Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions, 第 1-75 頁﹔第 177-225 頁

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Cambridge University Press, 2004年2月9日 - 384 頁
Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.
 

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用戶評語  - thcson - LibraryThing

This is not a bad book on federalism, but I think the argumentation could have been a lot more clear and concise. The first 100 pages or so provide an introduction to the theoretical problems that ... 閱讀評論全文

內容

Federations and the Theoretical Problem
1
12 Definitions
5
13 The Long Search for Stability
16
14 The Fundamental Problem of Stability
26
15 j Basic Premises and Conclusions
33
Federal Bargaining
42
21 Alliances versus Federations
44
22 The Private Character of Public Goods
50
54 Voters versus Elites
161
55 Desirable Imperfection and a Democratic AsIf Principle
169
Political Parties in a Federal State
177
62 Parties in a Democracy
182
63 The Idealized Party System
186
64 Integrated Parties
190
65 Integration outside the United States
196
66 India
213

23 Equilibrium Selection and Redistribution
52
24 The Federal Problem
55
25 Bargaining for Control of the Center
61
26 Allocating Jurisdictions
68
27 Three Levels of Institutional Design
71
Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining
76
31 The Czechoslovak Dissolution
79
32 The Soviet Disintegration
88
33 The Feasibility of Success in Initial Bargaining
101
The Special Road to Renegotiation
104
Representation
111
42 A National Venue for Bargaining
116
43 Within versus Without
119
44 Direct versus Delegated Representation
125
45 Other Parameters of Design
127
46 Bilateral Decision Making and the Case of Russia
131
Incentives
142
52 The Court
151
53 Some Simple Rules of Constitutional Design
157
Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I
226
72 Level 2 and The Federalist Papers
229
73 Level 3 Institutions
236
74 Australia Canada Germany and India Revisited
241
75 Local and Regional Design Parameters
252
Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II
259
81 Electoral Mechanisms and Societal Structures
260
82 Level 2 Again and a Proper Federal Structure
268
83 Level 1 and the Scope of the Federal Mandate
289
84 Level o Things beyond Design
294
Designing Federalism
299
92 Russia
301
93 The European Union
315
94 Conclusion
331
References
337
Name Index
367
Subject Index
374
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