That they should be so is not strange, since we have then entered on a state of things, which, in its essential features, is new, and which, in all its diversities of duty, and pleasure, and danger, attracts, and excites us by continual novelty. Who can forget the plains where he wandered in early life? Who can erase from his recollection the associates of those days of wonder, activity, and hope? "Who can obliterate from his heart his toils, and his sufferings, and his joys, all of which assumed a peculiar emphasis and importance, being connected with future prospects, the adversities and the successes of after life?These things remain, while others vanish. Such feelings, so deeply fixed in the mind, and bound together and made permanent by the strength of a mutual association, are frequently recalled; they recur to the soul in the activity and bustle of life, and in those more favoured moments, when it is given up to silent and solemn meditations. The effect of this frequent recurrence can easily be imagined. The early impressions, which are the subjects of such recurrence, become in time, if one may be allowed the expression a part of the mind itself; they seem to be woven into its existence. Hence old men, who have no eye and no hearing for the events, that are passing around them, repeat, with the greatest animation, the stories of scenes, and actions, and friendships of fifty years ago.

§. 208. Memory of persons of a rich imagination.

It is a remark of Dr. Watts, that a fine genius is often found to have a feeble memory. By a fine genius he probably understood what we commonly mean by a person of a rich imagination; that is, one, who is furnished with a rich store of images, has readiness in the perception of their congruity or incongruity with each other, and of course has great power in the formation of various new combinations.

Such a person finds a luxuriance of wealth in himself. He is continually and happily entertained with the new pictures, which his imagination creates. Hence he does not so much entertain himself with outward events; many

facts, which are particularly noticed and retained by others, pass by him unregarded; and, therefore, quickly escape from his remembrance. Montaigne (§. 8.) seems to have been a person of this description; acquainted with the general principles of the sciences, possessing an exuberance of intellectual riches, but utterly incapable of remembering dates, times, places, and the numerous matters-of-fact of every day's occurrence.

Weakness of memory in persons of a rich imagination is discovered also in their reading of books. The reason of it seems to be a too great confidence in their own ability. Conscious of their own resources, they are tempted to peruse books in a hasty and careless manner, and without due attention. The result of this careless manner, both in respect to events and the sentiments of authors, is that they are but imperfectly known at first, and are very speedily forgotten. This will not appear strange, in connection with the remark at § 238, on the connection existing between memory and attention. The weakness of memory, therefore, in persons of rich imagination is not constitutional and permanent, but a matter of mere accident; and, for this reason, the more discreditable. When such persons have habitually taken an interest in the common affairs of life, they are found to remember their details, however unpoetical; and in their reading of authors nothing seems to be wanting but interest and attention, in order to secure them from the reproach, under which they are thought to labour.

§. 299. On the compatibility of strong memory and good judg

ment.

By JUDGMENTS we understand here nothing more than the opinions, which we form in view of evidence; in other words, they are the results or conclusions of moral reasoning. By a person of good judgment, we accordingly mean one, who examines subjects with caution, and whose. results founded on such examination, for the most part prove correct. That persons may possess, in a very high degree, the susceptibility of memory, and still be incapa

ble of correct moral reasoning or of exhibiting any other indications of a well judging mind, is a fact well known. There have even been idiots, who certainly could present no claims to the character of judging well, that have, nevertheless, been remarkable for memory. Such are, indeed, instances of an extreme kind ;-but there are not wanting many other cases, where strong memories have been found united with feeble judgment. On this fact it may be remarked, as follows.

The connection between a strong memory and a weak judgment, it may be said without any hesitation, is not necessary, but merely accidental; that is, is not the constitution of nature, but in general the result of circumstances. As it is an accidental state of things, and not any thing essential and permanent in our mental structure, we must look for its appropriate cause in erroneous mental discipline. It may well be supposed, that those, who possess strong memories, are not insensible of their excellence in this respect; and the approbation, which they have received in consequence of it, encourages them to treasure up a dry collection of all facts, which will, in any way, bear repetition. Dates, genealogies, local incidents, traditional anecdotes, are all seized, and retained with peculiar avidity. But too much intent upon the mere dates and names of things, such persons fail to inquire into their true nature; they neglect other and more important forms of mental discipline; and thus justly sustain the reputation of possessing a showy rather than discriminating and sound knowledge. In instances of this description, the relations, by which the suggested trains of thought are associated, are the more slight and obvious ones, such as of time, place, &c. But there are some exceptions to this unwise course; individuals may be found, who, with an astonishing ability to recal the most unimportant incidents of daily occurrence, as well as the dry details of historical facts, combine the far more enviable ability of discriminating the true differences of things, of combining means for the attainment of ends, and of rightly estima

ting evidence in its various applications; which are among the characteristics of men of sound judgment.

§. 300. Intentional memory or recollection.

The definition of MEMORY, which has been given, is, that it is the power or susceptibility of the mind, from which arise those conceptions, which are modified by the relation of past time. This definition necessarily resolves memory in good part into association. It is, therefore, to be here observed, that our trains of associated thought are not voluntary; that is, are not directly under the controlof the WILL. They come and depart, without it being possible for us to exercise any thing more, than an indirect government over them. (See §. 213.) It follows from these facts, that our remembrances also are not voluntary; or, in other words, it is impossible for us to remember in consequence of merely choosing to remember. To will or to choose to remember any thing implies, that the thing in question is already in the mind; and hence there is not only an impossibility resulting from the nature of the mind, but also an absurdity, in the idea of calling up thought by volition. Our chief power, therefore, in quickening and strengthening the memory, will be found to consist in our skill in applying and modifying the various principles or laws of association. And this brings us to a consideration of what is called INTENTIONAL MEMORY OF RECOLLECTION; a subject, which was partly illustrated in the section above referred to.

Whenever we put forth an exercise of intentional memory, or make a formal attempt to remember some circumstance, it is evident, that the event in general, of which the circumstance when recalled will be found to be a part, must have previously been an object of attention. That is, we remember the great outlines of some story, but cannot, in the first instance, give a complete account of it, which we wish to do. We make an effort to recal the circumstances not remembered in two ways.We may, in the first place, form different suppositions, and see, which agrees best with the general outlines; the general features

or outlines of the subject being detained before us, with a considerable degree of permanency, by means of some feeling of desire or interest. This method of restoring thoughts is rather an inference of reasoning, than a genuine exercise of memory.

We may in the second place, merely delay upon those thoughts, which we already hold possession of; and revolve them in our minds; until, aided by some principle of association, we are able to lay hold of the particular ideas, for which we were searching. Thus when we endeavour to recite what we had previously committed to memory, but are at a loss for a particular passage; we repeat, a number of times, the concluding words of the preceding sentence. In this way, the sentence, which was forgotten, is very frequently recalled.

§. 301. Instance illustrative of the preceding.

We had occasion, in a former section, to mention the case of an individual, who, in consequence of an attack of apoplexy, forgot all the transactions of the four years immediately preceding. It is further to be observed here, that the same individual recovered by degrees all he had lost; so as after a while to have nearly or quite as full a In this instance remembrance of that period, as others. the power of the principles of association appears to have been at first completely prostrated by the disease, without any prospect of their being again brought into action, exThis assistance, cept by some assistance afforded them. no doubt, was reading and conversation. By reading old newspapers and by conversation, he, from time to time, fell upon ideas, which he had not only been possessed of before, but which had been associated with other ideas, forming originally distinct and condensed trains of thought. And thus whole series were restored.-Other series again were recovered by applying the methods of INTENTIONAL RECOLLECTION; that is, by forming suppositions and comparing them with the ideas already recovered, or by continually revolving in mind such trains as were restor