mandating new or expanded activities by local governments without full state financing of the additional costs and from reducing the state financing proportion of the costs of existing mandates.43 Accordingly, a state statute imposing new duties on localities with respect to solid-waste management resulting in increased costs was unconstitutional. A state statute increasing the salaries of county employees was held to violate the Missouri version of this significant new guarantor of local fiscal autonomy.

Conclusion

The recognition of procedural, dignitary, and autonomy interests of local governments has significant implications for state-local relations. In the first

43 Mich. Const. art. 9, Sec. 26; Mo. Const. art. X, Sections 16-24.

Discussion Notes

1. An article referred to by Professor Libonati, James E. Herget, "The Missing Power of Local Government: A Divergence Between Text and Practice in Our Early State Constitutions," Virginia Law Review 62 (June 1976): 999, provides an exhaustive treatment of the early state constitutional silence with respect to local government, and the evolution of the powers of local government.

2. See also, Howard Lee McBain, "The Doctrine of An Inherent Right of Local Self-Government," Columbia Law Review 16 (March, April

Durant v. State Board of Education 424 Mich. 364, 381 N.W. 2d 622 (1985)

BOYLE, Justice.

We granted leave in these two cases to consider the proper interpretation of specific provisions of the "Headlee Amendment," Const. 1963, art. 9, Sections 29, 30, and 32.

I Facts

The issues in this case arise from: A) the fact that the amount of state funding for K-12 education, taken as a whole, has declined since 1978-79, and B) from the further fact that the result of application of two distinct formulae for financing has, as applied, re

place, state courts have begun to undo the unitary theory of sovereignty whereby localities are presumed not to have interests adverse to those of the state that created them. Second, local governments are viewed not as mere servants of the state but as potential protagonists in the ongoing process by which state legislative claims to omnipotence are checked and balanced by judicial review. Third, a significant new class of potential plaintiffs is now empowered to vindicate the rule of law in a variety of public-law areas hitherto unscrutinized by the state judiciary. Fourth, state courts have indicated an increased willingness to resolve conflicts that inevitably arise between the general interests represented by the state and the particular interests represented by local governments within the overriding framework of the state constitution.

1916): 190, 299; Amasa M. Eaton, "The Right to Local Self-Government," Harvard Law Review 13 (1900): 441, 570, 638; 14 (1901): 20, 116.

3. See, Richard Briffault, "Localism in State Constitutional Law," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1988): 117.

4. Professor Libonati mentions the recent state constitutional amendments requiring states to fund increased mandated services by local governments. What are the ramifications of such provisions? Read the following case with this in mind.

sulted in a reduction of the state-financed proportion of individual school districts' budgets. These two formulae are used to determine the amount of state aid which will be available to school districts during each school year.

II

Does the Headlee Amendment Require that Funding to Each School District Be Maintained at 1978-79 Levels?

The first contention of plaintiffs in both Durant and Waterford is that the state is required by Const. 1963, art. 9, Sec. 29. (hereafter Sec. 29) to contribute the same percentage of the school operating budget as it did in 1978-79. Section 29 provides:

The state is hereby prohibited from reducing
the state financed proportion of the neces-
sary costs of any existing activity or service
required of units of Local Government by

state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18.

Plaintiffs argue that this provision was intended to cover the constitutional obligation of a free education mandated by Const. 1963, art. 8, Sec. 2. If we accept plaintiffs' contention, a school district which received fifty percent of its total operating budget in the form of state aid in 1978-79 would be constitutionally entitled to that percentage of their budget in all succeeding years.

The defendants, on the other hand, argue that Sec. 29 applies only to specific requirements imposed on the school districts by state statutes and state agencies. Defendants further argue that this would mean that the state could constitutionally reduce the amount of state aid given to individual school districts below the proportion of the total school budget in 1978-79.

A. Is the Mandate of a Free Public Education in Const. 1963, art. 8, Sec. 2 an "Activity or Service Required... by State Law" As Set Forth in Sec. 29 of the Headlee Amendment?

The issue here involves the proper interpretation of the term "state law" as it appears in Sec. 29. Plaintiffs claim that the voters intended the term "state law" in Sec. 29 to include constitutional provisions, such as the mandate of a free education in article 8, while the defendants argue that it was intended only to refer to state statutes and state agency rules.

Article 9, Sections 25-34 was presented to the voters under the popular term "Headlee Amendment," named after its original proponent, Richard Headlee. It was proposed as part of a nationwide "taxpayer revolt" in which taxpayers were attempting to limit legislative expansion of requirements placed on local government, to put a freeze on what they perceived was excessive government spending, and to lower their taxes both at the local and the state level.

For the reasons which follow, we hold that it was not the intent of the voters to include in Sec. 29 any obligations that may be imposed upon local governmental units by Const. 1963, art. 8, Sec. 2 and that unrestricted state aid is not funding for an "existing

activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law."

1. The Language of the Constitution.

In order to determine the proper interpretation of the term "state law" in Sec. 29, we must ascertain the intent of the voters who passed the Headlee Amendment. We begin by looking to the language of the Constitution itself.

First, a proper reading of the first two sentences of Sec. 29, in combination with each other, evidences that the correct interpretation of the term "state law" in the section is that asserted by the defendants, i.e., state statutes and state agency rules. The first sentence of Sec. 29 states:

The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law.

The second sentence adds:

A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs.

The first sentence, the one at issue in this case, is aimed at existing services or activities already required of local government. The second sentence addresses future services or activities. Both sentences clearly reflect an effort on the part of the voters to forestall any attempt by the Legislature to shift responsibility for services to the local government, once its revenues were limited by the Headlee Amendment, in order to save the money it would have had to use to provide the services itself.

Because they were aimed at alleviation of two possible manifestations of the same voter concern, we conclude that the language "required by the legislature or any state agency" in the second sentence of Sec. 29 must be read together with the phrase "state law" in the first sentence. This interpretation is consistent with the voters' intent that any service or activity required by the Legislature or a state agency, whether now or in the future, be funded at an adequate level by the state and not by local taxpayers.

Discussion Notes

1. Missouri adopted a provision much like Michigan's, also as part of an amendment proposed by a "tax revolt" initiative. See Edward D. Robertson, Jr. and Duncan E. Kincheloe, III, "Missouri's Tax Limitation Amendment," University of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review 52 (1983): 1; Boone County Court v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1982).

2. Would a limitation such as Michigan's or Missouri's apply where a judicial interpretation of a statute resulted in a new requirement of local governments? See University Emergency Service v. City of Detroit, 141 Mich. App. 512, 367 N.W.2d 344, 348 (1984).

3. What would be the proper remedy for courts to grant for violations of these kinds of provisions?

In 1955 Jefferson B. Fordham noted:

In the state orientation there is a very important choice between use of the state constitution as the direct instrument for allocating governmental powers and reliance upon the legislature as a continuing powerdistribution organ in the state. As between the three branches of the state government the primary allocation is, of course, made by the constitution. More or less discretion may be left to the state legislature even at this level. The devolution of authority to local units has traditionally been a function of the state legislature under the strongly prevailing doctrine of legislative supremacy over local government. It is here that the basic choice of political method presents great difficulty. What factors militate in favor of modifying legislative supremacy by constitutional amendment?

Jefferson B. Fordham, "Foreword: Local Government in the Larger Scheme of Things," Vanderbilt Law Review 8 (June 1955): 668.

He continued:

The prospect of adequate legislative recognition of local problems and needs is considered so slight by the proponents of constitutional home rule that they regard constitutional amendment as the only practical recourse. They say, in effect, that life is too short; local government cannot afford to wait on the vague prospect that the legislative institution will undergo the desired improvement. It is a familiar theme. Let's by-pass the legislature and provide for this or that problem by modifying the organic law. Ibid., 671.

Read the following materials with these issues in mind.

City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. 261 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1972)

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

We here review by direct appeal a decision of the Circuit Court, Dade County, holding unconstitutional an Ordinance of the City of Miami Beach purporting to regulate rents. . . . Ordinance No. 1791, entitled "Housing and Rent Control Regulations," provides for regulation of rents in all housing with four or more rental units except for hospitals, nursing homes, retirement homes, asylums or public institutions, college or school dormitories or any charitable or educational or non-profit institutions, hotels, motels, public housing, condominiums and cooperative apartments, and any housing accommodations completed after December 1, 1969.

The City Council enacted the Ordinance in October, 1969 after making a determination that an inflationary spiral and a housing shortage existed in the City which required the control and regulation of rents. The City contends that it acted with the intent and purpose of protecting its residents from exorbi

tant rents.

The trial court declared the Ordinance invalid after determining that the City of Miami Beach does not have the power to enact a rent control ordinance. .. and that the Ordinance conflicted with state law, specifically Sections 83.03, 83.04 and 83.20, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

The legal issues involved in this case are as follows:

(1) Whether or not the City of Miami Beach has the power to enact this rent control ordinance?

(3) Whether or not the rent control ordinance conflicts with state law?

The first issue must be answered in the negative. The City of Miami Beach does not have the power to enact the ordinance in question. This Court recognizes that the language in the Florida Constitution which governs the powers exercisable by municipalities has been changed by Article VIII, Section 2(b), 1968 Florida Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution of 1885 reads,

The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. ...

Section 2, Article VIII of our new 1968 Constitution provides,

(a) Establishment. Municipalities may be es-
tablished or abolished and their charters
amended pursuant to general or special law.

...

(b) Powers. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

Although this new provision does change the old rule of the 1885 Constitution respecting delegated powers of municipalities, it still limits municipal powers to the performance of municipal functions.

That the paramount law of a municipality is its charter, (just as the State Constitution is the charter of the State of Florida,) and gives the municipality all the powers it possesses, unless other statutes are applicable thereto, has not been altered or changed.... The powers of a municipality are to be interpreted and construed in reference to the purposes of the municipality and if reasonable doubt should arise as to whether the municipality possesses a specific power, such doubt will be resolved against the city. Liberis v.

Harper (Fla. 1925) 89 Fla. 477, 104 So. 853. "Municipal corporations are established for purposes of local government, and, in the absence of specific delegation of power, cannot engage in any undertakings not directed immediately to the accomplishment of those purposes." Hoskins v. City of Orlando, Florida (5th Cir., 1931) 51 F.2d 901. The aforestated holding of the United States Fifth Circuit Court is entirely consistent with the 1968 change in our Constitution.

The Charter of the City of Miami Beach does not authorize the City of Miami Beach the power to enact a rent control ordinance. Section 6 of the Code contains no mention of such a power. The only possible source of such a power is Section 6 (x) which permits the City "to adopt all ordinances or do all things deemed necessary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare, comfort, education, morals, peace, health and convenience of said city, or its inhabitants and to exercise all of the powers and privileges conferred upon cities or towns by the General Law of Florida when not inconsistent herewith."

The weight of authority is that without specific authorization from the state, the cities cannot enact a rent control ordinance either incident to its specific municipal powers or under its General Welfare provisions. Warren v. City of Philadelphia, (1956) 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703, Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, (1954) 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99, Grofo Realty Co. v. Bayonne, (1957) 24 N.J. 482, 132 A.2d 802, Wagner v. Mayor and Municipal Council of City of Newark, (1957) 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794.

Local governments have not been given omnipotence by home rule provisions or by Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1968 Florida Constitution. "Matters that because of their nature are inherently reserved for the State alone and among which have been the master and servant and landlord and tenant relationships, matters of descent, the administration of estates... and many other matters of general and statewide significance, are not proper subjects for local treatment. ..." Wagner v. Mayor and Municipal Council of Newark, supra, at 800. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (Ct.App. 1929) made the following statement which is in support of the above stated proposition,

There are other affairs exclusively those of
the state.... None of these things can be said
to touch the affairs that a city is organized to
regulate, whether we have reference to his-
tory or to tradition or to the existing forms of
charters.

The State of Florida through legislative action has enacted statutory provisions to regulate the landlord tenant relationship. Chapter 83, Fla.Stat.F.S.A. Absent a legislative enactment authorizing the exer