CONCLUSION.

THE doctrines of the innate moral depravity of mankind, and of the sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, are attended with inexplicable difficulties; yet these difficulties are of such a nature, that they do not afford even a presumption against the truth of the doctrines which they accompany.

For no one can reject these doctrines on account of the difficulties which attend them, and which have been already stated, but he must involve himself in the most palpable absurdities. He must reject the universal experience of mankind; and combat the plainest dictates of common sense.

The introduction of moral evil into the world, and its prevalence in all ages, cannot be accounted for upon any scheme unincumbered with difficulties.

Let any person capable of close reflection inquire, how it comes to pass that the generality of mankind in all ages have not been truly virtuous, since virtue is acknowledged to have an intrinsic amiableness.*

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To say, that mankind have been led away by their passions contrary to their better judgment, is only to allow the fact, but to give no reason for it. It is to say, that mankind have not followed the will of God so far as they have known it.

If you say, they have followed bad examples, I ask, why they followed these rather than good ones.

If you tell me they received bad instructions, you do but remove the difficulty one step backwards, without giving any solution of it. For it may be asked, how did it happen that bad instructions were given, or bad examples afforded, instead of good ones. Or, if good and evil were equally set before them

By virtue, I here mean a temper and conduct in all things conformed to the will of God, as far as that will has been made known.

by instruction or example, why did they prefer the evil. Remove the difficulty as often as you please, it still recurs, and must remain unanswered upon the hypothesis here adopted.

The Scriptures inform us how sin entered into the world; and profane history concurs with sacred in exhibiting the general depravity of mankind. These accounts must be admitted as indubitable facts, though attended with difficulties which we cannot solve.

The universal concurrence of mankind annexes responsibility to all the voluntary acts of every man who retains his understanding. Yet we daily see, that these acts are influenced by a great variety of circumstances. But all laws, both human and divine, must be given up as irrational, if we are resolved to withhold our approbation or dislike, until we know why a man chooses one mode of conduct rather than another. No general answer can possibly be invented to solve that famous question,-"What determines the will?” Let ingenuity be racked for the solution, the answer will always be an identical proposition. Mr. Locke's solution is manifestly absurd, as it puts the effect for the cause. If the mind is in perfect equilibrium, (as must be the case previously to any choice, which is a men

tal preponderation,) it cannot be uneasy: if it is uneasy, it has willed, or is inclined one

way.

Since the manner in which the mind is influenced by that variety of causes continually operating in the common affairs of life, cannot be discovered, we should not wonder that the manner in which the Holy Spirit of God influences the mind, is equally unknown. We perceive that men are often directed in their choice by the arguments and persuasions of others; and why may not the Divine Agent produce good volitions, by suggesting suitable arguments, either directly, or by the instrumentality of others? But I pretend to assert nothing concerning the mode of operation in any case where volition and subsequent conduct are produced. I only know that if a man acts voluntarily, he acts responsibly, unless he be deprived of his understanding.

If a certain number of children were educated in the most proper manner by parents of the most virtuous character; and an equal number of children were educated by parents hardened in vice;-would the chance be equal, whether the greater number of good men would be found among the virtuous or the vicious? No one can entertain a doubt on this

subject. But let us attempt to give a reason for our expectation in such a case, and we must be constrained to resolve the question into a matter of mere experience. Yet the virtue and the vice produced by these means respectively, most certainly are not destroyed by their cause. Virtue and vice do not cease to be such, because they have originated from good or bad education.

The certainty of the event in the case of moral influence, creates no additional difficulty in our attempts to explain that influence. For the difficulty resides in the nature of the event, and not in its frequency. If argument, persuasion, or example, produce good or bad moral conduct in men, the nature of the connexion between the cause and the effect, in this case, is not altered by the frequency of the event. If any objection can be made to the cause, it must arise from the nature of that cause, and not from the frequency of the effect produced.

Whatever difficulties attend the doctrines of innate moral depravity, and divine grace; the same attend the constitution and course of nature, as they lie against all influence whatever.

Let us then bow down before the great