servient to the power of reasoning, since all processes of reasoning are made up of successive propositions, the comparison of which implies the exercise of judgment. The associations of thought, which have been mentioned in this chapter, are so intiinate or rather almost indissoluble, that they try and discipline the mind in this respect, they teach it to discriminate. They are worthy to be examined, therefore, and to be understood, not only for the immediate pleasure, which they afford in the discovery of our errours; but also because they have the effect of training up one's powers to some good purpose. Let a person be accustomed to making such discriminations as are implied in fully understanding the instances in this chapter, and he acquires a readiness, which is not easily outwitted; he trains himself to such a quickness of perception in finding out what truly belongs to an object and what does not, as will not allow him to be imposed upon by that confusion of ideas, which in so many cases distorts the judgments of the multitude.

§. 213. Power of the will over mental associations.

In view of what has been said in this and in former chapters, the inquiry naturally arises, What is the degree of influence, which we are able to exercise by mere will or volition over associated trains of thought? The answer to be given to this inquiry is, that we have no direct influence or power over them ;--there is a constant train of ideas, but their succession, their coming and departing depends on causes beyond our immediate voluntary control. The truth of the general statement, that we cannot produce or call up an idea by a mere direct act of the will, and that, consequently, trains of ideas are not directly under its control, cannot but appear quite evident on a little reflection. We never can will the existence of any thing without knowing what it is which we will or choose. This requires no further proof than is contained in the proposition itself. Therefore, the expressions, to will to have a certain thought or train of thought,

clearly imply the present existence of that thought or train; and, consequently, there can be no such thing as calling up and directing our thoughts by immediate volition.

To this view of want of direct voluntary power over our associated ideas and to the argument in support of it, those mental efforts, which we term recollection or intentional memory, have been brought up as an answer. In cases of intentional memory it will be said, an object or event is remembered, or in other words, an idea or train of ideas is called up, by mere volition or choice. To this objection we make this reply. It is evident, before we attempt or make a formal effort to remember the particular circumstances of an event, that the event itself in general must have been the object of our attention. There is some particular thing in all cases of intentional remembrance, which we wish to call to mind, although we are totally unable to state what it is; but we know, that it is somehow connected with some general event, which we already have in memory. Now by revolving in mind the great facts or outlines of that event, it so happens, that the particular circumstance, which we were in search of, is called up. But certainly no one can say that this is done by a direct volition ;-so far from it,

explain it, than the com- .

that nothing more is wanting to mon principles of association. This statement is illustrated, whenever, in reciting an extract which we had committed to memory, we are at a loss for the beginning of a particular sentence. In such a case we naturally repeat a number of times the concluding words of the preceding sentence, and very soon we recall the sentence, which was lost; not, however, by direct volition, but by association.

§. 214. Associations controlled by an indirect voluntary

power.

But we would not be understood to say, that the will possesses no influence whatever over our trains of thought; its influence is very considerable, although it is

not as we have seen, immediate and direct.-(1) We have, in the first place, the power of checking or delaying the succession of ideas. This power is always found to exist, when the direction of the mind towards a particular subject is attended with a feeling of desire or interest. We are not, indeed, enabled by our power in this respect either directly to call up or to banish any one or any number of our thoughts. But the consequence is, a variety of trains of thought are suggested, which would not have been suggested, had it not been for the circumstance of the original train being delayed. Thus, in the course of our mental associations, the name of Sir Isaac Newton occurs ;-we experience a strong emotion of interest; aided by this interest, we check the current of our thoughts at that name, and we feel and are conscious, that we have within us the ability to do so. While we delay upon it, a variety of series of ideas occurs. At one moment we think of eminent mathematicians and astronomers, for he himself was one; at another, we think of those cotemporaries, who were his particular friends, whatever their rank in science, because they lived at the same time; a moment after, our minds dwell upon some striking incidents in his life or some marked features in his social or intellectual character; and again, we may be led to think, almost in the same instant, of some proposition or demonstration, which had once exercised his patience and skill. In consequence of delaying a few moments on the name or rather on the general idea of the man, these different trains of thought are presented; and we can evidently fix our minds upon one of these subjects if we choose, or have a desire to, and dismiss the others. This is one way, in which by choice or volition we are able to exercise a considerable indirect power over our associations.

(2) We acquire, in the second place, great power over our associations by HABIT; and as no man ordinarily forms such habit without choosing to form it, we have here another instance of the indirect power of volition. By the term Habit, when it is applied to our mental opera-.

tions, we mean in particular that facility or readiness, which they acquire by being frequently repeated. The consequence of repetition or frequent practice is, that certain associations are soon very much strengthened, or that a facility in them is acquired.

Striking instances of the effect of repetition have been given in the course of this chapter, although it might perhaps be said in respect to these,that they were forced upon us by our particular situation, rather than brought about by positive desire or choice. But there are other instances, to which this remark is not equally applicable. It is a well known fact, that almost any person may become a punster or rhymer by taking the pains to form a habit, that is, by increasing the facility of certain associations by frequent repetition. By punning we understand the power of readily summoning up, on a particular occasion, a number of words different from each other in meaning, but resembling each other more or less in sound. That facility of association, which is acquired by frequent repetition and which is commonly expressed by the word HABIT, (as when we say of a person that he has formed a habit of expression,) is the great secret of fluency in extemporaneous speaking. The extemporaneous speaker must, indeed, have ideas; no modification of association whatever can supply the place of them. But his ability to arrange them in some suitable order and to express them in words without previous care and effort, is the result, in a great measure, of habits of association flowing from his own choice and determination.-(See Stewart's Elements, Vol. I. CH. VI. PT. 2; Historical Dissertation, PT. I. §. I. CH. 2; Brown's Lectures, XLI, XLII, XLIX. &c.)

CHAPTER ELEVENTH.

COMPLEX NOTIONS OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN.

§. 215. Of simplicity and complexness of mental states in general.

BEFORE leaving that portion of our knowledge, which has an external origin, it is necessary to examine it in relation to the principle or law of Simplicity and Complexness, which was formerly considered. We find on examination, that our mental states do not possess the same value, but oftentimes one is virtually equal to many others; and hence we are able to resolve the whole mass of them into the two general classes of Simple and Complex. It may seem surprising, that one mental state, which has a perfect unity and simplicity in itself, should still embrace two, three, or any number of others; but such is undoubtedly the fact. Let us fix our attention upon whatever complex notion or feeling we please to, and we shall find it susceptible of being examined under this view; we may consider it in its whole or in its parts, in its comprehension or its elements.

And it may be added here, that in a practical point of view, the ability to do this, and the habit of doing it are of much importance. In early life, and in all the stages of education, the practice of mental analysis, in its application to particular thoughts and feelings, should undoubt