considered as illustrating and confirming the views in the preceding section.

§. 203. Of our conceptions at tragical representations.

These observations suggest an explanation, at least in part, of the effects, which are produced on the mind by exhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of tragedies, it must be admitted, that there is a general conviction of the whole being but a fiction. But, although persons enter the theatre with this general conviction, it does not always remain with them the whole time. At certain passages in the poet peculiarly interesting, and at certain exhibitions of powerful and well-timed effort in the actor, this general impression, that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the spectator may be said to rush into the scenes; he mingles in the events; carried away and lost, he for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush at the catastrophe which he witnesses. The explanation, therefore, of the emotions felt at the exhibition of a trag edy, such as indignation, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the exhibition we have a momentary belief in the reality of the events, which are represented. And after the illustrations which have been given, such a belief cannot be considered impossible.The same explanation will apply to the emotions, which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or any other natural and affecting descriptions. In the world of conceptions, which the genius of the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the world of real existence, and for a while fully believe in the reality of what is only an incantation.

§. 204 Application of these principles to diversities in the mental character of individuals.

It is a remark sometimes made, that the sanguine are apt to believe and assert what they hope; and the timorous what they fear. This remark implies, and is founded in part on what every one knows, that there are diversities in the mental character of different individuals. Some are constitutionally fearful; every obstacle assumes

an undue importance, and every terror is magnified. Others are confident, fearless, ardent. Both of these classes of persons are known to commit frequent mistakes in judging of those things, which are future, and which have any connection with their respective mental characteristics.

The remarks, which were made in the three last sections, will help us to an explanation in this thing.As to what is called BELIEF, it is presumed no one can be ignorant of it, although it would be futile to attempt to explain it by words. It is, however, important to remark, that belief is regulated and controlled, not by direct volition, but by the nature of the circumstances, which are placed before the mind. But it has been already sufficiently shown, that belief is in a measure under the control of our conceptions, when they are very vivid. It is also undoubtedly true, that vividness of conceptions is always attended with a strong feeling of pleasure, or of desire, or of some other kind. But it is implied in the mental characters of the persons, on whom we are remarking, that their feelings are strong, though opposite; in the one case, confident and ardent ; in the other, dejected and timid.

Hence their conceptions will be strong. To the one, all difficulties and dangers will be magnified; to the other, the glory and the fruition of success. And as these distorted conceptions necessarily control more or less their belief, it will follow, that perfect reliance is not to be placed on their opinions, when they are directly connected either with their hopes or their fears. Nor will such distrust always imply an unfavorable opinion of the rectitude of their intentions. (See, in connection with this. subject, Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, IV.; Stewart's Elements, CH. III.; Brown's Lectures, XLI; Priestley's Examination of Reid, SECT. VIII.; Kaime's Elements of Criticism, CHAP. II., &c.)

CHAPTER TENTH.

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS.

§. 205. Association sometimes misleads our judgments.

It is necessary in this part of the history of the mind, to refer again particularly to the great law of Association. There are some cases, where the power of association so misleads us,that we cannot easily form a correct judgment of the true nature of things. Every object of thought, in order to be fully understood, ought to be so much in our power, that we may examine it separately from all other objects. Whenever, therefore, it happens from any circumstances, that the power of association so combines one object of thought with another, that the object cannot readily be looked at and examined by itself, it so far has the effect to perplex and hinder correct judg

ment.

It will be found, when we look into our minds, that there exist a few associations or combinations of thought of this kind, which are obstinate and almost invincible. To explain the origin, and to correct the erroneous tendencies of all such connections of thought, although the number of such as we have now in view cannot be large, would occupy us too long. The examination of a few somewhat striking instances will not only throw light on the philosophy of the mind in general, but will be of some practical benefit. Other instances of CASUAL ASSOCIA

TION, which have a less degree of strength, and exert a less considerable influence in disturbing the just exercise of the intellect, will require some examination hereafter. The whole subject of Prejudices, which has a conspicuous place in every practical system of Mental Philosophy, is necessarily taken up in a great degree with such cases. §. 206. Casual association in respect to the place of sen

sensation.

One of the casual associations of that extreme kind, which we have now especial reference to, concerns the place, or rather the supposed place of sensation.—All sensation, it will not be forgotten, is in the mind. Whatever is inanimate or material can of course have no feeling. Nevertheless if a wound be inflicted on the hand or foot, we seem to experience the sensation of pain in that particular place. When we merely bring the hand in contact with a warm or cold body, we even then assign a local habitation to the subsequent feeling, and it clearly seems to be, not in the mind, but in the hand.

This reference of the sensation to the outward organ and place, instead of thinking of it as existing in the soul, is the result of an early and strong association. As the wound in the hand for instance is the cause of the painful feeling, the consequence is, that the sensation, and the place whence it arose constantly go together in our thoughts. The result of this connection, which has been repeated and continued from our youth up, is that we find it extremely difficult in later life to separate them, even with the greatest effort. So difficult is it, that a soldier, whose arm or leg has been amputated, still speaks of feeling pain in those limbs, though they are now perhaps buried in the earth or the depths of the sea.

Although we are liable in these cases to be led into a mistake, if we do not guard against it with care, it is perhaps an obvious remark, that the foundation of this liability to errour is laid in our constitution for beneficent ends. It is not ordinarily so important in a practical point of view, that we should attend to the internal feeling, as

to the external part which is affected. An injury in the external senses, the muscles, or the limbs, if it be not attended to, soon affects other parts of the body and even life itself. Hence Providence has put us in the way to form this strong and almost unconquerable mental habit, in order to secure protection, where it seems to be most urgently and frequently needed.

§. 207. Connection of our ideas of extension and time.

If we examine carefully our notions of Time, we shall find here also a CASUAL ASSOCIATION of long continuance and of great strength. It is believed to be the fact, that Time, as it exists in the apprehensions of most persons, regarded as something extended. It is not necessary to delay here,to undertake a definition of time, to show what it is in the abstract, or to give a history of the notion which we form of it. Taking it for granted, that every one knows what is meant when we use that term, we merely assert here, that for some cause or other it is exceedingly difficult to think of it, except in the light of a modification of EXTENSION. The correctness of this remark may not perhaps appear perfectly obvious at first; but the expressions, which we apply to intervals of duration, are an evidence of its truth.

We say before such a time or after such a time, the same as before or after any material object; we speak of a long or a short time with no more hesitation than of a long or short distance, of a long or short bridge, or railway, or any other object of extension. We utter ourselves precisely in the same way we should do, if we were certain of having detected some real analogy between the two, between length and shortness in material substances, and what are called length and shortness in time. But it is not too much to say, that there is no such analogy, no such similitude; nor is it worth while to anticipate, that we shall ever be able to detect such analogy or similitude, until we can in practice apply the measures of feet, ells, roods, &c. to hours, and days, and weeks. How then can it be accounted for, that we apply terms, nearly in the