required of every one to give away twice as much as he was possessed of. Would the common sense of any man have suffered him to look upon this as a reasonable command? By no means. The maxim, then, is indubitable: but let us carefully attend to the meaning of the expression, out of our power, and words of like import, as cannot, unable, unavoidable, impossible, incapable, irresistible, necessary, &c. The words which I have added, as explanatory in the proposition, exactly point out the meaning of such terms, which have always a relation to a contrary desire and endeavour, that either is, or may be, supposed in the case. A thing is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, when it is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. Or it is necessary, with respect to us, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. The word impossible has manifestly a reference to some supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for that effect, or a thing is impossible to us, when the utmost exertion of our powers is ineffectual to accomplish it. That is properly irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavours to the contrary. A man cannot properly be said to be unable to do any thing which he could do if he would; and, therefore, the terms cannot, and the like, are never used in their proper sense, unless such words may be added, as imply the existence of an inability, notwithstanding a contrary will and endeavour.* It is the more needful to settle the meaning of such relative terms, because we frequently use them in a sense different from that which is their primary and proper one. In common language we often apply the terms, where no such contrary will and endeavour can be supposed; and this sense of the words, I shall, by way of distinction, call their improper sense. example, of a generous man, that he cannot do a base action, we do not mean that such an one could not do it if he would, which is implied in the proper sense of the word cannot; we only mean to assert, in a strong manner, When we say, for * These relative terms are always used in their primary and strict sense, in the following pages, unless where the contrary is intimated to the reader. + It is not meant to be asserted, that it is improper to use these terms in any sense except their primary one; but the different meaning of words ought to be clearly pointed out, when the force of the reasoning depends upon that difference. that such a generous person will not act basely. It is in this sense that divines make use of these relative terms, when they say, that God is necessarily holy, that he cannot mistake, or that it is impossible he should act unjustly; for the case will not allow us to suppose the existence of a contrary will and endeavour; no more is meant than that God is certainly holy, and will always act justly and wisely. The reason of our adopting these terms on such occasions seems to be this; that, the certainty of an event being one of the most striking circumstances relating to necessity, when we would express in the strongest manner the certainty of any event, we use terms borrowed from necessity, though the event has nothing else in common with necessity, but the certainty implied in it.* And, as the terms borrowed from necessity are most commonly used in their improper sense upon mo * Every necessary event is certain, but a certain event is not always necessary. It may be said with propriety," All men must necessarily die;" because they must die whether they will or not. But we cannot properly say; "A good man necessarily does good actions;" because we cannot add, that he does them whether he will or not: in strict propriety of speech it can only be said; "A good man certainly does good actions." ral subjects, the certainty of an event is often called its moral necessity: but this expression is very apt to mislead us, as morality and necessity, in the proper sense of the words, are incompatible. The greatest care should be taken to distinguish the proper from the improper sense of the words cannot, unable, impossible, unavoidable, incapable, necessary, &c. as these senses are not only different, but, in some respects, diametrically opposite. If a man cannot do a thing, in the proper sense of the word, he is perfectly free from blame, provided that want of power is the only hinderance: but we often intend the highest degree of blame by the expression, when we use it in the improper sense; as when we say of a very covetous man, "He is such a wretch, he cannot do a generous action." Or, when a person, stimulated by the ill treatment of his opponent, says, "I thank God, I have in me a soul incapable of treating an adversary with contempt," he means to assert his own good disposition as something worthy of praise: whereas, was he really incapable of a base passion, in the proper sense of the word, this incapacity would be no more virtuous in him than it is in a stone; or than the incapacity of flying is in mankind. Proposition II. There are only two things which can prevent our compliance with any known command that is laid upon us; and these are inability and unwillingness to obey. I say, any known command, as otherwise ignorance might be reckoned a third source of disobedience: though, since this is always either voluntary or involuntary, it might not unjustly have been ranked with one or other of the two causes I have mentioned, had I omitted this restriction. But to pass by this, it is a plain maxim of common sense, that a man either cannot, or will not, do what he is bidden and since it has been already shown that a man is so far excusable as he is truly and properly unable to obey what is commanded, this consequence will certainly follow, that unwillingness is the only source of criminal disobedience.* Supposing a man It is not meant to be denied, that the understanding is darkened by sin; but the assertion in this passage only implies, that criminal ignorance always arises from the blindness or hardness of the heart, as the Apostle informs us. Ephesians iv. 18. If we suppose a man perfectly desirous of knowing the will of God, in order that he may practise it, and using every method which God has appointed to obtain that |