carrying on business in their own names and they merely have the privilege of putting out their products NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. thoroughly distinguished from those of the older concern. Whatever trouble they may have in doing this is nothing to the older Halls. They must thoroughly and readily distinguish their own products, and in doing this if they attempt to use their name, as a tradename for their products, they should submit to some such implication against their own products as the use of the word "original" may convey. LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVILEGE EXTENDED ACCORDING ΤΟ CUSTOM IN COURSE OF BUSINESS.-The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that an instruction to the jury that, where a slanderous statement was made by one to another in regard to business negotiations in the presence of the latter's wife and son, the jury might consider whether this was made in the usual course of business. Cook v. Gust, 145 N. W. 225. The court said: "It is probably a very general custom for farmers to consult their wives and members of their family when they are about to engage in a new business enterprise of some importance. Where this practice is pursued, such communication as here made is privileged to the other members of the family as well as the husband, assuming that it is made in good faith and not from malicious motives." The point is very technical that the slander was privileged only so far as the husband was concerned, and it would seem to be well within the rule of privilege that mention is made only in presence of others of the household. It would be expected, that one would tell of the matter to members of his family, as the law will presume their intimate interest in all that concerns the family. The husband could mention the matter to members of his family and would be expected so to do. COURTS-HEADNOTES AS THE DECISION OF A COURT.-In Burbank v. Ernst, 34 Sup. Ct. 299, it was held that the opinion of the court is to be looked to as to what is really decided, where the reasoning is not represented in the headnotes, though the latter are made by authority of the court, but the headnotes are given no special force by statute or rule of court, as in some states. The court said: "We look to the opinion for the original and authentic statement of the grounds of decision." It is to be observed here that the court limits this rule to states where statute or rule of court does not provide otherwise. Should the opinion and the headnote disagree in these circumstances, we imagine that the opinion would be regarded purely as the personal view of a particular judge. BAILMENT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY GRATUITOUS BAILEE IMPUTABLE TO BAILOR.-It seems something remarkable to hold that where one lends his property to another to use for his own purposes and the property is destroyed by a third person, by reason of the contributory negligence of the bailee, the bailor may recover for its loss. This, however, has been held by Kansas City, (Mo.) Court of Appeals in the case of Spellman v. Delano, 163 S. W. 300. This ruling is made on the theory that there is no relation of principal and agent between bailor and bailee, as for example, where the bailment is to subserve some purpose of the bailor, and therefore there is nothing to make the fault of the bailee imputable to the bailor. But the question is begged in making this statement, because in a sense the bailee is the agent of the bailor to hold the property for him in a permissive use. It would seem that where a bailee holds property for his own use and not for mere safekeeping, he is bound to a stricter rule as to care than were he holding it for the bailor's benefit and that, if he were careless in the former case in exposing it to destruction, he might be liable to the bailor, when in the latter case he might be excused from liability. Therefore, the bailor may the more expect that he will not violate his contract to be careful about its keeping. He depends upon that when he allows the bailee to take the property into his possession. It really, however, would seem to be of no interest to a third person what is the nature of the bailment. He must respect it in one case just as in the other and, if the bailee neglects to care for the property, he makes himself liable to the bailor. Agency, therefore, is a sort of fiction! The bailee is exercising control over the property by consent of the bailor and for negligence in this regard he takes his chances. It hardly seems right to speak of imputability or nonimputability, as the bailee has a special property which enables him to sue for the injury and account to his bailor for the recovery. The case cites considerable authority pro and con on the subject and, seemingly, the weight is against what it holds. WHO ARE "WORKMEN" UNDER WORKMEN'S For the purposes of this article, only the provisions of the English Workmen's Compensation act defining workmen, and the decisions rendered thereunder, will be considered. Some or all of these provisions have been incorporated in many of the statutes enacted in the United States, and their construction in this country will be the same as in England. In some of the statutes the term "employe" is used, while others use that of "workman." The two words are synonymous and are used interchangeably. The English act provides: "Workman' does not include any person employed otherwise than by way of manual labor whose remuneration exceeds two hundred and fifty pounds a year, or a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business, or a member of a police force, or an out worker, or a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house, but save as aforesaid, means any person who has entered into or works under a contract of |