§. 129. This classification frequently recognized in writers.

Although on this subject we have looked to the unlettered multitude, and men of business and action first, we are by no means to exclude mere men of letters, and to hold their testimony, in whatever way it may be given, as unimportant. Literary writers of eminence for the most part clearly recognize, either directly or indirectly, the generic arrangement, which has been proposed. It is perhaps unnecessary to make the remark, that Locke, although he did not limit himself to one class of subjects, took for his principle and prominent topic the INTELLECT; the title page of his great work intimates this; it reads, An Essay concerning Human Understanding; but Edwards, who was animated with the hope of seeing men brought nearer to their Creator, selected the higher part of human nature as the great object of his inquiries, and treated of the Will and the Affections. Mr. Stewart professedly extended his inquiries, and at some length, to both parts of our constitution. He alludes in very clear terms to the distinction between them in the introduction of his Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers." In my former work on the Human Mind (he remarks) I confined my attention almost exclusively to Man, considered as an intellectual being; and attempted an analysis of those faculties and powers, which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or his understanding."

But it is not to professed writers on these subjects, that we would refer in this case; the distinction is made by authors, who cannot be supposed to have ever studied the mind as a science. The Roman Historian indicates it, when he informs us, that Mutius Scævola purposely consumed his hand in the fire, and meanwhile exhibited outwardly as little sensibility to suffering, as if his intellect were separated from the power of feeling, (quam quum velut alienato ab sensu torreret animo.) It is indicated also by a later historian of the same great nation, when he says of Cataline, (fuit magna vi animi, sed ingenio malo pravoque,) that he possessed a vigorous intellect,

but in his disposition was evil and depraved. And we might ask, What historian or poet, of any age or people, has given a faithful sketch of man for any length of time, without being compelled to recognize the same distinction, in what they so uniformly inform us of the strivings of the judgment against the passions, and of the passions against the judgment?

§. 130. Languages referred to in proof of this generic

arrangement.

It is further worthy of notice, that there is a multitude of words in the various dialects of men, which have a relation to the arrangement before us. In our own language, when the discourse relates to our sentient constitution, we employ the terms, feelings, emotions, desires, passions, affections, inclinations, and the like; but when it relates to the understanding, we employ another set of words, viz, perceptions, thoughts, notions, ideas, intellectual states, &c. It is true, there are other terms of a more general nature, (as when we speak of the states, acts, or exercises of the mind,) which are applied to both classes indiscriminately, but those, which have been mentioned, are commonly restricted in their application, and are not, as a general statement, interchanged with each other.

Well may we conclude, therefore, inasmuch as language is designed by the framers of it to be a sort of representative of the mind, that the great distinction, which has now been laid down, is well founded. The existence of these distinct classes of terms, which were not framed without an object, and without an adequate reason, cannot be accounted for, except on the ground, that there is a corresponding distinction in the mind's acts. And if there be a distinction in the acts or exercises, there is of course a distinction in the mind itself, a twofold nature, the outlines of which, we again venture to assert, will not fail to discover themselves in every individual, in whom the elements of humanity exist in so high a degree as to render him an object of notice at all.

On any other grounds, what shall we make of the ex

pressions, which have been already referred to in eminent writers? What shall we say, (to take a single instance out of the multitude, that might be brought together,) of the following language of a learned critic,* in relation to a speech of Mr. Fox in Parliament, on the great question of the Slave Trade :-"It is among the happiest productions of a rapid and vigorous INTELLECT, called into action. suddenly by the warmth of an honest and noble HEART. The FEELING seems all INTELLECT; the INTELLECT all FEELING."

S. 131. The nature of this classification a matter of con

sciousness.

The classification, which we are considering, is the more important, because it is founded, not in the, mere circumstances attending the origin of the mental states, but in the nature of the states themselves. We feel, we know them to be different. But when we are required to state with precision what the actual difference is between these two classes of the exercises of the soul, it cannot be denied, that the question is more readily proposed, than answered. A man may believe and know himself, (it is very often the case,) what he may find it difficult to communicate, and explain to others. An inability to set forth in words the nature of any particular acts of the soul is not a proof, that those exercises do not exist, or that the condition of one state of the mind does not differ from that of another.

On the contrary it may be answered in this case, as in others, that every person knows from his CONSCIOUSNESS, that great and ultimate guide which Providence has given men, that there is not only a difference, but a radical and essential difference between the two classes.

No one, for instance, can be supposed to be insensible of this diversity in the mental states, expressed by the terms, truth, belief, certainty, order, equality, and the like, and those, expressed by the terms, pleasure, pain, hope,.

*Edin. Review on Clarkson's History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, July 1808. .

desire, love, &c. We refer, therefore, on this point to each one's internal experience, to his own consciousness.

"Every man, [says Copdillac, Origin of Knowledge, Pt. I. CH. I,] is conscious of his thought; he distinguishes it perfectly from every thing else; he even distinguishes one thought from another; and that is sufficient. If we go any further, we stray from a point, which we apprehend so clearly, that it can never lead us into errour."

§. 152. Of the different names given to it.

It remains to be remarked further, that the explicit and scientific statement of this classification is by no means new; on the contrary, in its essential features, it has repeatedly made a formal appearance under various names. Some of these designations will be briefly referred to.

I, Cognitive and Motive.A long time since, it was proposed, particularly by Mr. Hobbes, to employ these two words, as expressive of the general division under consideration. Undoubtedly the epithet cOGNITIVE, whether we consult its etymology or its meaning as established by use, is sufficiently applicable to that part of our mental nature, which regards the mere origin of knowledge, as perception, judgment, reasoning, &c. The term MOTIVE, as indicative of the other part of our mental constitution, was probably adopted on the ground, that our emotions, desires, and passions are particularly connected with movement or action. This nomenclature seems not, however, to have been generally adopted.

"The terms cognitive and motive, [says Mr. Stewart, Elements, Pt. II,] were long ago proposed for the same purpose by Hobbes; but they never appear to have come into general use, and are indeed liable to obvious objections."

II, The Understanding and Will.--The generic classification, which we have been considering, has made its appearance also under these names. We have already had occasion to refer to Locke and Edwards; those distinguished writers not only recognized the classification in question, and made it the basis of the particular direc

frequently employed this Under the term Underintellectual, the thinking

tion of their great efforts, but phraseology as expressive of it. standing was included the whole and reasoning part of our nature. By the Will seems to have been meant that ability, in whatever way it might exhibit itself, which was supposed to be necessary in bringing the mental constitution into action; it was the mind's impelling and controlling principle; something which moved and governed it. To determine precisely, howev

er,

what feelings and operations belonged to the one and what belonged to the other was by no means a matter well settled, but of no small doubt and contention. The designation of the arrangement by these names has consequently fallen into comparative discredit. The word Understanding, however, is still employed in its original extent, as synonymous with intellect; the word Will, with a much restricted signification.

III, Intellectual and Active Powers.--For the epithet MOTIVE proposed by Hobbes, the term Active has been substituted by some modern writers, particularly Reid and Stewart. This epithet, like that for which it was substituted, was probably introduced on the ground, that the sentient part of our nature is immediately and particularly connected with motion,effort, or action. It is probably not meant to be intimated by those who adopt this designation, that the feelings and powers,included under it, possess in themselves more activity than others, but are active in the sense of being particularly connected with, and leading to action; which is undoubtedly the truth.

§. 133. Classification of the intellectual states of the mind.

For the reasons, which have been given, we find ourselves authorized, in the first place, in considering the states, exercises, or acts of the mind, (for these terms, the most general we can employ, will apply to both classes,) under the two general heads of Intellectual and Sentient. Our intellectual states of mind, together with their corresponding susceptibilities and powers, will first come under consideration. On looking attentively, however, at