stances, we act on principles, which are explained and demonstrated in some of the branches of Natural Philosophy. We act on them, while we are altogether ignorant of the science. But no one, it is presumed, will consider this a good excuse for making no philosophical and systematic inquiries into that department of knowledge.

But without contenting ourselves with the answer, which has now been given to the objection, that the study, upon which we are entering, is of no practical profit, some remarks will be made, more directly and positively showing its beneficial results.

§. 4. Mental Philosophy tends lo gratify a reasonable curiosity.

If it were true, that the practical good results of a prosecution of this science are exceedingly inconsiderable, it might, nevertheless, be properly studied, because a natural and reasonable curiosity is in this way gratified. The botanist examines the seed of a plant and its mode of germination, the root and the qualities by which it is fitted to act as an organ of nutrition and support, the structure of the stem, and the form of the leaves. The mineralogist inquires into the properties, the constituent parts, and the relations of the various mineral masses, which enter into the formation of the earth's surface. And whatever opinion may exist as to the amount of practical benefit resulting from inquiries into these departments of science, they are justly considered as exceedingly commendable, and as suitable to the inquisitive turn of an intellectual being. In other words, the constitution of the inind itself, which in its very nature is restless and inquisitive, is regarded as a pledge of the propriety of such inquiries, independently of their subserviency to the indirect increase of human happiness.

But it is certainly not too much to say, that the soul of man presents a nobler subject of examination, than the inanimate masses of matter beneath his feet, or the flowers, that open and bloom around him. In whatever points we may hereafter compare them, we shall have frequent occasion to observe, that spirit possesses the preeminence

over that, which is immaterial. Matter and mind are utterly different in their nature: although in making the remark here, we anticipate the views, by which it is authorized. Our experience teaches us, that the former is compounded and separable into parts; but we know the latter to be simple and inseparable. Being inseparable, it is not subject to the change of dissolution, but continues unaltered in its nature amid the rapid decays of material existence. And what is a further mark of its superior claims on our attention, the mind is subject to a law of increase; it is not stationary, but is always advancing, always strengthening its susceptibilities of knowledge.

§. 5. Further grounds for this view.

The remark last made is worthy of particular consideration. Look at man in the beginning of his existence. The thoughts and feelings of the infant mind are few indeed, but it is able, in the creative expansion of its powers, to multiply them both in their simple and complex forms, to an immeasurable extent.-In various ways does this appear; in every thing, which admits of the application of mind; in the arts, sciences, and social order.

Writers say, that man is born in society, and it is true, that he is so. But what is his situation in the introductory period of his life! If he be an object of love, he is also an object of solicitude and pity; he is utterly under the direction of another, unable at first to guide his own footsteps. But in a few years, such has been the growth of his intellect, that he, who but yesterday could not govern himself, tomorrow enacts the constitution and laws of empires; he, who but yesterday knew no social principle but that of simple dependence on his mother, tomorrow comprehends the philosophy of Montesquieu, and has become the guide and legislator of the world.

Nor is this growth of mind, this wonderful expansion of the intellect limited to any one class of objects to the exclusion of others.-Mark the childhood of man in his earliest inquiries into nature. At first he is filled with astonishment at beholding the clustering beams of light,that

are reflected from a piece of metal. Pleased but not satisfied, as the mind acquires strength, he traces the direction and the rapidity of its progress from planet to planet, till he finds its source in the sun, whose form, and magnitude, and revolution he is able to estimate. At first, too feeble of judgment for the simple operation of combining syllables into words, he shortly reads the Principia of Newton, and interprets from the evanescent aspects and facts of nature the hidden and immutable laws, by which she is governed. Such being the nature of the human mind, so vastly capacious in its progress, though weak indeed in its beginning, it is, in itself considered, a most rational and worthy object of examination.

§. 6. Mental Philosophy teaches us where to limit our inquiries.'

But there is another view of the mind, necessary to be taken, which is somewhat different from the foregoing, although equally true. That the human mind possesses a natural energy and is rapidly progressive is certain ;, but it is not less so, that it has its boundaries. And here we find another of the good results of a knowledge of Mental Philosophy, that we are taught by it to limit our inquiries to those subjects, to the investigation of which our capacities are equal and are adapted.

The Supreme Being is an all pervading mind, a principle of life, that has an existence in all places and in all space, and whose intelligence is like his omnipresence, acquainted with all things. But man, his creature, is made with an inferiour capacity; he knows only in part, and it is but reasonable to suppose, that there are many things, which he will never be able to know. But, although it be justly admitted, that man is subordinate to the Supreme Being and is infinitely inferiour to Him, his Maker has kindly given him aspirations after knowledge, with the power of satisfying, in some measure and under certain limitations, such aspirations. If, therefore, man be a being, formed to know, and there be, moreover, certain restrictions, placed upon the capacity of knowledge, it is highly

important to ascertain the limitations, whatever they may be, which are imposed. Nor is this always an easy thing to be determined. There is oftentimes a difficulty in ascertaining precisely the boundary, which runs between the possibility and the impossibility of knowledge, but whenever it is ascertained, there is an indirect increase of mental ability by means of the withdrawment of the mind from unprofitable pursuits, in which there is an expense of effort without any remuneration.

The necessity of ascertaining what things come within the reach of our powers and what do not, was a thought which laid the foundation of Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.

§. 7. Remarks of Mr. Locke on this point. “Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay (he remarks in the Epistle to the reader) I should · tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties, that arose on every side.

After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts, which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course, and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. . This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented, and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first inquiry.”

Such were the sentiments on this subject of a man, who has probably contributed more largely than any other individual to help us to the correct understanding of the mind; and whose writings, such is their singular originality and acuteness, can hardly be too strongly recommended for perusal.

§. 8. Helps us in the correction of mental errours. A third advantage, resulting from the study of the Philosophy of the Mind, is, that it teaches us in many cases

to correct whatever deficiencies or errours may exist in our mental constitution.

In our present state of imperfection, while we are found to experience various kinds of bodily evils, we are not exempt from those of the mind; and we know not, that it can any more excite surprise, that some people exhibit mental distortions, than it can, that we daily see not only the healthy and the well-formed, but the maimed, the halt, and the blind. If then it be asked, how are these various mental defects to be remedied, the answer is obvious, that we should act in regard to the mind as we do in promoting the restoration of the body; we should commit the business of ascertaining a remedy to those, who are in some good degree acquainted with the subject and with the nature of the disease. A physician, altogether ignorant of the anatomy and physiology of the human system, would be poorly fitted to restore a fractured limb, or subdue the ravages of a fever. But if knowledge be necessary, in order to heal the weakness of the body and restore it to its proper soundness and beauty, it is not less important in the restoration of analogous evils in the mental constitution.

In looking round to see, whose minds are disordered, and who:e are in a sound and healthy condition, we notice, for example, that some persons are troubled with a very weak memory. We have a very candid confession on this point in the writings of Montaigne. He informs us, that he did not trust to his memory.

“I am forced (says he) to call my servants by the names of their employments, or of the countries where they were born, for I can hardly. remember their proper names; and if I should live long, I question whether I should remember my own name.” It appears, however, from his acquaintance with the principles of the ancient philosophers that he had not much reason to complain, except of his own inattention to this valuable mental susceptibility. He remembered principles; he could keep in recollection the outlines of the sciences, but could not so well remember insulated facts, especially if they related to the occurrences of common